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I. INTRODUCTION
During the past forty years, the law of jurisdiction and
judgments in interstate child custody litigation has undergone
two periods of major development and is just now entering a
third period. After almost two centuries of nearly total disuse'
of its power under the full faith and credit clause to "prescribe
... the Effect" of judicial proceedings in sister states, 2 Con-
gress recently superimposed upon an already complex system
of federal and state law a new statute providing special rules
affecting the making, enforcement, and modification of child
custody decisions.3 The impact of this new legislation on cus-
tody proceedings may prove to be even greater than that of the
two earlier upheavals. In addition, the enactment and imple-
mentation of the new statute, which some call the Wallop Act
after its principal congressional sponsor,4 probably has given
1. See Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Consti-
tution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4-6 (1945). But see 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
2. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
3. 28 U.S.C-.A § 1738A (West. Supp. 1980).
4. Senator Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming originally introduced the meas-
ure in Congress, 124 CONG. REC. 783-88 (1978), and until its enactment remained
its most active and knowledgeable congressional proponent. The author of this
Article conceived the legislation, wrote the first several drafts of it, see Notes,
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the utility of the congressional full faith and credit power its
clearest test to date.
In some respects, the subject of child custody constitutes a
difficult test case for federal legislation on conflict of laws. In-
terstate parochialism and conflict have been the American tra-
dition in custody cases.5 Uniform legislation recently adopted
in most states,6 though initially perceived as a firm basis for in-
terstate cooperation in child custody,7 has not produced consis-
tent respect for sister states' proceedings and has generated
important legal issues that some states have virtually ignored
and others have resolved inconsistently.8 The application of
the constitutional requirements of due process and full faith
and credit to custody litigation remains unsettled.9 The Wallop
Act, engrafted upon this web of inconsistent and unclear law,
has been substantially misinterpreted.10 Commentators have
described it as requiring full faith and credit for custody de-
crees, although it actually requires something quite different,"
and they have imputed to it breadth of application 2 and pre-
emptive effects13 beyond its explicit scope.
This Article identifies the legal questions created by the
Wallop Act and by other recent developments in federal and
state law, considers how some of these questions have been an-
swered and how others should be handled, and suggests im-
provements in existing law for interstate child custody cases.
Drafts, and Memoranda (on file with the Minnesota Law Review) and partici-
pated as a Senate staff member and later as a witness and an informal consult-
ant during its consideration in the Congress. See, e.g., Parental Kidnaping
Prevention Act of 1979, S.105: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Justice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Child and
Human Development of the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 133 & Addendum at 267 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Senate
Hearing].
5. See infra text accompanying notes 42-45, 53-54, 473-76.
6. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (1968) [hereinafter cited as
U.C.C.JA]. The U.C.C.J.A. text and notes are reproduced in 9 U.L.A. 111-170
(1979). See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
7. See Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Leg-
islative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L REV.
1207, 1244 (1969); Project, Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 5 PAc. L.J.
365, 371-74 (1974); Comment, Legislative Opportunity for Oregon: The Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 7 Wni.mErrE LJ. 498, 509-10 (1971).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 79-80, 91-138, 512-49, 556-57, 559, 563-
69, 581-83.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 141-52, 477-82.
10. See infra note 420.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 622-29, 729-32.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 295-302.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 647-726.
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The Article briefly reviews the history of interstate compe-
tition over jurisdiction in "initial" custody proceedings-pro-
ceedings occurring when neither the forum state nor any other
state has ever issued a custody order concerning the particular
child.14 It then examines the present law governing initial ju-
risdiction and finds that state law still permits parochialism
and interstate conflict, partially due to disparate interpretations
and applications of provisions of the nearly ubiquitous Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (U.C.C.J.A.).15 The Article next
considers the due process limits on jurisdiction when the inter-
ests of nonresident defendants are affected, and concludes that
a few applications of the U.C.C.J.A. probably are unconstitu-
tional.16 Then it interprets the provisions of the new congres-
sional enactment on initial jurisdiction. The Article predicts
that the effects of these provisions will be relatively minor, ex-
cept that under certain circumstances they will preclude simul-
taneous proceedings in more than one state.1 7
After completing the discussion of initial jurisdiction, this
Article examines the subjects of interstate recognition, enforce-
ment, and modification18 of custody decrees. This part of the
Article summarizes the history of comity and conflict between
states making custody orders,' 9 considers the potential applica-
tion of full faith and credit to custody decrees, and explores the
possible legal and practical justifications for the Supreme
Court's avoidance of the full faith and credit question when it
decided several custody cases twenty to thirty years ago.20 The
Article next examines current state law, including the relevant
U.C.C.J.A. provisions, and suggests that one of these provisions,
largely ignored so far, can be interpreted to effect a major ex-
pansion of interstate issue preclusion.2 ' Other key provisions,
as construed in this Article, require neither interstate claim
14. See infra text accompanying notes 34-54.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 55-140.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 141-294.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 295-449.
18. This Article uses "modification" of a custody order and other cognate
terms to refer to the making of any custody order other than the first order con-
cerning the child, regardless of whether the prior order was temporary, final, or
ex parte, and regardless of whether it was made in the same court or state or a
different one. This usage conforms to that in the Wallop Act and the U.C.C.J.A.
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(b) (5) (West Supp. 1980); U.C.C.J-A. § 2(7) (1968). It is
a departure from prior usage in some states. See, e.g., Durfee v. Durfee, 293
Mass. 472, 479, 200 N.E. 395, 399 (1936).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 450-76.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 477-509.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 510-49.
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preclusion nor interstate issue preclusion, but only enforce-
ment of and refusal to modify dispositions made in foreign 22
proceedings.23 The Article finds that some states interpret
even this requirement so that uniformity is an exaggeration
and comity is undependable. 24 Returning to consideration of
federal full faith and credit, the Article suggests that, due to re-
cent developments in custody law and practice, the Supreme
Court's application of full faith and credit to custody litigation
is now more appropriate and important than it would have
been before these developments, at least as a requirement of
interstate preclusion of relitigation of factual issues. 25 The Ar-
ticle's treatment of recognition, enforcement, and modification
of decrees concludes by considering questions concerning the
Wallop Act and the relationships among it, the U.C.C.J.A., and
the due process and full faith and credit requirements. Inter-
pretation of the Wallop Act yields two basic conclusions: it cre-
ates only narrow but firm duties to enforce and not to modify
certain foreign custody decrees, 26 and it preempts very little
state law.27 The Article finds that the requirements of the Wal-
lop Act, the U.C.C.J.A., and the due process and full faith and
credit clauses are cumulative and conflict only in isolated situa-
tions.28 It also observes that various jurisdictional criteria gov-
ern application of the respective provisions of the Wallop Act,
the U.C.C.J.A., and the full faith and credit clause.29 Conse-
quently, it argues that state or federal law can preclude relitiga-
tion in one state of jurisdictional issues decided by another
state, even though application of the federal and state child
custody statutes depends upon the outcome of these jurisdic-
tional issues.30
The final part of the Article is a favorable assessment of the
appropriateness of the respective roles now played by federal
constitutional and statutory law and state law in this complex
system of legal rules and principles.3 ' The Article approves of
22. References in this Article to "foreign" custody proceedings and decrees
refer invariably to those of the sister states of the United States or of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands. Conflict of laws in inter-
national custody litigation is beyond the scope of this Article.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 512-14, 550-53, 573-75, 584-600.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 554-72, 576-83.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 601-18.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 619-46.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 647-726.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 727-32.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 733-52.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 753-805.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 806-78.
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the Wallop Act's novel exercise of the full faith and credit
power, primarily because, although it is strict where it applies,
the Act is so narrow and substantively neutral that policy mak-
ing on child custody remains almost exclusively a function of
the states. The Article suggests that this narrow federal Act
may illustrate the limits more than the expanse of the utility of
the congressional full faith and credit power.32 Finally, the Ar-
ticle briefly reiterates the changes and interpretations of state
and federal law that would best permit states to serve policies
underlying child custody law, while preserving appropriate lim-
its on the role of federal law.33
II. INITIAL JURISDICTION
Modern criteria for jurisdiction to make the initial award of
a child's custody vary somewhat from state to state. The rea-
sons for such variances are in part historical.
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Judicial decisions awarding or confirming the custody of
children in the United States were rare until the mid-19th cen-
tury, because the legislatures rather than the courts granted
the few divorces that occurred before that time.34 When the
courts began to issue judicial decrees of custody, they generally
found that they had initial jurisdiction to render such decrees
only if the child were domiciled in the forum state.35 For many
years some authorities treated this ground as the only proper
basis for initial jurisdiction, 36 but gradually a number of courts
began to use other tests. The courts of some states, for exam-
ple, claimed jurisdiction over the custody of any children physi-
cally present within those states. 3 7 Other courts held that
personal jurisdiction over both parents was a sufficient basis
for custody jurisdiction.38
32. See infra text accompanying notes 859-70.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 879-88.
34. Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees: Law and Rea-
son v. The Restatement, 51 MicH. L. REv. 345 (1953); Thomas, Child Abuse and
Neglect (pt. 1), 50 N.C. L. REV. 293, 306-25 (1972).
35. Ehrenzweig, supra note 34, at 346-47.
36. Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10 LAw
& CoNTEmp. PROBs. 819, 820-24 (1944); see, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF
LAws § 117 (1934).
37. Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 McIC. L REV. 795, 797
(1964); Stansbury, supra note 36, at 824.
38. See Comment, Jurisdictional Bases of Custody Decrees, 53 HAnv. L.
REv. 1024, 1026 (1940).
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Until 1953, federal law placed virtually no limits on the free-
dom of a state to set its own jurisdictional standards in custody
proceedings. Federal law did not regulate either the jurisdic-
tion over a child or the jurisdiction over the subject of the
child's custody.39 State courts, therefore, could freely adopt
one or more criteria of jurisdiction, reject others, and imple-
ment those choices not only in determining their own jurisdic-
tion, but also in assessing whether to recognize the decrees of
courts in other states. In 1953, the Supreme Court did an-
nounce that the Constitution required a court to have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant in a custody proceeding.40 Yet
the Court failed to impose jurisdictional standards on the
states beyond this limitation, and refrained from deciding
whether the full faith and credit clause applies to child custody
proceedings.41
In the absence of federal limits, many states were rela-
tively aggressive in claiming broad initial jurisdiction for them-
selves.42 Courts occasionally declined to exercise jurisdiction if
the circumstances of interstate cases seemed to justify such
self-denial.43 It was relatively common, however, for one court
to apply its own state's jurisdictional standards and to decide
the custody of a child, even though a court in another state had
potential jurisdiction under its own law44 or was exercising
such jurisdiction in a pending suit for custody of the same
child.45
These jurisdictional rules and practices drew criticism.
Commentators argued that basing jurisdiction on the domicile
of the child in the forum state was a highly technical concept
and inadequate to measure either a state's interest in the
child46 or the ability of its court to investigate and to determine
39. See Stumberg, The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U. CHL
L. REV. 42, 58-59 (1940).
40. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 534 (1953); see infra text accompanying
notes 141-51.
41. See Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S. 493, 495-96 (1981); Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187,
192 (1962); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 608 (1958); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S.
528, 533 (1953); New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 615-16 (1947);
Note, Ford v. Ford: Full Faith and Credit to Child Custody Decrees?, 73 YALE
LJ. 134, 135 (1963). But cf. Currie, Full Faith and Credi Chiefly to Judgments:
A Role for Congress, 1964 Sup'. CT. REV. 89, 115 (cases indicate that if faced with
the question, the Court would hold that custody decrees are not entitled to full
faith and credit).
42. See Stansbury, supra note 36, at 827.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Minick v. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 490, 149 So. 483, 492 (1933).
45. See, e.g., Omer v. Omer, 108 Kan. 95, 97, 193 P. 1064, 1065 (1920).
46. See, e.g., Stansbury, supra note 36, at 822-23.
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that child's welfare.47 Professor Stansbury urged the acknowl-
edgment of concurrent jurisdiction between courts of two
states if both states had substantial interests in the welfare of a
child or in the preservation of the child's family unit, and sug-
gested that the courts avoid potential conflicts by practicing
self-restraint and comity.48
The California Supreme Court adopted the latter approach
to initial jurisdiction in its influential 1948 decision, Sampsell v.
Superior Court.49 In Sampsell, the court accepted several al-
ternative bases of initial jurisdiction-domicile of the child, the
child's physical presence, and personal jurisdiction over the
parties-and instructed the lower California courts to defer to
the courts of other states when they had more substantial in-
terests in the child.50 This approach to initial jurisdiction was
later endorsed in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws51 and gained wide acceptance in state courts.52
The courts that used this standard did not, however, ade-
quately embrace its principle 6f deference. They generally
seemed more willing to justify their own initial jurisdiction by
using any of the three acceptable jurisdictional bases than to
defer to the jurisdiction of other states. 53 The approach of
Sampsell and the Restatement (Second), therefore, merely en-
couraged parental self-help and forum shopping and often re-
sulted in litigation in states lacking both appropriate
connections with the child and adequate access to the
evidence. 54
B. THE ERA OF TH U.C.C.J.A.
Due to the failure of the Sampsell approach, a new move-
ment for reform of child custody conflicts law began. The gene-
sis of the reform movement was Professor Ratner's proposal to
adopt principles and rules allocating custody jurisdiction in
most cases to the state where the child has his or her estab-
lished home.55 Building upon this proposal, the National Con-
47. See, e.g., Stumberg, supra note 39, at 62.
48. Stansbury, supra note 36, at 828-32.
49. 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948).
50. Id. at 777-79, 197 P.2d at 749-50.
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1971).
52. Id., reporter's note.
53. See Bodenheimer, supra note 7, at 1214-15.
54. Ehrenzweig, The Interstate Child and Uniform Legislation: A Plea for
Extralitigious Proceedings, 64 MiCH. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1965); Ratner, supra note 37,
at 810-13.
55. Ratner, Legislative Resolution of the Interstate Child Custody Problem:
1982]
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ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, with
cooperation from the American Bar Association, prepared and
approved the U.C.C.J.A.6 The Act prescribed criteria to govern
initial jurisdiction,57 as well as criteria to govern the enforce-
ment and modification of decrees.5 8 Initially, the states were
slow to accept the Act, but passage of the U.C.C.J.A. gained mo-
mentum in the late 1970's.5 9 By 1982, forty-seven states had
either enacted the U.C.C.J.A. in its entirety or had adopted sub-
stantial portions of the Act.60
A Reply to Professor Currie and a Proposed Uniform Act, 38 S. CAL. . REV. 183
(1965); Ratner, supra note 37, at 810-13.
56. 9 U.L.A. 114 (1979).
57. See infra text accompanying notes 68-136.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 510-600.
59. The Act took effect in nineteen states between its promulgation in 1968
and the end of 1977, when the author conceived and drafted the Wallop Act; in
another twenty-four states by the end of 1980, when Congress enacted the Wal-
lop Act; and in four more states during 1981. For a list of enacting states and
the effective dates of the statutes, see 9 U.LA. 11 (Supp. 1982); S. KATZ, CHILD
SNATCHING 125-29 (1981).
60. See ALA. CODE §§ 30-3-20 to -44 (Supp..1981); ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.30.010
to .910 (1977); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-401 to -424 (Supp. 1981); ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 34-2701 to -2726 (Supp. 1981); CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 5150-5174 (West Supp.
1981); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-13-101 to -126 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-
90 to -114 (West Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1901-1925 (1981); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 61.1302-.1348 (West Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 74-501 to -525
(1981); HAWAI REV. STAT. §§ 583-1 to -26 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 5-1001 to -1025
(1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 2101-2126 (Smith-Hurd 1980); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 31-1-11.6-1 to -24 (Burns 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 598A.1 -.25 (West 1981);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1301 to -1326 (Supp. 1980); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.400 -
.630 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1700 to :1724 (West
Supp. 1981); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 801-825 (1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16,
§§ 184-207 (1981); McH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 600.651-.673 (1981); MINN. STAT.
§§ 518A.01-.25 (1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 452.440-.550 (Vernon Supp. 1981); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 40-7-101 to -125 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-1201 to -1225 (Supp.
1980); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 125A.010-.250 (1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 458A:1 to
:25 (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A-34-28 to -52 (West Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40-10-1 to -24 (Supp. 1981); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 75-a to -z (McKinney
Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50A-1 to -25 (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-
14-01 to -26 (1981); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.21-.37 (Page 1980); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1601-1627 (West Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.700-.930 (1979);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 5341-5366 (Purdon 1981); R.L GEN. LAws §§ 15-14-1 to -26
(1981); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-782 to -830 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAws ANN. §§ 26-5-5 to -52 (Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1301 to -1325
(Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45c-1 to -26 (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, §§ 1031 to 1051 (Supp. 1981); VA. CODE §§ 20-125 to -146 (Supp. 1981); W. VA.
CODE §§ 48-10-1 to -26 (Supp. 1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 822.01-.25 (West 1977);
Wyo. STAT. §§ 20-5-101 to -125 (1977).
In addition to these forty-seven states, Texas has enacted some of the
U.C.C.J.A. provisions. See TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 14.10 (Vernon Supp. 1981).
Thus, the only jurisdictions that have not yet enacted any substantial part of
the U.C.C.J. are Massachusetts, Mississippi, the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands. This Article will refer to the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, as "states," since the provisions of the Wal-
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The Commissioners felt that previously existing rules gov-
erning initial jurisdiction engendered both vital legal and
human problems. They believed that the Sampsell rules had
resulted not only in the selection of inappropriate forums for
custody litigation and in competition and conflict between
courts of various states, but also in psychological harm to the
children who were the objects of the litigation.6' They there-
fore designed jurisdictional rules to serve these various legal
and human interests, explicitly identifying these interests in
section 1 of the U.C.C.JA.62 This section explains that the new
rules were written to "assure that litigation concerning the cus-
tody of a child take place ordinarily in the state"63 most closely
connected to the child and family and most able to obtain sig-
nificant evidence concerning that child's "care, protection,
training and personal relationships."6 4 The Act is designed to
insure a decision by "that state which can best decide the case
in the interest of the child."65 It notes that the U.C.C.J.A. was
designed to "avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict [be-
tween] states."66 It also suggests that the statute was formu-
lated to "deter abductions and other unilateral removals of
children undertaken to obtain custody awards." 67 These three
goals, the selection of an appropriate forum, the avoidance of
interstate competition and conflict, and the deterrence of uni-
lateral removals of children, are, therefore, the motivating force
of the U.C.C.J.A.
1. Flexible Accommodation of Conflicting Goals
An inevitable tension exists among these goals. Criteria
that would assign initial jurisdiction clearly and inflexibly to
one state on the basis of facts outside the control of either par-
lop Act discussed in this Article are applicable to these jurisdictions. 28
U.S.C. § 1738A(b) (8) (West Supp. 1980). See also supra note 22.
61. See U.C.C.JA Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9 U.L. 111-14 (1979).
62. U.C.C.J-.A § 1 (1968). This section contains the U.C.C.J.'s "general
purposes."
63. Id. § 1(a)(3).
64. Id.
65. Id.§l(a)(2).
66. Id. § l(a)(1).
67. Id. § 1(a) (5). In including deterrence of abductions among the goals of
the U.C.C.T.A, the Commissioners eschewed exclusive reliance on the deter-
rent effects of tort law, see RESTATEMENT (SEcoNvD) OF TORTS § 700 (1976), crim-
inal law, see, e.g., COLO. Rnv. STAT. § 18-3-304 (1978), and decisions against
abductors on the merits in custody cases, cf. Moniz v. Moniz, 142 Cal. App. 527,
530, 298 P.2d 710, 711-12 (1956) (mother denied custody for disobeying court or-
der to return children to jurisdiction).
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ent would most forcefully deter parental abductions and forum
shopping, and would most surely prevent conflicts between
states. Such criteria would, however, certainly prevent some
cases from being decided by the courts best situated under all
the circumstances to gather the relevant evidence and to deter-
mine custody. The Commissioners dealt with this tension by
including various standards governing the existence and exer-
cise of jurisdiction that give a court considerable latitude in de-
ciding to emphasize one goal over another.
To deter parental abductions and forum shopping and to
minimize conflicts between states, two sections of the
U.C.C.J.A. provide that the relocation of a child from one state
to another shortly before the commencement of custody litiga-
tion ordinarily does not deprive the original state of initial ju-
risdiction or establish initial jurisdiction in the new state. One
section essentially provides that states where children have
lived for six months have jurisdiction even after their departure
from those "home states" if the custody proceedings are com-
menced in those states before they have been absent six
months.68 The parallel provision prevents the states to which
they are taken from acquiring jurisdiction as their new "home
states" until they have lived there for six months.6 9
The Commissioners recognized, however, that an ex-
tremely rigid rule establishing initial jurisdiction exclusively in
the "home state" would, in some cases, frustrate their other
stated goal favoring the litigation of custody in the most appro-
priate forum. They therefore created two additional bases for
concurrent initial jurisdiction in section 3 of the Act, and de-
fined them to give courts flexibility in their application. Under
one of these bases, the child must be physically present in the
state. He or she must be abandoned or it must be "necessary
in an emergency to protect the child because he has been sub-
jected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is other-
wise neglected [or dependent]."7o The other basis requires
only that it be
in the best interest of the child that a court of this State assume juris-
diction because (i) the child and his parents, or the child and at least
one contestant, have a significant connection with this State, and
(ii) there is available in this State substantial evidence concerning the
68. U.C.C.JA. §§ 2(5), 3(a)(1) (1968).
69. Id.
70. Id. § 3(a) (3). State enactments have treated the bracketed language
and other language in this paragraph differently. See 9 U.L.A. 125 (1979); id. at
15 (Supp. 1981); R. CROUCH, INTERSTATE CUSTODY LIrGATION 75-82 (1981); infra
text accompanying notes 367-71.
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child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal
relationships.7 1
The Commissioners acknowledged that this latter jurisdictional
test, which this Article will call the "significant connection" ba-
sis of jurisdiction, was a flexible one.7 2
In section 8 of the Act, the Commissioners gave the state
further opportunity to deter abductions and to minimize inter-
state competition. This section authorizes a state that has ju-
risdiction under the U.C.C.J.A. to decline to exercise
jurisdiction "[i]f the petitioner for an initial decree has wrong-
fully taken the child from another state or has engaged in simi-
lar reprehensible conduct,"7 3 but only if declination is 'just and
proper under the circumstances." 74 Section 8 gives the courts
great flexibility in deciding whether to deter misconduct and to
promote interstate harmony through its use of the undefined
terms "wrongfully" and "similar reprehensible conduct," its
qualification that declining to exercise jurisdiction based on
such conduct must be 'Just and proper under the circum-
stances," and its provision that the court's power not to exer-
cise its jurisdiction is discretionary.
Finally, in section 7, the Commissioners gave courts more
freedom in choosing whether to select the most appropriate fo-
rum and to minimize interstate competition.75 This section ex-
pressly gives a court that has jurisdiction the discretion to
decline to exercise its jurisdiction if it is an inconvenient forum
and another state's court is a more appropriate forum.7 6 The
discretionary nature of this provision highlights its flexibility.
Moreover, in deciding whether to exercise its discretion under
this provision, a court may consider whether "the exercise of
jurisdiction by a court of this state would contravene any of the
purposes stated [in the first section of the Act],"77 one of which
is the deterrence of abductions and similar conduct.7 8 This fo-
rum non conveniens provision thus may also serve any of the
three goals of the U.C.C.J.A.
The flexibility built into these jurisdictional standards does
not, however, only facilitate the courts' selection among the
U.C.C.J.A.'s competing policies. It also provides opportunities
71. U.C.CJ.A. § 3(a) (2) (1968).
72. U.CC.J4.A § 3 Commissioners' Note, 9 UJ.LA 124 (1979).
73. U.C.CJ.A. § 8(a) (1968).
74. Id.
75. See U.C.CJ. § 7 Commissioners' Note, 9 UJ-LA. 139 (1979).
76. U.C.CJA § 7 (1968).
77. Id. § 7(c) (5).
78. Id. § 1(a)(5).
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for courts to establish precedents that vary from state to state
and that thereby undermine the apparent uniformity of juris-
dictional rules among U.C.C.J.A. states. It more importantly
provides a state substantial freedom to indulge a parochial
preference for its own initial jurisdiction.
Given the long history of disagreement between the states
over the criteria for determining initial jurisdiction and of the
chauvinistic application of these criteria,7 9 it is not surprising
that state courts have used the latitude provided under the
U.C.C.J.A. to continue to prefer their own jurisdiction over the
jurisdiction of courts in sister states. For example, when some
courts in U.C.C.JA. states considered the question of jurisdic-
tion under the Act when no prior foreign proceedings were
pending and there were no foreign orders, they appeared unim-
pressed with claims that they lacked jurisdiction or should de-
fer to the potential jurisdiction of another state.80 They instead
resolved ambiguities in the statutory language and conflicts be-
tween the goals of the U.C.C.J. in favor of their own jurisdic-
tion.81 There are, however, relatively few reported cases of this
kind. A state court's jurisdiction under the U.C.C.J.A. to make
initial custody decrees is litigated more often in cases of con-
current attempts by two states to assume and to exercise such
jurisdiction.
2. Control of Concurrent Initial Proceedings Under the
Uniform Act
To prevent or to resolve conflicts between two courts, both
of which have initiated custody proceedings, the U.C.C.J&A. sets
forth, in addition to the criteria for establishing and declining
initial jurisdiction, a provision in section 6(a) on concurrent
proceedings. It forbids the courts of the enacting state to exer-
cise jurisdiction "if at the time of filing the petition a proceed-
ing concerning the custody of the child was pending in a court
of another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in con-
formity with this Act, unless the proceeding is stayed by the
court of the other state."82
79. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38, 42-53.
80. See, e.g., Dykes v. Dykes, 395 So. 2d 188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Potter
v. Potter, 104 Misc. 2d 930, 430 N.Y.S.2d 201 (Fan. Ct. 1980). But see Loper v. Su-
perior Court, 126 Ariz. 14, 612 P.2d 65 (Ct. App. 1980) (holding lower court
abused discretion by denying without sufficient evidence and communication
with foreign court a motion that it find itself an inconvenient forum).
81. See Dykes v. Dykes, 395 So. 2d 188, 190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Potter
v. Potter, 104 Misc. 2d 930, 932-34, 430 N.Y.S.2d 201, 203-05 (Fam. Ct. 1980).
82. U.C.C.J.A. § 6(a) (1968).
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a. The Technique of Control
Section 6(a) is somewhat less subject to parochial abuse
than the U.C.C.J.A.'s rules of jurisdiction,83 clean hands,84 and
forum non conveniens 85 governing the existence and exercise
of initial jurisdiction in the absence of a concurrent proceeding.
This is clearly appropriate, because deference to another state
is more vital to the goals of sound forum selection and inter-
state harmony when two states are asserting interests in a case
than when another state is only potentially involved.
Section 6(a) partially achieves its greater inflexibility by
prohibiting the court's exercise of initial jurisdiction, unlike the
clean hands and forum non conveniens sections which give the
court discretion to decline jurisdiction. This difference alone
does not, however, explain the greater stringency of section
6(a). After all, the section 3 standards for the existence of ju-
risdiction are mandatory, yet courts have found in them lati-
tude for chauvinism.86 Section 6(a) is different, because the
application of its prohibition partially depends upon the deci-
sion of a state other than the forum state. By properly enter-
taining a proceeding and failing to stay it, the court of the other
state limits the freedom of the court of the forum state to pre-
fer itself as the appropriate arena. This is unlike the jurisdic-
tional criteria in sections 3, 7, and 8, in which the forum state
resolves every issue, including whether "it is in the best inter-
est of the child" that the forum have jurisdiction,87 whether it
or another state's court "is a more appropriate forum,"88 and
whether it "is just and proper under the circumstances" that
the forum decline to exercise its jurisdiction.89
By allowing another state to partially restrain the forum,
the Commissioners used a technique that in theory could pro-
vide flexibility for the accommodation of the various purposes
of the U.C.C.J.A. without allowing both states to use that flex-
ibility to justify their own exercise of jurisdiction. A mechani-
cal rule giving only one court, here the court that is first-in-
time, the power to apply the U.C.C.J.A.'s flexible jurisdictional.
standards would permit that court to accommodate the conflict-
ing goals of the legislation. Yet, because that court's applica-
83. Id. § 3. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
84. U.C.C.J.A § 8 (1968). See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
85. U.C.C.J-.A § 7 (1968). See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
87. U.C.C.J.A. § 3(a) (2) (1968).
88. Id. § 7(a).
89. Id. § 8(a).
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tion of those standards would bind the other court, the rule
would also provide certainty and avoid conflict between the
states.
This theoretical possibility is not, however, fully realized in
section 6(a). Applicability of the section does not depend en-
tirely or even primarily on decisions made by the court in
which proceedings were first filed. Under this section, the court
of the forum state can exercise its jurisdiction despite the prior
proceeding if it concludes that the court of the other state is
not "exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with
this Act."90 The forum court applies this test and uses the law
of its state in doing so. Thus, even section 6(a) gives a state the
authority to prefer itself as a forum over a state in which a
prior proceeding is pending.
b. The Scope of Control
The degree of latitude provided in section 6(a) depends in
part upon an issue of interpretation of its substantial conform-
ity phrase, an issue that commentators have not discussed and
courts have not critically examined.91 The problem lies in de-
termining the provisions of the U.C.C.J.A. with which a foreign
court must substantially conform to receive the respect man-
dated by section 6(a). By identifying these provisions, one cir-
cumscribes the freedom of the forum court to claim and to
exercise jurisdiction, because the forum court may then prop-
erly consider only these provisions in deciding whether the for-
eign court acted in substantial conformity with the Act. An
analysis of two U.C.C.JA. provisions that have similar language
can aid in resolving this question. Section 13 instructs a forum
court to recognize and to enforce an initial or modification
decree
of a court of another state which had assumed jurisdiction under statu-
tory provisions substantially in accordance with this Act or which was
made under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards
of the Act, so long as this decree has not been modified in accordance
with jurisdictional standards substantially similar to those of this
Act.92
Section 14(a) forbids the modification of a foreign decree un-
less, among other requirements, "the court which rendered the
decree does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional pre-
90. Id. § 6(a).
91. See cases cited infra notes 135-36.
92. U.C.CJ.A. § 13 (1968).
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requisites substantially in accordance with this Act.' 93
A court must at least satisfy the section 3 criteria for the
existence of jurisdiction to entitle its proceedings to mandatory
respect under sections 6(a), 13, and 14(a). The Commissioners
certainly intended this requirement,9 4 and the courts have rec-
ognized it.95 But there is a question whether the foreign court
must also conform to one or more of the mandatory or discre-
tionary restrictions on the exercise of jurisdiction to earn such
respect for its proceedings.96 The mandatory provisions, found
in sections 4, 5, 6(a), 8(b), and 14(a), deal with notice and op-
portunity to be heard,97 concurrent litigation in two states,9 8
the "unclean hands" of petitioners for modifications, 99 and peti-
tions for modifications of foreign decrees still modifiable by the
93. Id. § 14(a).
94. See U.C.C.J.A. §§ 6,13, 14 Commissioners' Notes, 9 U.L.A. 135, 151, 154-55
(1979). A forum's respect for foreign proceedings under sections 6(a) and 13
depends upon the foreign court's satisfying section 3 at the time of the foreign
proceedings. See supra text accompanying note 90; infra text accompanying
notes 550, 554-67. Respect under section 14(a), in contrast, depends upon the
foreign court's ability to satisfy section 3 at the time of the proceeding in the
forum. See infra text accompanying notes 574-78.
95. See, e.g., In re McDonald, 74 Mich. App. 119, 253 N.W.2d 678 (1977); Wil-
liams v. Zacher, 35 Or. App. 129, 581 P.2d 91 (1978).
96. The U.C.C.J-.A text consistently and clearly treats the criteria in sec-
tion 3 as governing the existence of jurisdiction, and the criteria in sections 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, and 14 as governing the exercise of jurisdiction. See U.C.C.JA. §§ 3 (pre-
scribing circumstances under which a court "has" jurisdiction and providing
that physical presence of a child is not alone sufficient to "confer" jurisdiction
and is not a "prerequisite for" jurisdiction); 4 (making cross-reference to sec-
tion 5); 5(a) (referring to notice required for the "exercise" of jurisdiction);
6(a) (prescribing circumstances under which a court must not "exercise" juris-
diction); 7(a) (authorizing a court under prescribed circumstances to decline to
"exercise" jurisdiction); 8 (prescribing circumstances under which a court must
or may decline to "exercise" its jurisdiction); 14(a)(1) (prescribing circum-
stances under which even a court that "has" jurisdiction must not 'modify" a
foreign decree).
Some language in the Commissioners' Notes, however, seems to treat sec-
tions 8 and 14 as limiting the existence, not the exercise, of jurisdiction. See,
e.g., U.C.C.J.A. §§ 3, 6 Commissioners' Notes, 9 U.L.A. 125, 135 (1979). Neverthe-
less, in their Note to section 3, the Commissioners specifically mentioned the
distinction between the section 3 rules that regulate the existence of jurisdic-
tion and the sections 6 and 7 rules that determine whether it will be "exer-
cised." U.C.CJA. § 3 Commissioners' Note, 9 UJ.-A. 124 (1979). Their failure to
make this distinction as clear elsewhere in the Notes probably resulted either
from sporadic inattention to the distinction or from an attempt to make the
Notes concise and readable. Courts and commentators have often drawn this
distinction between existence and exercise of jurisdiction under the U.C.C.J.A.
See, e.g., R. CRouCH, supra note 70, at xii, 16-30.
97. U.C.C.J.A. §§ 4, 5 (1968).
98. Id. § 6(a).
99. Id. § 8(b).
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rendering states.oo The discretionary provisions, found in sec-
tions 6(c), 7, 8(a), and the second sentence of section 8(b), may
be applicable if another state is exercising jurisdiction,101 if an-
other state would be a more convenient forum,10 2 or if the peti-
tioner has "unclean hands."'0 3
A close look at the variation in language among sections
6(a), 13, and 14(a) reveals which of these mandatory and dis-
cretionary provisions the forum court may consider in deciding
whether it is forbidden to exercise jurisdiction by section 14(a).
Only section 14(a) refers solely to the existence of jurisdiction.
In contrast, section 6(a) expressly refers to the exercise of ju-
risdiction, and section 13 uses language that may encompass
exercise as well as existence of jurisdiction.104 Read literally,
therefore, section 14(a) prohibits the forum state, which shall
be called state B, from modifying a decree of another state,
which shall be called state A, if A has jurisdiction under "pre-
requisites substantially in accordance with"105 those of section
3. Whether other sections require or indicate that A should de-
cline to exercise its jurisdiction would, in other words, be
irrelevant.
This interpretation of section 14(a) is reasonable. Unlike
section 6(a), which makes state A's present exercise of its ju-
risdiction exclusive, 06 and unlike section 13, which accords re-
spect to state A's past exercise of jurisdiction,107 section 14(a)
protects state A's future exercise of modification jurisdiction.108
Although one can argue that B should be able to evaluate A's
present or past compliance with the rules for exercising juris-
diction, it is sensible that B should not be able to evaluate A's
100. Id. § 14(a).
101. Id. § 6(c).
102. Id. § 7.
103. Id. § 8(a), (b).
104. One variation, which is not pertinent to this discussion, is the distinc-
tion between one of the clauses of section 13, which omits the word "substan-
tially," and the other clauses under discussion, all of which employ that word.
See supra text accompanying notes 90-93. The variations among "prerequi-
sites," U.C.C.J.A. § 14 (1968), "statutory provisions," id. § 13, and "standards,"
id., seem insignificant, as do those among "conformity with," id. § 6(a), "ac-
cordance with," id. §§ 13, 14(a), and being "similar to" the Act or parts of it, id.
§ 13. For other variations within the U.C.C.J.A. that appear to be simply the re-
suits of unsystematic drafting, see supra note 96; infra notes 112, 376, 389.
105. U.C.C.J.A. § 14(a) (1968).
106. See Bodenheimer, supra note 7, at 1230.
107. See id. at 1220, 1235-36.
108. See U.C.C.JJA. § 14 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 154 (1979) ("all peti-
tions for modification are to be addressed to the prior state if that state has suf-
ficient contact with the case to satisfy section 3").
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likely future compliance with such rules, since it is improbable
that A would violate them. First, the argument that A would
violate section 6(a)'s prohibition against concurrent proceed-
ings is circular; no state could properly exercise jurisdiction
and thereby preempt A under section 6(a) unless A lacked ju-
risdiction for some reason other than section 6.109 Second,
state A could not violate the mandatory "unclean hands" rule
of section 8(b), because 8(b) by its terms applies only to the
modification of a decree "of another state." Thus, A could not
violate section 8(b) by modifying its own decree.
Of course, state A could violate some jurisdictional rules in
exercising its modification jurisdiction. It might, for example,
deny notice, or opportunity to be heard, or violate sections 6(c),
7, or 8(a) in abusing its discretion to exercise jurisdiction.110
Neither the U.C.C.J.A. text nor the Notes, however, suggest that
section 14(a) permits state B to conclude that state A "does not
now have jurisdiction" under the Act merely if B predicts that
A Will err in one of those ways. Indeed, the Note to section 14
says that "all petitions for modification are to be addressed to
the prior state if that state has sufficient contact with the case
to satisfy section 3."111 State B, therefore, apparently can exer-
cise jurisdiction under 14(a) only if it determines that modifica-
tion by state A would violate section 3, the section governing
the existence of jurisdiction.
Because sections 6(a) and 13 do not, like section 14(a), in
terms refer only to the existence of jurisdiction,112 it is less
clear under these sections which jurisdictional rules state A
109. Unless A lacked jurisdiction under section 3, the other state's exercise
of jurisdiction would violate section 14(a), see supra text accompanying notes
104-10, would therefore not be "substantially in conformity with this Act,"
U.C.C.J.A. § 6(a) (1968); see infra text accompanying notes 119-34, and would
consequently fail to make the bar of section 6(a) applicable to A.
110. See U.C.C.J.A. §§ 4, 5, 6(c), 7, 8(a) (1968). In some cases, a higher court
of state A may decide that the abuse is great enough to warrant reversal of the
lower court. See, e.g., Winkelman v. Moses, 279 N.W.2d 897 (S.D. 1979).
111. U.C.C.J.A § 14 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L. 154 (1979).
112. See supra text accompanying note 104. In their Notes discussing these
phrases, the Commissioners sometimes treated statutory language that by its
terms or by implication governs the exercise of jurisdiction as though the lan-
guage governs the existence of jurisdiction. Compare U.C.C.J.A. § 6(a) (1968)
("exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this Act") with id.
Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L. 135 (1979) ("have jurisdiction under the criteria
of this Act"); compare id. § 13 ("made under factual circumstances meeting the
jurisdictional'standards of the Act") with id. Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L-.A 151
(1979) ("would have had jurisdiction under the facts of the case if this Act had
been the law in the state"). It is clear, however, that they did not mean to indi-
cate that section 3 provides the only criteria for application of the duties dis-
cussed in those Notes. See infra text accompanying notes 114-15.
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must comply with to gain respect for its assertion of jurisdic-
tion. Certainly state B, in applying section 6(a) or section 13,
can at least determine if state A satisfied the section 3 rules
governing the existence of jurisdiction." 3 It is also clear that,
in applying section 13, State B can consider whether A com-
plied with sections 4 and 5; the Commissioners definitely
viewed the sections 4 and 5 requirements of notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard as controls on the exercise of jurisdiction" 4
and clearly intended that their violation deprive state A's pro-
ceedings of the protection of section 13.115 Courts applying the
U.C.C.J.A. have agreed." 6 In applying section 6(a), state B, by
analogy, probably should be able to examine state A's compli-
ance with sections 4 and 5.117 But beyond these three sec-
tions-3, 4, and 5-it is uncertain which U.C.C.J.A. standards
apply under sections 6(a) and 13. Because the statutory lan-
guage provides no answer to this question,"i8 the Commission-
ers' Notes must be examined. In the Note to section 6(a) the
Commissioners wrote that "[w]hen the courts of more than
one state have jurisdiction under sections 3 or 14, priority in
time determines which court will proceed with the action, but
the application of the inconvenient forum principle of section 7
may result in the handling of the case by the other court."" 9
113. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
114. See U.C.C.J.A. §§ 4, 5(a) (1968). See generally Developments in the
Law--State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 987-88 (1960).
115. See U.C.C.J.A. § 12 (1968); id. §§ 4, 12 Commissioners' Notes, 9 U.L.A.
130, 150-51 (1979); cf. id. § 23 (reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard
given to all affected persons required to extend U.C.C.J. to international
area); id. Commissioners' Note, 9 U.LA 167-68 (1979) (treating reasonable no-
tice and opportunity to be heard as prerequisites for international recognition
and enforcement of custody decrees).
116. See, e.g., Wenz v. Schwartze, 598 P.2d 1086, 1096 (Mont. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980). But see Youmans v. Youmans, 276 S.E.2d 837, 840
(Ga. 1981).
117. The Commissioners failed to make this result as clear for section 6(a)
as they did for section 13. Compare U.C.C.JA § 6 Commissioners' Notes, 9
U.LA. 135 (1979) with U.C.C.J.A. §§ 12, 13 Commissioners' Notes, 9 U.L.A. 150,
151 (1979). Section 6(a) is like section 13 and unlike section 14(a), however, be-
cause a court of state B applying section 6(a) is able to determine the actual
compliance of state A's court with sections 4 and 5, not merely to predict A's
future compliance. See supra text accompanying notes 106-10. Given that the
Commissioners intended application of section 13 to depend upon compliance
with sections 4 and 5, see supra text accompanying note 115, and intended ap-
plication of section 14(a) not to depend upon compliance with sections 4 and 5,
see supra text accompanying notes 104-10, it is therefore reasonable, in the ab-
sence of clear language on the point in the statute or Commissioners' Notes, to
interpret section 6(a) as similar in this respect to section 13, rather than to sec-
tion 14(a).
118. See supra note 104.
119. U.C.C.JA § 6 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 135 (1979).
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Under this language, if proceedings are commenced in two
states, both having jurisdiction under section 3, and if section
14 does not prohibit either of them from exercising jurisdiction
due to the existence of a prior order,120 then the state in which
the second suit was begun, state B, must defer to state A. This
statement implies that A, not B, applies section 7. State A can
in its discretion defer to state B under section 7's forum non
conveniens principles. State B, on the other hand, cannot em-
ploy section 7 to hold that A is not "exercising jurisdiction sub-
stantially in conformity" with the U.C.C.J.A. and thereby avoid
its section 6(a) duty to defer to A's prior proceeding.
This language also implies that B cannot avoid the applica-
tion of section 6(a) by accusing A of violating the "unclean
hands" rule of section 8(b); if B's deferral to A is determined
by "priority in time," then it is not determined by B's applica-
tion of section 8(b) to the litigation in A. A statement at the
end of the same Note, however, seems to contradict this impli-
cation by intimating that state B can insist that state A comply
with section 8(b): "Once a custody decree has been rendered
in one state, jurisdiction is determined by sections 8 and 14."121
This statement is puzzling. One can avoid the contradiction be-
tween the two parts of the same Note by reading the statement
as if it only suggests that section 6(a) is wholly inapplicable to
modification proceedings. There is no apparent reason, how-
ever, to so limit the application of section 6. Moreover, the ref-
erence to section 14 earlier in the Note is inconsistent with this
interpretation. The most reasonable way to avoid the internal
contradiction is to assume the statement is not an interpreta-
tion of section 6. The statement is likely just a reminder to the
reader that section 6 is not the only section restricting the exer-
cise of jurisdiction to modify a decree.122 It is, in effect, a mere
cross-reference to other limits on modification.
Other sections of the U.C.C.J.A. and their accompanying
Notes also imply that sections 6(a) and 13 demand that state A
conform only with the rules of sections 3, 4, 5, and 14, and not
with the rules of sections 6, 7, and 8. Both section 12,123 which
120. See supra note 96.
121. U.C.C.J.A. § 6 Commissioners' Note, 9 UJ._L 135 (1979).
122. A similar reminder appears at the end of the Note to section 3, and
could not have been intended other than as a mere reminder. Id. § 3 Commis-
sioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 125 (1979). The Note to section 3 does not discuss any of
the duties created by sections 6, 13, and 14.
123. U.C.C.JA § 12 (1968).
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describes the scope and effects of a decree,124 and the accompa-
nying Note make it clear that application of section 12 depends
only upon the jurisdictional, notice, and hearing requirements
of sections 3, 4, and 5. Neither section 12 nor its Note mentions
the provisions of section 6, 7, or 8.125 The Note to section 13
similarly states that the "jurisdiction" and "jurisdictional stan-
dards" referred to in three clauses of section 13 are "the re-
quirements of section 3 in the case of initial decrees and...
the requirements of sections 3 and 14 in the case of modifica-
tion decrees.' 2 6 Although it is not of any apparent signifi-
cance, the failure to mention the notice and hearing
requirements of sections 4 and 5 in the Notes to sections 6 and
13 is remarkable, especially since those requirements were
mentioned in the section 12 Note.127
It appears probable, therefore, that the Commissioners in-
tended to allow state B, in applying sections 6(a) and 13, to ex-
amine only whether state A substantially conformed to the
rules of sections 3, 4, 5, and 14. Under this interpretation, B
must defer to A even if B believes that A should have declined
to exercise its jurisdiction because of section 6, 7, or 8.
It is appropriate to exclude sections 6, 7, and 8 from B's de-
cision to exercise jurisdiction under section 6(a). First, it is un-
likely that A will have violated section 6(a) in this context. If B
is considering whether it can exercise jurisdiction under sec-
tion 6(a), A is already exercising its jurisdiction in an ongoing
concurrent proceeding, making it unlikely that there is yet a
third state that is also exercising jurisdiction in the same
case. 28 Second, although A is much more likely to have vio-
124. Section 12 identifies the parties bound by the decree and the interstate
effects concerning them until the decree is duly modified. Id.
125. See id. Commissioners' Note, 9 U.LA4. 149-50 (1979).
126. Id. § 13 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 151 (1979). The references to the
requirements of section 14 in the Note to section 6, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 119 & 121, and in the Note to section 13, refer only to the prohibition of
modification in section 14(a) and not to the provisions of section 14(b). The lat-
ter subsection merely reminds the reader that modification can be prohibited
not only by section 14(a), but also by section 8, and requires "due considera-
tion" of documents concerning previous proceedings.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 113-17.
128. If the earliest of the three proceedings occurred not in states A or B
but in a third state, X, one must consider two possibilities: one, at the time
when the proceeding in B is filed, X may still have jurisdiction; or two, X may
have lost jurisdiction. If X still has jurisdiction, then section 6(a) or section 14
bars not only A from exercising jurisdiction, but B as well. Thus, the question
of whether A's pending proceeding also bars B's is irrelevant. If, on the other
hand, X has lost jurisdiction, then the possibility that A earlier failed to comply
with section 6(a) has little relevance to the current choice of a forum. State A
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lated sections 7 and 8, the standards of those sections are so
broad that letting B review A's application of them would be
unwise. The criteria of sections 7 and 8(a) are not only discre-
tionary,129 but also vague.130 And even though section 8(b)'s
requirements are ostensibly mandatory, its criteria are so
vague that it too is essentially discretionary.131 To allow B to
exercise jurisdiction concurrently with A if it concludes that A
was abusing its discretion or was otherwise in error under such
vague standards would severely undercut the effectiveness of
section 6(a).
The vagueness of sections 7 and 8 also justifies excluding
these sections from B's application of section 13. It is obviously
less wise, however, to exclude section 6(a) in this context. Sec-
tion 6(a), unlike sections 7 and 8, provides criteria as specific
and objective as the criteria of section 14, which the Commis-
sioners apparently intended state B to consider in applying
section 13. Thus, section 6(a) could probably limit the duty of
recognition and enforcement without seriously undermining
that duty.
It nevertheless seems preferable to exclude A's compliance
with section 6(a) from B's consideration for two reasons. First,
the language of the U.C.C.J.A. and of the Notes does not indi-
cate that, in applying section 13, state B can consider A's com-
pliance with section 6(a). There is a possible indication in the
Notes that B can consider A's compliance with section 8,132 but
there is no parallel indication concerning section 6. If one con-
cludes, despite the Note language, that the interstate recogni-
is first-in-time as against B, and has jurisdiction otherwise consistent with the
Act. Under these circumstances, A's earlier error seems to be an inadequate
reason for creating an exception to the first-in-time rule.
The earliest of the three proceedings may, however, have conceivably oc-
curred in state B itself. Yet even if state A violated section 6(a) by exercising
jurisdiction during the earlier litigation in B, B should not be free to exercise
jurisdiction in a later proceeding while the suit in A is still pending. This situa-
tion would rarely arise; if the earlier B proceeding had resulted in an order, A
would violate not only section 6(a), but also section 14(a), and would likely de-
cline to exercise its jurisdiction. Moreover, on appeal of the case from the A
trial court, the appellate court can either correct the court's error or find that
no error occurred, which in either event would resolve the issue. See infra text
accompanying notes 753-67.
129. See U.C.C.J.A. §§ 7, 8(a) (1968).
130. Section 7(a) uses standards of "inconvenience" and "appropriateness."
Id. § 7(a). One of section 7(c)'s criteria refers to "contravention of the statu-
tory purposes." Id. § 7(c) (5). Section 8(a) employs the vague requirements of
"wrongfulness," "reprehensibleness," "justice," and "propriety." Id. § 8(a).
131. Section 8(b) uses standards of "propriety" and "the interest of the
child." Id. § 8(b).
132. See supra text accompanying note 121.
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tion of state A's proceedings is independent of state A's
conformity to section 8, it seems to follow that one must reach
the same conclusion about section 6(a), because it has even
less support in the Notes. Second, making compliance with
section 6(a) a requirement under section 13 would broaden the
class of decrees that other states cannot modify but need not
recognize or enforce. These cases are in a limbo created by the
interaction of sections 13 and 14(a).133 Section 13 allows a state
not to recognize and enforce decrees made in violation of sec-
tions 3, 4, 5, and 14, while section 14(a) stops a state from modi-
fying some decrees that do not meet these same standards.134
The results appear to be anomalous and unjustifiable. Adding
section 6 to the sections that state A must comply with before
it satisfies section 13 would increase the number of cases in
this limbo.
It seems, therefore, that one should in this respect inter-
pret sections 6(a) and 13 uniformly: they constrain state B if
state A has conformed to the provisions of sections 3, 4, 5, and
14, whether or not state A has also conformed to sections 6, 7,
and 8.
c. The Effectiveness of Control
Even a court that interprets section 6(a) in this fairly nar-
row fashion has some latitude, through interpretation and ap-
plication of sections 3, 4, 5, and 14, to hold that the initial
jurisdiction of another state's court was not substantially in
conformity with the U.C.C.JA.135 A court would have even
more latitude if it rejected this Article's interpretation of sec-
tion 6(a), and held that under section 6(a) it can examine
whether the foreign proceeding complied with sections other
than 3, 4, 5, and 14.136 The freedom that a court has in applying
and interpreting section 6(a), therefore, is substantial.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 578, 630.
134. See infra text accompanying note 578.
135. See, e.g., Williams v. Zacher, 35 Or. App. 129, 136-40, 581 P.2d 91, 96-97
(1978). But see S. KATZ, supra note 59, at 20 (stating that the U.C.C.J.A. "as-
sumes that all state courts take jurisdiction under requirements similar or
identical to those of the Act" and that therefore section 6 in effect "assumes
that the court with priority [in time] has properly taken jurisdiction"). See
also Lopez v. District Court, 606 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1980) (en banc) (prohibiting
lower court from exercising jurisdiction in case where Colorado petition was
filed during pendency of case in California trial court); In re Rector, 39 Colo.
App. 111, 565 P.2d 950 (1977) (affirming dismissal of Colorado petition filed dur-
ing pendency of Kansas appeal).
136. See Allison v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 993, 160 Cal. Rptr. 309
(1979) (relying on perceived violations of sections 5 and 6 by Texas court in
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3. The Current, National Pattern of Initial Jurisdiction
The flexibility built into the U.C.C.J.A.'s treatment of initial
jurisdiction has resulted in some impairment of the U.C.C.J.A.'s
goals of uniformity and comity. The several states that have
not adopted the Act also prevent nationwide uniformity. The
courts of the District of Columbia and Massachusetts, for ex-
ample, can base some custody proceedings on personal juris-
diction over the contesting parents.137 The law of the Virgin
Islands goes still further. It has permitted a court to grant the
initial award of a child's custody, despite the pendency of a
custody proceeding in the state of the child's residence, on the
basis that the forum had personal jurisdiction over the same
parties in a divorce action that took place two and one-half
years earlier.138
There appears, then, to be considerable variation both
among U.C.C.J.A. states and among nonenacting states con-
cerning the circumstances that justify the assertion and exer-
cise of jurisdiction to make initial custody decrees.
Furthermore, whether or not a state has adopted the U.C.C.J.A.,
there are claims and exercises of such jurisdiction in very
doubtful cases, sometimes even in the face of the concurrent
exercise of jurisdiction by other states. It is therefore impor-
tant to determine the limits that federal law places on initial
custody jurisdiction. There appear to be only two sources of
such federal law, the due process clause' 39 and the Wallop
Act.140
C. DUE PROCESS LIMITS ON INMIAL JURISDICTION
Prior to the Wallop Act, federal law limited state court ju-
risdiction over initial determinations of child custody only in
the area of personal jurisdiction over the defendants.
1. May v. Anderson and Later Developments
In May v. Anderson,141 the United States Supreme Court
reversed an Ohio judgment recognizing and enforcing an initial
custody decree of a Wisconsin court. Justice Burton, writing
holding that section 6 did not require the California court to defer to Texas
proceeding).
137. See Alves v. Alves, 262 A.2d 111, 116-17 (D.C. 1970); Green v. Green, 351
Mass. 466, 471, 221 N.E.2d 857, 860 (1966).
138. Cox v. Cox, 8 V.L 543, 457 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1972).
139. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
140. See -upra note 3 and accompanying text.
141. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
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for the Court, stated the question as "whether a court of a
state, where a mother is neither domiciled, resident nor pres-
ent, may cut off her immediate right to ... custody ... without
having jurisdiction over her in personam."142 At another point
he wrote that the case presented the "narrow issue" of whether
"in the absence of personal service" a custody decree has "any
binding effect" on the parent not served.143 Because of these
phrases and other language' 4 4 both in Justice Burton's opinion
and in Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion,145 some have read
the case as establishing that a court violates a parent's due pro-
cess rights if it awards custody without personal jurisdiction
over the parent.146 In other words, they suggest that May ap-
plies the International Shoe Co. v. Washington'47 standards of
personal jurisdiction to child custody cases. Others, however,
have interpreted May more narrowly.148 In his concurring
opinion,149 Justice Frankfurter, one of only five Justices who
joined in the Court's opinion, insisted that the Court was decid-
ing only that the full faith and credit clause did not require rec-
ognition of the Wisconsin decree and stated that "[f] or Ohio to
give respect to the Wisconsin decree would not offend the Due
Process Clause."'6 0 Some aspects of Justice Burton's opinion
also seem consistent with this narrower interpretation of the
May holding.' 5 '
The susceptibility of May to at least these two interpreta-
tions, and the importance of both the full faith and credit ques-
tion May answered and the due process question it may have
142. Id. at 533.
143. Id. at 532-33 (quoting Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 615-16 (1947)).
144. See, e.g., 345 U.S. at 533 ("Rights far more precious to appellant than
property rights will be cut off if she is to be bound by the Wisconsin award of
custody.").
145. See id. at 537 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
146. See Hazard, May v. Anderson: Preamble to Family Law Chaos, 45 VA.
L. REV. 379, 383-85 (1959).
147. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
148. See, e.g., U.C.C.J.A. § 13 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 152 (1979);
Bodenheiner, supra note 7, at 1232-33.
149. 345 U.S. at 535-36 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
150. Id.
151. Justice Burton made no specific response to Justice Frankfurter's limit-
ing interpretation of the holding, and referred to the due process clause only in
explaining the prior history of the litigation. 345 U.S. at 530 n.2. Furthermore,
he dismissed the contention that the children, although resident in Ohio, were
technically domiciled in Wisconsin br saying that, even if true, that fact would
"not give Wisconsin, certainly as against Ohio, the personal jurisdiction that it
must have in order to deprive their mother of her personal right to their imme-
diate possession." Id. at 534 (emphasis added and footnote omitted).
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answered, led to an outpouring of professional commentary.152
No solid consensus emerged, however, on the existence or
stringency of a due process requirement of personal jurisdic-
tion in custody cases. 5 3
Promulgation of the U.C.C.J.A. in 1968, and the accelerating
trend in the late 1970's toward its universal adoption, made the
problem of personal jurisdiction and due process still more
complex.154 The Act's criteria that determine the existence and
exercise of initial jurisdiction do not include any requirements
for contacts with defendants claiming custody or visitation
rights. 55 A Commissioners' Note explicitly stated that "[t] here
is no requirement for technical personal jurisdiction" in child
custody cases.1 5 6
Faced with the uncertainty of whether May imposed a due
process personal jurisdiction requirement in child custody
cases, the Commissioners took a practical position. If they had
tried to anticipate and codify in statutory form the specific de-
fendant-forum contacts that courts might later require, they
152. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 41, at 112-14; Comment, Full Faith and
Credit to Child Custody Awards, 5 KAN. L. REV. 77, 79-82 (1956). See generally
Hazard, supra note 146.
153. See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 152.
154. The tendency of courts to allow increasingly attenuated contacts be-
tween defendants and forum states to satisfy personal jurisdiction require-
ments further complicates the problem of interpreting May. For discussion of
this trend, see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292-93
(1980); Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEx. L. REV. 657, 662
(1959); Developments in the Law, supra note 114, at 918. In International Shoe,
decided six years before May, the Supreme Court provided a new doctrinal ba-
sis and fresh impetus for states to assert jurisdiction over defendants in a
broader range of circumstances. Since May, the Supreme Court has relaxed
due process limits on state jurisdiction even further.
This trend makes it difficult to predict which initial custody decrees violate
due process, if one assumes that May imposes such a standard. The parent's
rather extensive contacts with the forum state in May, see 345 U.S. at 530, might
have even satisfied due process requirements as they existed in 1953. They
were held inadequate in May, however, because Wisconsin lacked a long-arm
statute authorizing acquisition of personal jurisdiction through extraterritorial
service of process. Id. at 530-31. Most states lacked such long-arm statutes as
recently as the past decade. See Sampson, Jurisdiction in Divorce and Conser-,
vatorship Suits, 8 TEx. TEcH L. REV. 159, 166, 200 n.126 (1976); Note, Long-Arm
Jurisdiction in Alimony and Custody Cases, 73 COLUm. L. REv. 289, 311-12
(1973). Given suitable state legislation and today's relaxed constitutional stan-
dards, cases like May, and even cases involving fewer contacts between the de-
fendant and the forum state, may not violate due process.
155. See U.C.C.JA. §§ 3-8 (1968).
156. U.C.C.J.A. § 12 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 150 (1979). On the other
hand, when Congress imposed a requirement of interstate enforcement of cus-
tody decrees in the Wallop Act without making explicit reference to defendant-
forum contacts, it did not commit itself to a particular legal justification for that
decision. See S. REP. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1253-55 (1980).
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would have foreclosed the possibility that the courts would
hold that the Constitution required fewer or no contacts. If
they had added a general requirement that courts exercise ju-
risdiction consistently with due process jurisdictional limits as
they apply to child custody cases, 157 they would have failed to
contribute anything to the clarity or stability of due process
law. Moreover, enactment of such a provision seems unneces-
sary even as a demonstration of respect for whatever unknown
constitutional limits may exist. After all, exercise of unwar-
ranted personal jurisdiction is only one way a court might vio-
late due process rights in a custody case,158 and the U.C.C.J.A.
does not have provisions that govern those violations. The
practical alternative was, therefore, to create the desired state
law limits on custody jurisdiction and wait for the courts to de-
cide whether and how the Constitution imposes additional lim-
its. If the Supreme Court eventually holds that International
Shoe and its progeny do not apply to child custody cases,159 the
Commissioners and like-minded commentators will presuma-
bly be gratified.160
157. Cf. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1981) (providing for
the exercise of personal jurisdiction in suits affecting the parent-child relation-
ship upon "any basis consistent with the constitutions of this state or the
United States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction").
158. The court, for example, might take custody of a child from his or her
family for religious reasons. See, e.g., In re Hadeen, 27 Wash. App. 566, 619 P.2d
374 (1980). It might also take custody for reasons that are just too weak to jus-
tify state interference with parental custody. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (dictum); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972).
159. Some commentators have recently argued at length that the Supreme
Court's treatment of due process limits on states' judicial jurisdiction is in
some respects fundamentally misconceived and should be abandoned in favor
of alternative approaches. See, e.g., Ratner, Procedural Due Process and Juris-
diction to Adjudicate, 75 Nw. UI. REv. 363 (1980); Redish, Due Process, Feder-
alism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. REV.
1112 (1981); Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdic-
tion: A Historical Interpretive Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and
Due Process Clauses, 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 499 (pt. 1), 735 (pt. 2) (1981).
This Article, however, assumes that the Court will continue to apply and to
elaborate upon the general approach it has supplied since International Shoe.
Even critics of this approach concede that the Court has been relatively consis-
tent in approving its most criticized features. See, e.g., Ratner, supra, at 366-68
& n.19; Redish, supra, at 1115-21. But see Whitten (pt. 2), supra, at 843 (arguing
that, as applied, the Court's solicitude for states' interests serves defendants'
interests instead). Furthermore, the Court has restated its view so recently
and so forcefully that a prompt and major departure from that view is unlikely.
See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaf-
fer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
160. See, e.g., Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, Jurisdiction Over Child Cus-
tody and Adoption After Shaffer and Kulko, 12 U.C.D. L. Rev. 229 (1979).
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Although the Commissioners' approach is practical, it does
raise two problems if one assumes that due process jurisdic-
tional standards do apply to child custody cases. One can avoid
both difficulties, however, by properly interpreting the
U.C.C.J.A. The first problem arises because the U.C.C.J.A. al-
lows states to assert jurisdiction even though such an assertion
would violate due process. A court could therefore arguably
strike down the entire statute as an unconstitutional exercise
of jurisdiction. It would be more reasonable, however, to treat
the U.C.C.J.A. as the equivalent of a long-arm statute claiming
jurisdiction in every child custody case in which the due pro-
cess clause allows it.161 This could also avoid the need of
U.C.C.J.A. states, most of which lack other long-arm statutes
applicable to child custody cases, 162 to enact such statutes sim-
ply to reiterate the assertions of jurisdiction that the U.C.C.J.A.
already makes.163
The second problem is the possibility that no state may be
able to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of both the
U.C.C.J.A. and due process in a particular case. A case may
arise, for example, in which only one state, state D, has suffi-
cient contacts with the mother to satisfy due process require-
ments. Suppose that this state has enacted the U.C.C.J.A. and
161. Cf. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 213-17 (1977) (absent legislative as-
sertion of state interest in securing jurisdiction of out-of-state defendants, se-
questration of property insufficient); id. at 221 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (statutory authorization of state judicial power upon
constitutionally permissible grounds is a necessary ingredient of properly as-
serted state court jurisdiction); In re M.S.B., 611 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Tex. Civ. App.
1980) (jurisdiction established through "particularized rules governing adjudi-
cations of status"). See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 7 re-
porter's note at 59-60, comment c (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978). Although some
applications of the U.C.C.J.A. might violate due process, courts may treat the
Act as an assertion of state authority up to the limits of due process. Compare
Yules v. General Motors Corp., 297 F. Supp. 674 (D. Mont. 1969) (the Montana
long-arm statute claimed jurisdiction in a case in which due process would not
permit its assertion) with Ballard v. Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 263 F. Supp. 79 (D.
Mont. 1967) (exercising jurisdiction under the identical statute, because the
facts of the case satisfied due process requirements).
162. See supra note 154.
163. But see Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978) (implying that
due process may permit broader personal jurisdiction where a state has "at-
tempted to assert [a] particularized interest.., by, e.g., enacting a special ju-
risdictional statute" than might otherwise be asserted); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 214 (1977) (same). One can read the pertinent language in these cases
as general support for the proposition that a state might be able to assert
broader personal jurisdiction in child custody cases if it enacted not only the
U.C.C.J.A. rules of jurisdiction, but also specific rules detailing the contacts be-
tween a custody defendant and the enacting state that would be necessary for
personal jurisdiction.
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seems to be unable to meet its requirements for the existence
of jurisdiction.164 It meets neither the "home state" test nor the
"significant connection" test of section 3, paragraphs (1) and
(2).165 There is also no abandonment, mistreatment, abuse, or
neglect within the meaning of paragraph (3).166 The only re-
maining provision which could give state D jurisdiction is para-
graph (4), which is applicable if
(i) it appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under prereq-
uisites substantially in accordance with paragraphs (1), (2), or (3), or
another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that
this State is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of
the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that this court
assume jurisdiction.167
State D can easily satisfy the "best interest" requirement.
If one of the parents wants to sue, it ordinarily will be in the
best interest of the child that state D determine that child's
custody, because it is best to decide the issue rather than leav-
ing it unresolved, and state D is the only state that has jurisdic-
tion in compliance with the Constitution. The other
requirement of paragraph (4), however, appears impossible to
meet if there is another state, state E, that is a "home state" or
a "significant connection" state under paragraph (1) or (2).
State E would have jurisdiction "in accordance with paragraph
(1), (2), or (3)," even though its assertion of jurisdiction would
violate due process. Given this scenario, no state will be able
to hear the case; state D, the only state that satisfies due pro-
cess, will not have jurisdiction under the U.C.C.J.A.
One conceivable but unappealing solution is for state E to
go through a charade of actually declining to exercise its
U.C.C.J.A. jurisdiction. It would do so on the grounds that it
lacks jurisdiction consistent with the due process clause and
that state D, which has personal jurisdiction, is therefore "the
more appropriate forum." This procedure, however, is cumber-
some. Moreover, if state E does not decline to exercise its ju-
risdiction, and if state D is impotent because of paragraph (4),
there will be no state that can decide the case consistently with
both state law and due process. The best resolution of this
problem requires one to interpret paragraph (4) (i) so that state
E, although it satisfies "prerequisities substantially in accord-
ance with paragraphs (1), (2), or (3)," does not "have jurisdic-
164. As noted above, U.C.C.J.A. section 3 sdts forth the requirements for the
existence of jurisdiction. See supra note 96.
165. U.C.C.J.A. § 3(a) (1), (2) (1968).
166. Id.§3(a)(3).
167. Id.§3(a)(4).
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tion under" them because it lacks personal jurisdiction.168 This
construction of the U.C.C.J.A. could conceivably be adopted by
judicial interpretation in some states and by statute in the
others, thereby breaking the impasse.
2. Application of Current Doctrine to Custody Litigation
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Shaffer v. Heit-
ner 169 has further complicated the question of whether child
custody cases must satisfy the due process requirements of In-
ternational Shoe. In this 1977 decision, the Court announced
that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated
according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and
its progeny.' 7 0 The Court held that the standards that previ-
ously applied only to proceedings in personam would now also
govern proceedings in rem and quasi in rem.1 71 Shaffer's exten-
sion of the International Shoe standards, therefore, seems to
undermine the argument that the requirements for personal ju-
risdiction do not apply to child custody cases because these
cases are proceedings in rem or for determinations of status. 7 2
The Court in Shaffer arguably left some room, however, to
treat custody litigation as a special case under the due process
clause. It adverted to at least three categories of cases in which
lesser, or at least different, contacts between a defendant and a
forum state might satisfy the jurisdictional standards of Inter-
national Shoe. One category consisted of cases in which a
plaintiff tries to collect a debt in one state that another state
has already found to exist. 7 3 In a footnote to its opinion, the
Court reserved judgment on a second category of cases by stat-
ing, "[w]e do not suggest that jurisdictional doctrines other
than those discussed in text, such as the particularized rules
governing adjudications of status, are inconsistent with the
standard of fairness."'7 4 Finally, the Court declined to consider
"whether the presence of a defendant's property in a State is a
sufficient basis for jurisdiction when no other forum is avail-
168. See id.
169. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
170. Id. at 212.
171. Id. at 207-09. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
172. The Commissioners advanced this argument. See U.C.C.J.. § 12 Com-
missioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 150 (1979).
173. 433 U.S. at 210-11 n.36. This Article describes the analogous situation in
child custody cases-the mere enforcement of custody or visitation rights adju-
dicated elsewhere. See infra text accompanying notes 466-72.
174. 433 U.S. at 208 n.30.
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able to the plaintiff." 75 These apparently open questions are
relevant in deciding whether and how to apply due process ju-
risdictional requirements to child custody litigation.
a. The Indiscrimination of a Simple "Status" Exception
Neeley-Kvarme and the late Professor Bodenheimer have
argued that "status adjudications based on specialized jurisdic-
tional rules meet due process requirements of fairness without
the need for minimal contacts of the defendant with the fo-
rum."176 They suggested that this "status exception" applies
not just to ordinary custody cases but also to proceedings for
guardianship, neglect, termination of parental rights, and adop-
tion.177 In their view the "status exception" is applicable when-
ever there are "(1) a status adjudication, and (2) particularized
jurisdictional rules applicable to the proceedings."178
This analysis explaining both the "status exception" and its
application to child custody cases is oversimplified. Although it
may be appropriate to apply due process principles differently
to child custody cases than to other kinds of litigation,179 it
would be incorrect to make an uncritical assumption that legal
rules and principles governing other litigation are wholly use-
175. Id. at 211 n.37.
176. Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, supra note 160, at 240.
177. Id. at 240-48.
178. Id. at 240. Their argument relied in part on their interpretation of lan-
guage in footnote 9 to the opinion for the Court in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 657 (1972). In Stanley, the Court said that giving certain unwed fathers a
constitutional right to demand hearings on their fitness to have custody of their
children created "no constitutional or procedural obstacle to foreclosing those
unwed fathers who are not so inclined [to claim custodial rights]." Id. The
Court noted that state law allowed not only personal service of process, but
also service by certified mail and even, if personal or certified mail service was
impossible or a father's identity was unknown, service by publication ad-
dressed to "All whom It may Concern." "Unwed fathers who do not promptly
respond," the Court wrote, "cannot complain if their children are declared
wards of the State." Id.
One should interpret this dictum, however, as dealing only with the consti-
tutional requirement of notice. Read this way, Stanley is consistent with other
precedents. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950). The Stanley Court does not expressly purport to deal also with the
question of due process limits on territorial jurisdiction. There was no inter-
state element in the facts of the Stanley case, nor any reference to the special
problems of interstate litigation. Thus, the Court probably was addressing only
the fathers' right to "complain" of lack of notice, not their right to complain of
overbroad assertions of territorial jurisdiction.
179. As Justice Frankfurter wrote in May, "children have a very special
place in life which law should reflect. Legal theories and their phrasing in
other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to de-
termination of a State's duty towards its children." 345 U.S. at 536 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
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less to serve the legitimate purposes of proceedings affecting
the status of children.180 Courts have made virtually all of the
custody rulings that commentators have considered ultimately
harmful to the children in the name of their best interests.181
Thus, it is not sufficient to assume that invocations of "best in-
terests" in the U.C.C.J.A., in other jurisdictional rules, or in ju-
dicial opinions applying them justify a state's adjudication of a
child's custody status under all circumstances.
It would also be surprising if, after penetrating the concep-
tual fog surrounding in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court adopted the view of Bodenheimer and Neeley-
Kvarme and made blanket use of the concept of status in ap-
plying due process jurisdictional limits.182 A close reading of
180. Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme only began to examine whether mini-
mum contacts are necessary in child custody cases. They merely noted that
custody and other proceedings are "'child centered' rather than 'defendant
centered,'" and called for a due process ruling that is "beneficial to children."
Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, supra note 160, at 252.
181. Compare Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 614-15 (1947) (New York court
"empowered to modify the [Florida] decree in the interests of the child") with
U.C.C.JA Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 111-13 (1979) (courts have a
"tendency to over-emphasize the need for fluidity and modifiability of custody
decrees at the expense... of the child"); compare Sampsell v. Superior Court,
32 Cal. 2d 763, 777-80, 197 P.2d 739, 748-50 (1948) (existence of concurrent juris-
diction in two or more states serves interests of child) with S. KATZ, supra note
59, at 11-12 (existence of concurrent jurisdiction has contributed to child
snatching and consequent harm to children).
182. When the court in its Shaffer footnote, 433 U.S. at 208 n.30, expressly
left open the possibility that the rules governing jurisdiction in status adjudica-
tions might adequately comport with the standard of fairness, the only author-
ity it cited was two pages of a 1959 law review article, Traynor, supra note 154,
at 660-61. Justice Roger Traynor used those two pages to defend, on specific
and practical grounds, the rule that the plaintiff's domicile has jurisdiction to
dissolve the status of the plaintiff's marriage despite its lack of contacts with
the other spouse. He also argued, however, that a court should have personal
jurisdiction over the putative father of a child before it determines whether the
status of paternity exists. He went on to say that cases concerning the parent-
child relationship involve large interests of the state and momentous conse-
quences for the parties, and that these considerations and fair play "would nor-
mally preclude jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant having no contact
with the forum state." Id. at 661. "Nevertheless," Traynor continued on a page
not cited in Shaffer's footnote 30,
the state where a child is present must be competent to regulate his
custody whether his parent is present or not, and if the parent cannot
be found or has failed to discharge his parental obligations, that state,
given the best notice reasonably possible, should be free to promote
the interest of the child by permitting his adoption.
Id. at 661-62.
It is, of course, unlikely that the Supreme Court meticulously cited pages
as a subtle indication that creation of the divorce status requires no minimum
contacts, and that creation or termination of the paternity status does require
minimum contacts. Similarly, its failure to cite subsequent pages of the article
does not indicate disapproval of Traynor's views on custody and adoption. In-
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Shaffer and later cases suggests that the Court is not disposed
toward making such broad generalizations. These cases alter
the distinctions among proceedings in personam, in rem, and
quasi in rem, and among various kinds of cases within each of
these categories. 8 3 Instead of using the three categories of ac-
tions to displace the ultimate standards of International Shoe,
the Court now uses the three categories to help indicate
whether it is reasonable to give a state jurisdiction to affect the
parties involved. In both quasi in rem and in rem proceedings,
the presence of a res that is "the source of the underlying con-
troversy" is "normally" a sound basis of jurisdiction.184 If, how-
ever, this inference is invalid in a. particular case, then due
process bars the assertion of jurisdiction.185 Thus, identifying a
relationship as a status, a concept that a court should deter-
mine in rem, does not render the reasonableness standard of
International Shoe irrelevant; it only supports an inference
that jurisdiction is reasonable, leaving open the question
whether it actually is reasonable considering the nature of the
relationship and the circumstances under which that relation-
ship is litigated.186
stead, the Court likely cited Traynor to endorse his argument that minimum
contacts are sometimes needed and sometimes not needed for a fair adjudica-
tion of status. The Court thus may have indicated that it would not exempt
every "status" case from the requirement of defendant-forum contacts. Cf.
Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal
Courts, 66 CoRNu.. L. REV. 411, 423 n.67, 425-26 (1981) (suggesting that it might
be desirable to recognize, as categories of jurisdiction, jurisdiction over status
and jurisdiction by necessity, but that, in utilizing categories of jurisdiction
other than personal jurisdiction, courts arguably must determine the reasona-
bleness of a state's identification of the subject of litigation and attribution of
legal situs to it).
183. See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 101 (1978) (distinguishing
child support from commercial litigation in personam); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 199 n.17, 207-09, 213 (1977) (distinguishing quasi in rem jurisdiction in
which the cause of action relates to the attached property from quasi in rem
jurisdiction in which the property is unrelated to the claim).
184. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 207-08. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320,
328 (1980) (stating that a defendant's ownership of property in a state "may
suggest the presence of other ties") (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at
209).
185. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 207-08.
186. Arguably, even after Shaffer, the standards that courts will use in de-
termining whether jurisdiction is reasonable will vary depending on whether
the action is in rem, quasi in rem on claims related to the property made the
basis of jurisdiction, quasi in rem on claims not related to such property, or in
personam. See, e.g., Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53
N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 71-79 (1978). Even if the minimum contacts standards vary,
however, it does not necessarily follow that there can be actions in which no
forum-defendant contacts are necessary, regardless of other circumstances. See
infra notes 208-14 and accompanying text. Furthermore, in some states the
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Since the answer to this question hinges upon the particu-
lar characteristics of a status, and because the several recog-
nized statuses display different characteristics, the Court
probably will not treat all statuses alike. The legal relation-
ships involved in cases of child custody,l8 7 adoption,188 di-
vorce,189 separation,190 and annulment of marriage' 9' are
considered statuses. The natures of those relationships and
the direct and incidental consequences of their creation, altera-
tion, and destruction are different for each status, and they
vary from one state to another.192 Moreover, the rules gov-
erning judicial jurisdiction to create, to affect, or to destroy
these statuses have varied substantially from one status to the
other, from one time to another, and from one state to an-
other.193 It is appropriate, therefore, in determining whether
jurisdiction is reasonable in the specific context of the status of
custody, to consider its nature, the consequences of its adjudi-
cation, and the particular rules and circumstances upon which
jurisdiction to adjudicate it is based.
U.C.C.J.A. permits a forum to exercise jurisdiction although the presence of the
res is debatable, or the same or another related res is present elsewhere. See,
e.g., Allison v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 993, 998-99, 160 Cal. Rptr. 309, 311-
12 (1979); Reeve v. Reeve, 391 So. 2d 789, 791 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Thus,
even if no forum-defendant contacts are necessary, an application of the
U.C.C.JA. might violate the jurisdictional requirement of a res, so there still
would be a need for analysis of the forum's contact with the child. See infra
text accompanying notes 215-94.
187. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1971);
Goodrich, Custody of Children in Divorce Suits, 7 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 2-3 (1921).
188. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 78 (1971).
189. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942); RESTATE-
MENT (SEcOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 70-74 (1971).
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 75 (1971).
191. See, e.g., id. § 76.
192. An examination of grandparent visitation illustrates the variation from
state to state in the consequences of adoption, see In re Gardner, 287 N.W.2d
555 (Iowa 1980) (disallowing grandparent visitation and collecting decisions
from other states applying various rules on the subject), and custody, compare
Sparks v. Wigglesworth, 5 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 3173 (Ky. App. 1979), affd, 598
S.W.2d 763 (Ky. 1980) (unpublished opinion) (grandparent visitation allowed)
with West v. King, 263 S.E.2d 386 (Va. 1980) (grandparent visitation disal-
lowed). See also Annot., 90 A.LR.3d 222 (1979) (discussing grandparent visita-
tion rights).
193. For example, the traditional bases of custody jurisdiction have varied
substantially over time and from state to state. There still is considerable vari-
ation among states in the grounds on which jurisdiction is assumed and exer-
cised in custody cases. See supra text accompanying notes 35-54, 60-61, 80, 135-
38; infra text accompanying notes 450-76, 579-83. There has also been great vari-
ation among the states concerning the bases for jurisdiction in annulment and
adoption proceedings. See Developments in the Law, supra note 114, at 976-79.
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b. The Divorce Analogy
It is well settled that due process does not require forum-
defendant contacts in proceedings determining a person's di-
vorce status.194 Analysis of the reasons underlying this treat-
ment of divorce jurisdiction sheds light on the likely future
treatment of child custody jurisdiction.
Courts typically impose only one limitation on jurisdiction
to dissolve the marriage status. State' 95 and arguably federal
constitutional law 96 require that the forum state be the domi-
cile of either party. This requirement, however, is often satis-
fied very easily. 9 7 It scarcely seems adequate to serve either of
the functions that due process limits on territorial jurisdiction
perform-protection of defendants from unreasonable demands
to litigate in a distant or inconvenient forum and preservation
of territorial limits on the authority of states within the federal
system.19
If one considers the nature of the status of divorce and the
legal consequences of its ex parte adjudication, however, it is
probable that the Supreme Court will continue to allow the
domicile of the plaintiff to be an adequate substitute for de-
fendant-forum contacts. The only legal consequence of a di-
vorce decree is the dissolution of the parties' marriage, making
them free to remarry; it does not affect claims to property, sup-
port,199 or child custody.200 Commentators have observed that
the plaintiff and the plaintiffs domicile have a much greater in-
terest in obtaining the divorce than the defendant and the de-
fendant's domicile have in preventing it.201 In its formulations
of due process limits on territorial jurisdiction, the Court has
194. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1942).
195. See DEL CODE Am. tit. 13, § 1504(a) (Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
40, § 401(1) (Smith-Hurd 1980); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 4 (West Supp.
1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 70 comment d, § 71
(1971).
196. See Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 667 (3d Cir. 1953), vacated as moot, 347
U.S. 610 (1954). See generally Garfield, The Transitory Divorce Action" Jurisdic-
tion in the No-Fault Era, 58 TEx. L. REV. 501 (1980); Note, Domicile as a Consti-
tutional Requirement for Divorce Jurisdiction, 44 IOWA L. REv. 765 (1959).
197. See Garfield, supra note 196, at 504.
198. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 327-33 (1980); World-Wide Volks-
wagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-94 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court,
436 U.S. 84, 91-101 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 203-12 (1977).
199. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418-19 (1957).
200. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 534 (1953). But see supra notes 141-52
and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 316-17 (1968); Currie,
Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and Borax, 34 U.
Cm. L. REV. 26, 29 (1966).
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usually weighed such respective interests.202 In World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,203 for example, the Court re-
cently observed that, although the fairness of an exercise of
personal jurisdiction primarily depends upon the burden it
places on the defendant, that burden
will in an appropriate case be considered in the light of other relevant
factors, including the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute,
the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, at
least when that interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiff's
power to choose the forum, the interstate judicial system's interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive so-
cial policies.
2 0 4
The Court seems to have adopted as a fundamental sub-
stantive social policy the view that an unwilling spouse should
not be trapped in a broken marriage, despite the clear evidence
that not every state shares its commitment to this policy.20 5
Given this policy, the requirement that a plaintiff seeking di-
vorce be domiciled in the forum state arguably satisfies the
constitutional standards. A divorce plaintiff's decision either to
reside permanently in a state other than the defendant's, or to
undergo the expense and inconvenience of a temporary move
to one of the "quickie" divorce states, is a strong indication that
the marriage is already destroyed. The interest of such plain-
tiffs in obtaining divorces and escaping their marriages is great.
The need to protect this interest is even greater if the state in
which the defendant is domiciled would withhold the di-
vorce,20 6 a possibility that historically was fairly strong.207
This rationale underlying the Supreme Court's decision to
allow the domicile of the plaintiff to substitute for defendant-
forum contacts is not entirely persuasive. Although the disso-
202. See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978); McGee v. Inter-
national Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). But cf. World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 300 (1980) (quoting International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)) (forbidding personal jurisdiction where
there are no defendant-forum "contacts, ties, or relations"). It is not entirely
clear, however, that the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen meant to exclude
consideration of the respective interests.
203. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
204. Id. at 292 (citations omitted).
205. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 401(2) (Smith-Hurd 1980); S.D. Comp.
LAWS ANN. § 25-4-2 (1976).
206. Even if the forum state's interest in hearing the case is weak, it would
be the only forum interested in what the plaintiff and, therefore, the Supreme
Court consider necessary.
207. Many states have historically been very reluctant to grant divorces.
Today, however, most states have more relaxed standards. See infra notes 212-
13 and accompanying text.
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lution of a marriage theoretically changes only the status itself,
it has practical significance for the defendant spouse and for
children of the marriage whose interest the defendant might in
fact represent by resisting the divorce.208 For example, the
spouse and children may value the marriage status itself.20 9
Moreover, the prospect of a divorce and its occurrence typically
make reconciliation less likely.210 The adjudication of "mere"
status also may eventually affect the defendant spouse's prop-
erty rights.211 In addition, the necessity of offering the plaintiff
a forum that will grant a divorce has decreased, since many
states have recently expanded their grounds for divorce.2 12 The
remaining variations among the states in the grounds and pro-
cedures for divorce 213 merely cast doubt upon the Court's as-
sertion that there is a fundamental social policy to facilitate
divorces between unhappy spouses. Finally, the Supreme
Court itself may consider reversing present doctrine and re-
quiring that the defendant have at least some contacts with the
forum state.214 Although these arguments weaken the conten-
tion that even after Shaffer divorce is a status that a state can
create solely because it is the domicile of the plaintiff, that
practice will probably continue unless the Supreme Court
clearly decides differently.
c. Relevant Characteristics of Custody Adjudication
Although the criteria governing jurisdiction to make cus-
tody decrees vary considerably among the states,2 15 they gener-
ally impose more substantial restrictions on jurisdiction than
208. See infra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
209. See Drinan, What Are the Rights of an Involuntary Divorcee?, 53 Ky.
L.J. 209, 214 (1965).
210. See Currie, supra note 201, at 29 n.20.
211. See, e.g., Simons v. Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank, 381 U.S. 81, 84-85
(1965).
212. See Garfield, supra note 196, at 503, 522-24. When the Court first held
that due process does not require defendant contacts in a divorce case, Wil-
liams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942), a number of states granted divorces
only on proof of misconduct characterized by criminality and social stigma.
See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 351 Mich. 210, 213, 88 N.W.2d 483, 484 (1958); Mol-
loy v. Molloy, 46 Wis. 2d 682, 685, 176 N.W.2d 292, 295 (1970). See generally
Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L REv. 32 (1966).
213. See Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview, 14 FAm.
L.Q. 229 (1981).
214. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958); supra note 202. See
generally Redish, supra note 159, at 117-20; Note, Minimum Contacts As Ap-
plied to Products Liability-World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 29 DE PAUL
L. REv. 1159, 1164-65, 1172 (1980); Note, Specific Jurisdiction: Can the Fourth
Circuit Approach Survive Woodson?, 32 S. CAL. L. REV. 379, 391, 394 (1980).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 80, 135-38.
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the domicile requirement imposes in divorce cases. Yet, most
of those restrictions refer not to the relationship between the
forum and the defendant but to the forum's contacts with the
child.216 There is a genuine and long-standing national consen-
sus that legal rules applicable in custody cases should serve
the interests of the children more than the interests of the par-
ents.2 17 This Article takes no exception to that principle. This
lack of emphasis on the defendant's contacts with the forum
state may nevertheless violate due process. The rules of juris-
diction governing child custody cases are "particularized,"2 18
but their compliance with due process depends upon whether
the special nature of the status that is involved justifies the
rules' lack of defendant contacts requirements. The momen-
tous consequences of a custody determination for both the
child and the parents seem to indicate that the basis of a state's
jurisdiction should ordinarily include significant forum-defend-
ant contacts.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the interests of
parents in having custody of their children are legitimate and
substantial.2 19 In custody decrees courts may, for example,
give defendants custody subject to restrictions giving the plain-
216. See, e.g., Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); TEx.
FAm. CODE ANN. §§ 11.045, 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1980); U.C.C.J.A. § 3 (1968). In
several states a parent who takes his or her child from a distant state, where
the child had lived for years, could, after six months' residence, commence in
the second state an initial action for custody and for a total denial of visitation
to the other parent, who may never have been in the second state. See
U.C.C.J.A. §§ 2(5), 3(a) (1) (i) (1968); c. In re Leonard, 122 Cal. App. 3d 443, 175
Cal. Rptr. 903 (1981) (home state has jurisdiction to render custody decree
binding a parent over whom state lacks personal jurisdiction); Perry v. Ponder,
604 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (residence of mother and child in Texas for
eight months may give Texas court jurisdiction to render custody decree bind-
ing father who lacks minimum contacts with Texas). The Wallop Act does not
eliminate this possibility. See infra text accompanying notes 295-302.
217. See Foster, Adoption and Child Custody: Best Interests of the Child?,
22 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1972); Foster & Freed, Child Custody, 29 N.Y.U. L. REV.
423 (pt. 1), 615 (pt. 2), 425 (1964); Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judi-
cial Functions in the Face of Indeterminancy, 39 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBs. 226,
227-28, 230-49 (1975); Note, Legalized Kidnapping of Children by Their Parents,
80 Dcn. L. REv. 305, 318 (1975); Comment, Custody of Children: Best Interests
of Child vs. Rights of Parents, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 306 (1945). This consensus
prevails despite some interstate disagreement on which substantive custody
standards best serve children's interests. See Freed & Foster, supra note 213, at
233-37, 262-67. States whose substantive rules favor parental custody, even if
custody in nonparents best serves the interests of the children, typically justify
such rules at least partly on a theory that they serve the children's interests
more surely than ad hoc comparisons between particular parents and other
claimants. See, e.g., Frederick v. Frederick, 617 S.W.2d 629 (Mo. App. 1981).
218. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 208 n.30.
219. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1971).
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tiffs periodic possession of the children and a role in making
decisions concerning them.2 2 0 The defendants may, on the
other hand, be given no right to see the children nor to partici-
pate in their upbringing at all.22 1 Unlike a decree creating the
status of divorce, which primarily serves to confirm in law the
already accomplished demise of a relationship, and permits the
parties to the former marital relationship to establish new ones,
a decree creating or altering the status of custody commonly
expands or contracts the existing relationship between the
child and the defendant. Thus, it cannot be said that in custody
cases, as in divorce cases, the plaintiffs' interests in obtaining
the relief they request are as a rule greater than the other in-
terests that the decrees affect. The courts have long recognized
the strong parental interests in custody cases and have conse-
quently created a due process requirement that parents receive
notice and opportunity to be heard in custody proceedings, de-
spite the priority given by custody law to the interests of
children.222
The child too has a significant interest in seeing that the
defendant has contacts with the forum state. It is obvious that
an unwise custody decree can adversely affect the development
of the involved child.223 Unlike a divorce decree, which termi-
nates the defendant's legal ties only with a plaintiff who has re-
jected the relationship and who is considered capable of
making a responsible decision to do so, a custody decree may
reduce or cut off the defendant's relationship to a child who
may want or need the relationship and who may be too young
to assess his or her own interests. To avoid this harm, defend-
ant spouses must be able to participate fully in the custody
proceeding. The judicial systems of all the states depend on
parents to promote the children's best interests in custody liti-
gation. This is most obvious in states in which children may
not be parties, 224 may not be represented by counsel,225 and
220. See, e.g., Van Nortwick v. Van Nortwick, 87 I. App. 2d 55, 58, 230 N.E.2d
391, 392-93 (1967); Mirsky v. 1Miirsky, 69 Ill. App. 2d 382, 386-87, 217 N.E.2d 467,
469-70 (1966).
221. See, e.g., L.L.T. v. PA.T., 585 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. App. 1979).
222. See In re Donovan R., 5 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 2845, 2846 (Cal. App. 1979)
(holding notice of custody proceeding given to parent by publication violative
of due process, although "in modifying a custody decree the court is fundamen-
tally concerned with the child's welfare"); Parker v. Parker, 142 Colo. 416, 418,
350 P.2d 1067, 1069 (1960); U.C.C.J.A. §§ 4, 5 (1968); id. Commissioners' Notes, 9
UL..A. 130-32 (1979).
223. An unwise decision can also have serious consequences for the com-
munities in which the child will live during his or her life.
224. See, e.g., Leigh v. Aiken, 54 Ala. App. 620, 625, 311 So. 2d 444, 448 (1975).
225. See Robin v. Robin, 45 Ill. App. 3d 365, 373-74, 359 N.E.2d 809, 815 (1977).
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can be heard only through one of their parents or either par-
ent's attorney.226 It is also true in states in which children pos-
sess substantial procedural rights.227 Even there, the
defendant can contribute important information and make ar-
guments bearing on the interests of the child that the plaintiff,
the child's guardian ad litem, or the child's attorney fail to
make.228
If the burdens on defendants are unreasonable because of
the minimal contacts that they have with the forum, they may
be unable to make as effective a defense as they could make in
another forum.229 Since a reliable determination of the inter-
ests of the children as well as of the interests of the defendants
in custody cases substantially depends upon the ability of de-
fendants to litigate, there should be no cavalier assumption
that the focus of custody litigation on the interests of children
justifies utter disregard of the contacts that a defendant has
with the forum. On the contrary, this very solicitude for chil-
dren's interests in custody litigation suggests the need for due
process standards guaranteeing that defendants have reason-
able opportunities to participate. Commentators have justly
criticized230 the majority opinion in May for its virtual silence
concerning children's interests coupled with its exaltation of
parents' interests.231 Those who consider children's interests
important should hesitate, however, to conclude that due pro-
cess allows ex parte determination of those interests whenever
a state finds that its own law allows such a determination.
See generally Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in
Custody and Visitation Disputes Arisingfrom Divorce, 87 YAIE L.J. 1126 (1978).
226. See, e.g., Rathke v. Peebles, 31 I11. App. 3d 711, 714, 334 N.E.2d 362, 365
(1975); Hugo v. Hugo, 430 A.2d 1183, 1186 (Pa. Super. 1981). See generally Freed
& Foster, supra note 213, at 262-63.
227. See Note, supra note 225, at 1134-38.
228. See Berlin v. Berlin, 428 A.2d 1113 (Vt. 1981) (refusing to review propri-
ety of trial court's failure to appoint counsel for children in suit for divorce and
custody on the ground that neither parent had requested such appointment);
Note, A Child's Due Process Right to Counsel in Divorce Custody Proceedings,
27 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 924-27 (1976); Dembitz, Book Review, 83 YAIE L.J. 1304,
1312 (1974).
229. See Whitten, supra note 159, at 837; Developments in the Law, supra
note 114, at 924, 931.
230. See, e.g., Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, supra note 160, at 249.
231. The Court said a parent's rights were "far more precious ... than
property rights." May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. at 533.
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d. Constitutional Recognition of Affected Individual and
Institutional Interests
Although due process seems ordinarily to require that de-
fendants in custody cases have some contacts with the forum
state, the nature and consequences of custody adjudication and
the special federal and state rules for jurisdiction in custody
cases warrant broader due process standards than those that
the Supreme Court has imposed, for example, in child support
cases 232 or in commercial litigation.233 The Court has identified
four interests belonging to states, individuals, and the inter-
state judicial system that will affect the strictness of the due
process standards that it applies.2 34 In many custody cases,
under the states' existing rules of jurisdiction, these interests
are strong enough to justify relatively broad jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants.
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court recognized
the importance of a state's "interest in adjudicating the dis-
pute."235 Custody litigation heavily implicates this interest; in
such cases a state has dual concerns-the peaceful resolution
of the dispute between the contending adults and the advance-
ment or protection of the child's interests.236 The former con-
cern arises in all litigation. The latter concern, though, is
particularly affected by custody adjudications.237
The strength of a state's interest in protecting the child var-
ies from case to case, becoming stronger as the connection be-
tween the state and the child becomes closer. Jurisdiction
under the U.C.C.J.A. based on the forum state being the "home
state,"238 or both having a "significant connection" with the
child and the parents and possessing substantial evidence, 239
requires some connection between the child and the forum
state. The same is true for jurisdiction based on domicile or
232. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91-98 (1978).
233. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
234. See infra text accompanying notes 235-59.
235. 444 U.S. at 292.
236. Mnooldn, supra note 217, at 229, 232, 238, 242, 244-45, 265.
237. Id. At least in some contexts, the appropriateness of recognizing the
jurisdiction of a particular state may depend upon its approach to questions of
choice of law. See Silberman, supra note 186, at 79-99. States almost invariably
apply the law of the forum in custody cases. 1 A. EHRENZWEIG, PmrVATE INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 122 (1967). As long as this practice prevails, the law should gen-
erally limit custody jurisdiction to states having substantial interests not only
in providing a forum, but also in applying local law.
238. See U.C.C.J.A. § 2(5) (1968).
239. See id. §3(a) (1), (2).
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presence of the child in a non-U.C.C.J.A. state.24 0 The nature,
extent, and currentness of the connections vary, of course,
among these jurisdictional bases.24 1 Nevertheless, in each in-
stance some such connection is required.
Another variable affecting the strength of the state's inter-
est is the amount of difference that the custody determination
will make to the child. If the child will receive nearly the same
benefits regardless of which parent receives custody, the inter-
est of a state in seeing that its view prevails is fairly weak.242
The strength and legitimacy of the state's interest in protecting
the interests of the child also largely depend upon the forum's
ability to obtain fairly the necessary evidence and upon the in-
ability of another forum to perform that function equally as
well or better.243 The jurisdictional criteria of the U.C.C.J.A.
provide better assurance than either the technical concept of
domicile or the mere requirement of physical presence that the
state best equipped to decide the custody of a child will do
S0.244 All these rules, however, guarantee that the forum state
has some ability to gather relevant evidence.
In evaluating the strength of a state's interest, one should
also examine whether other forums have jurisdiction to hear
the case. The Supreme Court's refusal in Shaffer to consider
whether the presence of a defendant's property is a sufficient
basis for jurisdiction if no other forum is available to the plain-
tiff245 may suggest that the absence of an alternative forum
heightens a state's interest in deciding a case. This may be
particularly true in child custody cases because of the dual and
special nature of the state's interest in such litigation. If the fo-
rum state is the only state that has jurisdiction to determine
custody, it is the only state that can evaluate the interests of
the child.
240. See, e.g., Gil v. Servizio, 375 Mass. 186, 191, 375 N.E.2d 716, 720 (1978).
241. The forum-child connections are especially likely to be insubstantial if
jurisdiction is based on presence of the child.
242. See Mnookin, supra note 217, at 232 (implying that in a divorce custody
case unless one of the parties would endanger the child the decision of the
court performs no function of child-protection).
243. Cf. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98-100 (1978) (treating the
availability of proceedings under the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act (1968) as undercutting a state's interest in providing a forum for
child-support litigation); Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 150-51, 545 P.2d
264, 268, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352, 356 (1976) (treating the availability of evidence on
damages in a motor vehicle accident case as supporting state's interest in ob-
taining personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant).
244. See Bodenheimer, supra note 7, at 1221-25.
245. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37 (1977).
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Of course, some states may lack any substantial connection
with a child, thus weakening their interest in adjudicating the
case. A non-U.C.C.J.A. state, for example, may exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over two parents to decide the custody of a
child even though the child has no contacts with the forum
state.246 It may also exercise continuing jurisdiction to change
the custody of a child long after all connection between the
child and forum state was broken.247 If a state chooses not to
require child-forum contacts, it may have an interest in settling
the parents' dispute, but it cannot also claim the weighty state
interest in protecting the welfare of the child.
In addition to a state's interest, the Supreme Court will
consider in assessing the reasonableness of state jurisdiction
"the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective re-
lief, . .. at least when that interest is not adequately protected
by the plaintiff's power to choose the forum."248 Like the de-
fendant's interests in the litigation, the plaintiff's interests en-
compass not only his or her personal interests, but also the
interests of the child; both parents present arguments to assist
the court in determing what is best for the child.249 The plain-
tiff's interests, therefore, arguably are weightier than the inter-
ests of plaintiffs who sue only for their own benefit in cases in
which the courts do not play a paternalistic role. Indeed, in
many custody cases the interests of plaintiffs appear to justify
a departure from the policy discouraging litigation to change
the status quo and, thus, favoring the convenience of defend-
ants more than that of plaintiffs. In intitial custody suits, the
absence of either parent will impair the accuracy of a judicial
determination of the child's interests. Because both plaintiff
and defendant likely represent the child, courts should not nec-
essarily favor defendant's convenience.2 50
Plaintiffs must do more, however, than just demonstrate
their interest for the Supreme Court to consider it. They must
also show that the forum state is the only state that can supply
them with convenient and effective relief.251 If, for example, a
246. See cases cited supra notes 137-38.
247. See, e.g., Dillon v. Dillon, 219 S.C. 255, 256-60, 64 S.E.2d 649, 649-50 (1951);
State ex rel. Ravitz v. Fox, 273 S.E.2d 370, 372-73 (W. Va. 1980).
248. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 292.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 219-28.
250. There is a public interest in seeing a custody dispute resolved consist-
ently with the child's interests. See generally Ratner, supra note 159, at 367;
Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HfAv. L. REV. 1121, 1127-28, 1166-77 (1966).
251. See supra note 243.
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father and his child have lived in a state long enough to de-
velop extensive contacts with that state and to sever most of
the child's contacts with the mother's state, the father would
find it much more convenient to litigate in his state than in the
mother's state, especially if the mother's state contains little
evidence. Furthermore, the relief might be more effective if
granted by the father's state; indeed, the U.C.C.J.A. and the
Wallop Act may, in this example, only require enforcement of a
decree made in the father's state.2 52 The father's power to
choose a forum thus does not adequately protect his interests,
because the U.C.C.J.A. and the Wallop Act often permit only
one forum to render a custody decree, or at least to render one
that other states must enforce.253
If one assumes, however, that the mother's state has exten-
sive contacts with both parents and the child, contains a great
deal of evidence about the child, and under its law has jurisdic-
tion to decide the custody case, the father might find that litiga-
tion in his home state is just as burdensome as litigation in the
mother's state. Regardless of the site of the litigation, the fa-
ther will suffer the inconvenience and expense that arises from
the need for pretrial studies, depositions, and other proceed-
ings that will occur in each of the two states. 254 This situation
might also lead to a decree in the mother's state that would be
entitled to interstate enforcement and thereby just as effective
as a decree from the father's state.25 5 These hypotheticals illus-
trate that the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and ef-
252. See infra notes 630-46 and accompanying text. This argument may ap-
pear to be circular, since in contending that a decree does not violate due pro-
cess, the argument uses a line of reasoning that assumes the decree is
enforceable. That is, it assumes the decree does not violate due process. See
Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 232 (1946). Nevertheless, there are cases in which
the U.C.C.J-.A and the Wallop Act, see infra text accompanying notes 550-600,
619-46, and the full faith and credit clause and implementing act, see infra text
accompanying notes 603-18, might not give effect to a decree of the mother's
state. One can still argue, therefore, that if the constitutional limits on personal
jurisdiction permit the father's state to enter a decree, the decree will be more
"effective" than a decree of the alternate forum. See Kulko v. Superior Court,
436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37 (1977).
253. See supra notes 68-136 and accompanying text; infra notes 295-302, 345-
428, 573-83, 619-46 and accompanying text- cf. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (noting that a plaintiff's interest in obtaining
relief becomes important when the plaintiff has insufficient power to select a
forum).
254. See U.C.CJ.A. §§ 18-20 (1968). Even if the father would bear less and
the mother would bear more of these costs if the litigation were in his state, the
ability of the courts under the U.C.C.J.A. to apportion these costs between the
parties can negate this advantage. Id. §§ 19, 20.
255. See supra text accompanying note 168.
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fective relief sometimes but not always justifies a state's broad
exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.
The two final factors supporting the use of less rigorous
due process standards for child custody are "the interstate ju-
dicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolu-
tion of controversies" 25 6 and "the shared interest of the several
States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies."25 7
In custody litigation, these interests are interdependent and
apply with very special force. The insistence that courts deter-
mining custody attach primary importance to the best interests
of the children is one of the most uniformly expressed social
policies in state law.25 8 Practically all states also recognize that
the forum that can most easily determine the best interests of
children will have a connection with and interest in the child
and will have ready access to the relevant evidence. 25 9 Most
states even agree on the basic aspects of the U.C.C.J.A. and the
Wallop Act which they use to implement the shared social poli-
cies. The states have thus expressed their shared interest in
seeking the best interests of the children in custody cases by
not placing unduly rigid limits on jurisdiction over defendants
and by adopting jurisdictional criteria that promote efficiency
and avoid interstate conflict in the resolution of custody
disputes.
These two interests, unlike the interests of a particular
state or the interests of a particular plaintiff, justify a state's ex-
ercise of jurisdiction over the defendant if the state satisfies the
U.C.C.J.A. and Wallop Act standards, even though another
state has substantial contacts with the child and jurisdiction
under its own law. An application of specific statutory rules
would better serve the social policy promoting the efficient op-
eration of the combined federal-state custody scheme than
would case-by-case assessments of the relative interests of par-
ticular plaintiffs and particular states.
e. Litigation Involving Multiple Contestants
Although these four interests may often justify relatively
broad jurisdiction in custody disputes between two parties,
256. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 292.
257. Id.
258. See authorities cited supra note 217.
259. See Bates & Holmes, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: Pro-
gress and Pitfalls, 17 GA. ST. B.J. 72, 74 (1980); Ratner, supra note 37, at 809;
Rheinstein, Jurisdiction in Matters of Child Custody, 26 CoNN. B.J. 48, 65 (1952);
supra text accompanying notes 63-66.
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they support custody adjudication still more strongly in dis-
putes among more than two parties, even if the decree will bind
absent contestants. In a two-party case, the due process clause
very seldom prevents the rendering of a custody decree that
binds both parties; state law permitting, a willing and able
plaintiff can make the sacrifice of suing in a state having con-
tacts with the other party. If; however, three or more parties
contest custody or visitation of a child, it is more likely that one
or more contestants will be unwilling or unable to litigate away
from home. A too rigorous application of the due process
clause to such cases could mean that no single decree would
bind all the contestants even if the plaintiff were willing and
able to litigate away from home.26 0
The Supreme Court has considered various anomalies that
can result from limits on territorial jurisdiction in multiparty
cases. In Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co.,261 for example, it was
impossible to bring all possible distributees of a decedent's es-
tate before a single court having jurisdiction over the estate.
This produced inconsistent decisions in various states and in-
terfered with "the ideal distribution of the entire personal es-
tate as a unit."26 2  The court considered this a mere
"inconvenience" and a "necessary incident" of due process.
The situation neither justified relaxation of due process limits
on personal jurisdiction nor, presumably, denied due process of
law to distributees who received less from the estate under one
state's decision than they would have received under the other
state's decision.263 On the other hand, in Western Union Tele-
graph Co. v. Pennsylvania264 one state attempted to escheat a
fund in a proceeding not binding on another state that was also
trying to escheat part of the same fund. The court held that the
260. Such cases can take various forms. For example, the parties in a visita-
tion case may consist of the widowed mother of a child and the divorced par-
ents of the child's deceased father. If the mother and grandparents live in
three different states and lack contacts with each other's states, and if only the
mother is willing and able in effect to waive her due process right by suing
away from home, a strict requirement of minimum contacts would not permit
one custody decree to bind all three adults. In another such case a child's fos-
ter parents might be suing both the father and the mother for custody in two
states. Again, if a rigid test of due process gives each state jurisdiction over
only one defendant but not the other, one decree cannot bind both defendants.
In yet another case a state might itself seek custody of a child whose father or
mother lives in a different state and lacks contacts with the state of the child's
residence.
261. 242 U.S. 394 (1917).
262. Id. at 405.
263. Id. at 404-05.
264. 368 U.S. 71 (1961).
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first escheat violated due process.2 65
Custody contests conducted in two states can produce ei-
ther kind of anomaly if neither state can bind every party. Sup-
pose, for example, that a child's paternal grandparents are
divorced and live in two different states. The grandmother lives
in state A and the grandfather in state B; each grandparent
lacks contacts with the other's state. The child's widowed
mother, who lives in B, may sue the grandmother for custody
in A, where the child lived with his father until the father's
death. Suppose that the mother wins custody, subject to the
grandmother's right to visitation in July of each year. If the
grandfather later sues in B for visitation, the B court may make
factual findings that are inconsistent with those made by the A
court, or the B court may give the grandfather visitation rights
for each August. Like the distributee of the estate in Baker,
the mother suffers the inconvenience and expense of duplica-
tive litigation and loses certain rights she won in one state be-
cause of the judgment of another state. The limits on state
court jurisdiction to bind litigants thus interferes with "the
ideal distribution of the entire" 266 set of custodial rights. If the
court is concerned with the welfare of children, it might object
more to inconvenience and interference with "ideal" disposi-
tions in custody cases than to similar interference in estate liti-
gation. The court, however, might strictly adhere to Baker and
deem this anomaly in custody litigation a mere "necessary inci-
dent" of territorial limits on judicial jurisdiction.
Assume a second hypothetical in which the mother loses
custody contests in both states A and B. The A court orders
her to send the child to the grandmother in state A and the B
court orders her to deliver the child to the grandfather in state
B.267 If this occurs, the mother faces more than inconvenience
and inconsistent findings and more than the loss in one forum
of what she gained in another. She must face even more than
the double liability that violated due process in Western Union.
She is literally unable to satisfy both judgments and conceiva-
bly could face punishment for contempt of court or even crimi-
nal prosecution.268
265. Id. at 75.
266. Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. at 405.
267. Enactment of the Wallop Act and the near ubiquity of the U.C.CJ-A.
make this unlikely, but it remains possible. See infra notes 573-83, 619-21, 629-46
and accompanying text.
268. Cf. In re Walker, 228 Cal. App. 2d 217, 221, 39 Cal. Rptr. 243, 245 (1964)
(conflicting judgments left mother open to criminal charge in Texas).
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The Court's solution in Western Union will not work in
child custody cases. In Western Union, the Court left the fund
in the possession of the defendant until the states brought an
original action in the Supreme Court to determine their respec-
tive interests.269 No similar resolution would be possible in
many custody cases, because if due process prohibits jurisdic-
tion over some of the parties, no single plaintiff could bring all
the claimants before a single court. If the contestants prefer
self-help to inconvenient litigation, there may be no attainable
judicial solution. For example, the grandparents, each having
won custody in their own state, may decline to sue to resolve
their conflicting rights and may resort instead to interstate
child-snatching. Leaving a child exposed to such conduct until
the interested adults choose to waive due process is less satis-
factory than leaving funds in the hands of a stakeholder until
one state chooses to sue others in the Supreme Court. The
Court therefore should be reluctant to hold, by analogy to West-
ern Union, that a custody decree binding some but not all of
the claimants violates the due process rights of each party
bound. Neither, however, should the Court readily decide that
due process prevents joinder of all claimants in a single cus-
tody proceeding. Such a holding could result in inconvenience,
waste, inconsistency, harmful self-help, and the issuance by
different states of mutually contradictory custody orders with
which a party would be unable to comply.2 70 Instead, the Court
should treat some custody cases involving multiple parties dif-
ferently than cases involving only two contestants. In consider-
ing the requirement of the due process clause in the former
cases, it should give great weight to the individual, state, and
national interests tending to support the broad power of a state
court to bind nonresident defendants.271
f. The Territorial Imperative
The Supreme Court indicated, however, that some of these
individual, state, and national interests may be relevant only in
evaluating fairness to defendants, and not in deciding whether
269. 368 U.S. at 77 (1961).
270. Cf. Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 150-51, 545 P.2d 264, 268, 127
Cal. Rptr. 352, 356 (1976) (dictum) ("avoidance of a multiplicity of suits and
conflicting adjudications" should help to justify jurisdiction over nonresidents).
271. See Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306, 316 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); cf. Mul-
lane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 311-13 (1950) (consider-
ing state interest in closing trusts as rationale for permitting jurisdiction over
trust claimants).
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an exercise of jurisdiction exceeds the limits that a state's sta-
tus within the federal system imposes on that state.272 Even if
the exercise of jurisdiction over defendants serves their con-
venience as well as the plaintiff's and effects a strong interest
of the forum state, it can deny due process by violating "princi-
ples of interstate federalism." 27 3
The Court has not been consistent in emphasizing this
branch of due process analysis274 and has not yet specifically
defined its contours. The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson did, however, reiterate and claim to apply the Inter-
national Shoe dictum that due process excludes jurisdiction
over a defendant who has "no contacts, ties, or relations" 27 5
with the forum state. Furthermore, in Kulko v. Superior
Court,27 6 the one recent case in which the Court has applied
"minimum contacts" analysis to litigation concerning domestic
relations, the Court emphasized that the unilateral activity of
someone other than the defendant cannot create the necessary
contacts; they invariably must result from the defendant's pur-
poseful conduct as the defendant seeks the benefits and protec-
tions of the laws of the forum state.277
Current state law and the Wallop Act ensure that few cases
will arise in which courts of states having literally no relations
with the defendants adjudicate custody. Jurisdiction usually
results from a substantial period of the child's residence,278
while an adult's attempts to exercise rights of custody or visita-
tion usually bring the adult to the residence of the child. Adju-
dications by states lacking contacts with defendants are,
nevertheless, still possible.27 9 If there are no contacts, the
272. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-94
(1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251-53 (1958).
273. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 293.
274. See, e.g., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 327-33 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 207-12 (1977).
275. 444 U.S. at 294 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 319 (1945)).
276. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
277. Id. at 93-94 (holding personal jurisdiction lacking over defendant in
child support action).
278. See supra notes 70-71, 216-18 and accompanying text.
279. See, e.g., Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306, 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). For
example, a father may have lived in a different state from the mother and child
since the child's birth. Because the child never lived in his state, both the
U.C.C.JA. and the Wallop Act prevent the father from bringing a custody pro-
ceeding in his state that, under the U.C.CJA or the Wallop Act, would have
precluded. the mother from suing in her state. In another case, a father may
once have lived with his child but has since separated from his wife. If both
move to different states, the father alone and the mother and child together, the
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Supreme Court apparently might conclude that principles of in-
terstate federalism bar custody adjudication by a court of the
plaintiff's state whether or not litigation in that state would be
convenient and effective for the plaintiff, serve the interests of
the new state, or provide an efficient determination of the best
interests of the child.
Paradoxically, widespread enactment of the U.C.C.J.A., a
statute that assumes that there is no due process requirement
of territorial jurisdiction over custody defendants,2 80 undercuts
the arguments for relaxation of that requirement. It does so by
ameliorating the burdens of plaintiffs who are forced to litigate
outside their home state. Certain sections of the Act encourage
states to make evidence located in their state available in an-
other state and to minimize and to allocate the inconvenience
and cost of litigation in any particular forum.2 81 Although
courts have made varied use of these and other U.C.C.J.A. tools
of interstate cooperation,28 2 these sections weaken the argu-
ment that it is necessary for effective custody litigation to per-
mit assertions of jurisdiction over defendants that violate
principles of federalism or that sacrifice the principle of fair-
ness to defendants.283 Indeed, the Court relied on the availabil-
ity of a similar uniform statute when it refused to relax due
process requirements for jurisdiction in a child support ac-
tion.284 Given the Court's commitment to its approach to due
process limits on territorial jurisdiction, the burden seems to
be on those attempting to justify a categorical exception to that
father's new state cannot exercise jurisdiction and bar the mother's state from
exercising jurisdiction. In still another case, a father, whose wife may have
suddenly left the family home with the child and hidden in another state, may
have failed to promptly commence custody proceedings and thereby under the
Wallop Act failed to prevent the mother's and child's new state from exercising
jurisdiction. In each of these three cases, even if the father had no personal
contact whatever with the new state of the mother and child, state and federal
statutes would leave the courts of the mother's state free to decide custody of
the child. See &upra text accompanying notes 216-18; infra text accompanying
notes 302-03, 573-75, 579-83, 620-29.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 155-56.
281. See U.C.C.JJA. §§ 18-20 (1968).
282. Compare Green v. Green, 87 Mich. App. 706, 709-15, 276 N.W.2d 472, 473-
76 (1978) (decision by two judges of different states through telephone conver-
sation concerning which court should hear child custody case) with Loper v.
Superior Court, 126 Ariz. 14, 612 P.2d 65 (Ct. App. 1980) (vacating denial of par-
ent's motion for finding of inconvenient forum, on grounds that lower court
should have first consulted and cooperated with Alaska court).
283. These U.C.CJ-A. provisions can also ameliorate the burdens on the de-
fendant, so their availability also arguably favors requiring the defendant to lit-
igate the custody issue in the plaintiffs state. See supra note 254.
284. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. at 98-99.
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approach. These U.C.C.J.A. provisions make that burden
harder to carry.
g. Likely Invalidation of Some U.C.C.J.A. Applications
The preceding analysis suggests that there are two reasons
why the Supreme Court will likely hold that some extreme ap-
plications of the U.C.C.J.A. deprive defendants of due process.
First, the Court's minimum contacts test of reasonableness is
"not susceptible of mechanical application" 285 but requires
courts to weigh the facts of each case.2 86 Not only do the con-
tacts between custody defendants and forum states vary sub-
stantially from one case to another, but also two of the four
interests that the Court will use to evaluate the reasonableness
of burdening defendants vary from case to case and may not be
involved at all in some cases. 2 87
Second, the Court often voices a concern for territorial lim-
its on state authority.28 8 This concern appears to be separate
from considerations of convenience and interests of particular
parties and states and seems to require that defendants have
some purposeful contacts with the forum. Since it is possible
under state and federal statutory law for a forum state to exer-
cise jurisdiction over the custody of a child even if one parent
has no intentional contacts with the state and another state
would be a satisfactory forum, 2 89 there will probably be a few
cases in which the due process clause, as an instrument of fed-
eralism, will bar the exercise of jurisdiction otherwise proper
under federal and state law.
Using the due process clause to invalidate exercises of ju-
risdiction under the U.C.C.JA. in which there are insufficient
forum-defendant contacts may be an improvement, not a blight,
upon the current statutory law of custody jurisdiction. The
minimum contacts standard enhances the likelihood that each
adult who claims to speak for the child's interests has an ade-
quate opportunity to do s0.2 90 That opportunity in turn maxi-
mizes the information available to a forum when deciding
whether or not to defer to another forum also having jurisdic-
tion. Yet, courts should be reasonably flexible in applying the
285. Id. at 92 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958)).
286. Id.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 235-55.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 272-84.
289. See, e.g., In re Leonard, 122 CaL App. 3d 443, 175 CaL Rptr. 903 (1981);
Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306, 313-14 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
290. See supra text accompanying notes 223-28, 249.
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International Shoe requirement to custody litigation. Cases in
which there are strong individual and state interests in having
litigation occur in a particular forum should be allowed to re-
main in that forum, even though there will be some sacrifice of
defendants' interests. The clearest example of such a case is
an abandonment or neglect proceeding in which the location or
even the identities of a child's parents are unknown. Due pro-
cess should only limit the consequences of this proceeding on a
parent who may eventually appear; it should not limit the au-
thority of the state to take immediate protective action. The re-
quirements of due process should also be flexible in cases
involving either multiple parties291 or the absence of a suitable
forum having contacts with both of the parties. 2 92 In such
cases, the relevant individual and state interests may justify
proceedings binding each contestant despite the absence of
contacts that due process would otherwise require.
Using the due process standards of International Shoe is
far wiser than adopting other alternative due process stan-
dards. It would be inappropriate, for example, for the Court to
equate due process with the detailed statutory scheme of the
U.C.C.J.A. Since the Act is receiving disparate and parochial
interpretations and applications,2 93 this alternative would likely
be ineffective as well. If the Court instead held that due pro-
cess requires a forum state to have a connection with the child,
but defined this connection in terms other than those of the
U.C.C.J.A., the Court probably would interfere with the opera-
tion of the federal and state statutory scheme as much or more
than it would if it merely applied the general principles of Inter-
national Shoe and its progeny.294 Thus, sensible application of
the standards of International Shoe seems likely to provide the
best constitutional control on custody jurisdiction.
A flexible interpretation of the due process standards of In-
ternational Shoe neither abdicates to unfettered state law, nor
291. See supra text accompanying notes 260-71.
292. See supra text accompanying note 245.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 80, 135-38.
294. The federal and state acts probably recognize jurisdiction more often
in cases in which the child is not currently a resident or domiciled in the forum
state than in cases in which the forum state lacks both contacts with the de-
fendant and justification for not requiring such contacts.
In any event, it would be unwise for the Court to define this connection be-
tween the child and the state in terms of the child's domicile or residence. A
parent can easily manipulate the location of a child's domicile or residence.
Moreover, these criteria are inadequate to serve any of the purposes of selec-
tion among possible forums. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
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invariably requires forum-defendant contacts, nor indiscrimi-
nately dispenses with them. Instead, it reflects the general
standards of fairness and reasonableness in the special context
of custody litigation. In applying the due process clause to cus-
tody cases, courts should not only respect the individual and
institutional interests that the Supreme Court has recognized
as relevant, but also give some deference to the specific federal
and state statutory scheme adopted to advance those interests.
If courts do so, they will sustain custody jurisdiction exercised
consistently with the U.C.C.J.A. and the Wallop Act in all but
extreme cases in which courts adjudicate the rights of defend-
ants lacking significant contacts with the forum without real
justification.
D. THE NEW FEDERAL STATUTE
Certain commentators suggest that the Wallop Act,295 also
known as the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act or P.K.P.A.,
codified as section 1738A of title 28 of the United States Code,296
drastically alters federal and state law on initial custody juris-
diction.297 Professor Henry Foster and Dr. Doris Freed have
written that, unlike the U.C.C.J.A. with its "alternative bases
for custody jurisdiction,"298 the "PKPA, in effect, confers exclu-
sive and continuing child-custody jurisdiction on the home
state."299 Richard Crouch has similarly contended that the new
295. Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 6, 94
Stat. 3568.
296. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (West Supp. 1980).
297. See Foster & Freed, Child-Custody Decrees-Jurisdiction, N.Y.L.J., Apr.
24, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
298. Id. at 2, col. 1; U.C.C.J. § 3 (1968).
299. Foster & Freed, supra note 297, at 2, col. 1; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(c) (2) (B)
(West Supp. 1980). They have also stated that the Wallop Act renders signifi-
cant connection jurisdiction "superfluous" and suggested that "for all practical
purposes" it has been "eliminated." Id. at 2, cols. 1-2. They asserted that the
Wallop Act treated significant connection jurisdiction in this manner because
the measure was "prepared and passed in a hurry" and contended that the re-
sult surprised "concerned scholars." Id.
In fact, however, a recommendation that Congress make initial jurisdiction
of a home state exclusive of initial significant connection jurisdiction for the
purposes of the Wallop Act was presented in a Senate subcommittee hearing
on the legislation as early as April, 1979. See Parental Kidnaping, 1979: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 51-52 (1979)
(statement of Professor Brigitte M. Bodenheimer) [hereinafter cited as 1979
Senate Hearing]. Nine months later, when Professor Foster and Dr. Freed sub-
nitted statements on the bill to the same subcommittee, neither of them com-
mented on this recommendation. See 1980 Senate Hearing, supra note 4, at 52-
58 (testimony and statement of Dr. Doris Freed), Addendum at 218-33 (state-
ment of Professor Henry Foster). Later, in a Senate hearing in January, 1980,
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Act "makes express and exclusive the priority of home state ju-
risdiction over the other jurisdictions" and that it is therefore
in conflict with U.C.C.J.A. decisions that "have found and exer-
cised significant-connection jurisdiction despite there being a
home state elsewhere."300
These interpretations of the Wallop Act are inaccurate.
Section 1738A, correctly interpreted, does not "confer" jurisdic-
tion. The federal provision detailing the relationship between
the "home state" and "significant connection" bases of jurisdic-
tion 301 is not a grant or denial of initial jurisdiction; it is only a
criterion for applying the new federal statutory duties gov-
erning the enforcement and modification of foreign decrees and
the treatment of concurrent proceedings. 02 Only two of the
Wallop Act's provisions limit the authority of a state court to
make the initial award of a child's custody. One provision re-
quires that courts give contestants notice and opportunity to be
heard before it makes a custody determination.3 03 The other
provision forbids a state court under certain circumstances
from exercising custody jurisdiction during the pendency of a
proceeding in another state.3 04 The Wallop Act has no other
controls circumscribing the authority of a state court to con-
duct proceedings for, and to make, an initial custody decree.3 05
the recommendation received the endorsement of the author of this Article,
who suggested language to implement the recommendation which the Senate
subcommittee thereafter adopted. Id. at 145 n.16, Addendum at 270 (statement
and further submission of Russell M. Coombs). In June 1980, Dr. Freed again
testified on the legislation and again did not comment upon the recommenda-
tion in question. Parental Kidnaping: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 99-107 (1980). Two
months later the Senate passed a version of the Wallop proposal, including this
subordination of significant connection to home state jurisdiction, and on that
occasion Senator Wallop explained the reasons for the amendment. 126 CONG.
REC. Sl1,483-86, S11,489 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1980). Then in September 1980, three
months before enactment of the Wallop Act, the House-Senate conference com-
mittee approved the proposed legislation in a form which included the lan-
guage under discussion. ER. REP. No. 1401, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1980). The
statutory subordination of significant connection jurisdiction does not, there-
fore, seem to have been a result of haste nor a cause for surprise to concerned
scholars.
300. R. CROUCH, supra note 70, at 91.
301. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) (2) (B) (i) (West Supp. 1980).
302. This provision is analyzed in connection with the discussion of these
duties below. See infra text accompanying notes 380-90, 631-32.
303. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(e) (West Supp. 1980).
304. Id. at § 1738A(g).
305. See HIR REP. No. 1396, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 639 (1980); S. REP. No. 553,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1254 (1980). In the first draft of § 1738A and in several sub-
sequent revisions, subsection (c) did provide that a state "has jurisdiction...
if and only if' it meets the criteria of § 1738A(c) (1) and (2). Typed drafts of
amendment to S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Nov. 15, 1977) (on file with the Min-
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1. Notice and Opportunity to be Heard
Section 1738A(e) provides that "[b]efore a child custody
determination is made, reasonable notice and opportunity to be
heard shall be given to the contestants, any parent whose pa-
rental rights have not been previously terminated and any per-
son who has physical custody of a child."306 This provision
should have little practical impact on most initial custody pro-
ceedings, but in occasional cases it may give rise to difficult and
crucial legal issues.
Subsection (e) does not specify the methods to use in at-
tempting notification, the circumstances under which actual no-
tice is sufficient, the circumstances under which unsuccessful
attempts are sufficient, the period of time a person has to pre-
pare for a hearing, or the extent of participation in the proceed-
ings that courts must afford to particular classes of persons. It
answers these questions by referring to the constitutional stan-
dard of reasonableness. 30 7 Instead of describing what notice
and opportunity to be heard means, subsection (e) specifies
the classes of persons that must receive notice and opportunity
to be heard, even if state law308 and federal constitutional
law3 09 offer them no protection.3 10 The two principal problems
nesota Law Review). The language of the Act was changed, however, because
of information discovered by this author during negotiations with Senator Wal-
lop's staff over the possibility of Senator Wallop accepting the draft as a substi-
tute for a solely criminal provision on "child-snatching" that he had earlier
persuaded the Senate Judiciary Committee to insert in the Criminal Code bill,
S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Nov. 15, 1977). It was learned by this author that
Senator Culver of Iowa might oppose the substitute draft on the ground that it
unduly interfered with state power. The draft then was revised to make the
standards in section 1738A(c) (1) and (2) mere conditions on the proposed du-
ties governing interstate enforcement, nonmodification, and concurrent pro-
ceedings rather than criteria for the existence or nonexistence of jurisdiction.
When Senator Wallop agreed to accept the draft it incorporated that revision.
306. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(e) (West Supp. 1980).
307. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
308. See, e.g., Clements v. Barber, 49 Ala. App. 266, 272-73, 270 So. 2d 815, 820
(Civ. App. 1972) (notice of custody proceeding to "boarding home parents" in
physical possession of child not required); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 77 Ill. App. 3d
873, 876, 396 N.E.2d 668, 670 (1979) (father not required to give notice of custody
proceedings to mother's grandparents or child's maternal grandparents when
neither set of grandparents were members of class for which statute requires
notice).
309. See, e.g., Kyees v. County Dep't of Pub. Welfare of Tippecanoe County,
600 F.2d 693, 698-99 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding foster parents in possession of child
lack liberty interest requiring due process in removal of child).
310. In describing which persons should receive notice both inside and
outside the forum state, the Wallop Act generally follows U.C.C.J.A. section 4,
which establishes notice requirements only for persons inside the forum state.
U.C.C.J.. § 4 (1968). The Commissioners' Note to section 4 states that its pro-
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that one faces in interpreting subsection (e), therefore, relate
to the language it uses to describe which persons it covers. The
reference to termination of parental rights creates one problem,
while the use of the term "contestants" creates the other.
a. Notice and Hearing for a Parent Attacking Prior
Termination of Parental Rights
Subsection (e) requires that notice and opportunity to be
heard be given to "any parent whose parental rights have not
been previously terminated."3 1 This requirement may present
rather complex issues of law if parents, denied notice and op-
portunity to be heard on the ground that their rights had been
terminated, argue that they should have been given notice and
opportunity to be heard because the termination of their paren-
tal rights was invalid. Parents might claim, for example, that
they were given inadequate notice and opportunity to be heard
in the termination proceeding;31 2 that the terminating court
lacked jurisdiction over the parent,313 over the child,314 or over
the subject matter; 15 that failure to appoint counsel to repre-
sent the parent 316 or to allow the parent to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses3 17 denied him or her due process;
or that the substantive standard on which the court based ter-
mination was constitutionally inadequate on its face or as ap-
plied to the parent.3 18 Some of these claims have at least
vision of notice and opportunity to be heard is a due process requirement.
U.C.C.J.A. § 4 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 130 (1979). It is doubtful, however,
that mere physical custody of a child, which section 2(8) defines as "actual pos-
session and control," U.C.C.J.A. § 2(8) (1968), and which, therefore, even a
wrongdoer unrelated to the child could achieve, is a sufficient predicate for this
due process right. See Kyees v. County Dep't of Pub. Welfare of Tippecanoe
County, 600 F.2d 693, 698-99 (7th Cir. 1979).
311. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(e) (West Supp. 1980).
312. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) (holding that adoption
without notice to parent whose parental rights the adoption terminated vio-
lated due process); Tammie v. Rodriguez, 570 P.2d 332, 334-35 (Okla. 1977) (va-
cating termination of rights of mother not given notice required by statute).
313. See In re One Minor Child, 411 A.2d 951, 952-53 (Del. 1980).
314. See Huff v. Moore, 144 Ga. App. 668, 668, 242 S.E.2d 329, 329 (1978).
315. See In re Marriage of Carrico, 284 N.W.2d 251, 255 (Iowa 1979).
316. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham County, 452 U.S.
18, 24 (1981).
317. Cf. In re Jones, 429 A.2d 671, 673 (Pa. Super. 1981) (holding confronta-
tion and cross-examination of adverse witnesses required by due process in
dispositional hearing in child-custody case).
318. See Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 17-21 (S.D. Iowa 1975),
aFd, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976); In re J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d 118, 132-40, 306
N.W.2d 46, 53-57 (1981).
1982]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tenable bases in federal constitutional law, 319 state law, 320 or
both federal and state law. 321
In deciding how to apply the Wallop Act in the face of such
an attack, a court must decide not only whether the termina-
tion had indeed been defective, but also whether principles of
res judicata or full faith and credit prevent collateral attack on
the termination.322 If the court decides that these principles
permit collateral attack, it then must also consider whether it
should construe section 1738A(e) to bar such an attack and
whether the Constitution allows that construction.323 The Wal-
lop Act and its legislative history are silent on these questions,
and resolving them is beyond the scope of this Article. One
should nevertheless note that if subsection (e) requires that
persons who launch these attacks be given notice and opportu-
nity to be heard, and if state law fails to require notice and op-
portunity to be heard in such cases, 324 then subsection (e)
restricts the power to make initial custody decisions.
b. Notice and Hearing for a Person Claiming Custody or
Visitation
A contestant must be given notice and opportunity to be
heard under subsection (e). Subsection (b) defines "contest-
ant" as a person who "claims a right to custody or visitation" of
the child.3 23 In interpreting subsection (e), therefore, one must
decide whether the contestant's claim has to be cognizable
under state or federal law and, if it must, which state's law in
the absence of federal law determines whether it is cognizable.
The answer to the first question is clear-the claim must be
cognizable for subsection (e) to apply. Congress could not
have intended to allow total strangers to a child a right of no-
tice simply by their making a claim that all law would deny
319. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965); Alsager v. Dis-
trict Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 17-21 (S.D. Iowa 1975), affid, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir.
1976).
320. See, e.g., Huff v. Moore, 144 Ga. App. 668, 668-69, 242 S.E.2d 329, 329-30
(1978). Cf. Davey v. Evans, 156 Ga. App. 698, 700, 275 S.E.2d 769, 771 (1980) (res-
idence or domicile of the child is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to adoption).
321. See, e.g., In re One Minor Child, 411 A.2d 951, 952-53 (Del. 1980); In re
J.L.W., 102 Wis.2d 118, 130-40, 306 N.W.2d 46, 52-57 (1981).
322. See generally infra text accompanying notes 510-50, 584-619, 753-99.
323. See In re Riggs, 612 S.W.2d 461, 465-69 (Tenn. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 921 (1981).
324. Cf. People ex rel TAF., 624 P.2d 349, 351 (Colo. App. 1980) (members of
extended family lacked standing to challenge order terminating parental
rights).
325. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b) (2) (West Supp. 1980).
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them standing to assert. Subsection (e) must exist to protect
only those whose claims the courts would hear, because they
are the only ones whose claims will affect the proceedings.
There is, however, little authority explicitly supporting this po-
sition. The legislative history of the Wallop Act does not pro-
vide any guidance on the issue.326 The Commissioners' Notes
commenting on similar language in several sections of the
U.C.C.J.A.327 also do not adequately resolve the question. 328
One court has, however, interpreted the similar provision of
U.C.C.J.A. section 10, which requires a court when it learns of
people who claim custody or visitation rights to order that they
be notified and joined as parties. Almost a year before enact-
ment of the Wallop Act, the Supreme Court of Missouri held
that section 10 was inapplicable to foster parents on the ground
that under other Missouri law they lacked standing.329 Al-
though there' is no indication in the legislative history of the
Wallop Act that Congress was aware of this precedent, there is
also no indication that Congress intended, any more than the
Commissioners did, to require notice to persons lacking stand-
ing or substantive custody rights. 330
If the claim of the contestant must be cognizable, the court
must decide which state's law controls the question of standing
to claim custody or visitation rights.331 Since this choice will af-
fect the operation of section 1738A not only in initial custody
cases, but also in cases involving enforcement and modification
of custody orders, this Article defers full discussion of its
proper resolution until after an examination of the manner in
which the Wallop Act generally treats enforcement and modifi-
326. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1401, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 41-43 (1980); S. REP.
No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1253-55 (1980).
327. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b) (2), (e) (West Supp. 1980) with
U.C.C.J.A. §§ 2(l), 4, 10 (1968).
328. See U.C.C.J.A. §§ 2(1), 4, 10 Commissioners' Notes, 9 U.L.A. 120, 130, 147
(1979).
329. In re Trapp, 593 S.W.2d 193, 205 (Mo. 1980). In the Missouri version of
the U.C.C.J., joinder and notice under section 10 are discretionary, not
mandatory as in the U.C.C.J.A Id. at 205 n.11.
330. See, e.g., supra note 326.
331. Standing to hear the claim would usually depend on state law, but not
always. Even if state law denies a person, such as the father of an illegitimate
child, any substantive right to custody or visitation and any standing to request
it, if the Constitution gives him such a substantive right, then due process enti-
ties him to notice and a hearing. See generally Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972). In such a case, federal constitutional law surely requires the state court
to respect the claim. Since the person can make the federal claim in the state
court, it is a claim within the section 1738A definition of a "contestant" and sup-
ports application of the statutory requirement of notice and opportunity to be
heard.
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cation.332 It is sufficient to state this Article's conclusion that
subsection (e) probably requires the claim to be cognizable
under the law of the forum state. If this interpretation is cor-
rect, then the Wallop Act's requirement of notice and opportu-
nity to be heard in initial custody cases is in this respect no
broader than the notice and hearing requirements of the Con-
stitution333 and of state law. 334
c. Other Legal Issues
The legal issues that subsection (e) creates do not all con-
cern the question of who is entitled to notice and opportunity
to be heard. There is also a question whether violation of sub-
section (e)'s notice and hearing requirement invalidates a de-
cree within the rendering state and disqualifies it for the
recognition or enforcement that other states might give it
under state law or federal constitutional law. The intrastate ef-
fect of a state's violation of the Wallop Act's provisions seems
clear under the language of subsection (e) and under the re-
mainder of section 1738A.335 A custody determination made
without the required notice and opportunity to be heard vio-
lates federal law, because subsection (e) mandates these re-
quirements "before a child custody determination is made."3 36
The Wallop Act does not say, however, when and how the
courts of that state on direct or collateral review of the proceed-
332. See infra text accompanying notes 872-78.
333. See, e.g., Kyees v. County Dep't of Pub. Welfare of Tippecanoe County,
600 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1979).
334. Compare In re Trapp, 593 S.W.2d 193, 205 (Mo. 1980) (foster parents in
possession of child have no right under state law to intervene in custody pro-
ceeding) with People ex rel. M.D.C.M. v. Sanchez, 522 P.2d 1234 (Colo. App.
1974) (state statute requires that foster parents be entitled to intervene in a
dispositional hearing). Another feature of subsection (e) that may in some
states impose new restrictions on the exercise of initial jurisdiction is the re-
quirement that notice and opportunity to be heard be given to any person who
has physical possession and control of a child. This requirement applies re-
gardless of the possessor's relationship to the child or the possessor's standing
to seek custody or visitation rights. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(b) (7), (e) (West
Supp. 1980); cf. U.C.C.J.A. §§ 2(8), 4 (1968) (identical U.C.C.J. requirement).
335. See infra text accompanying notes 647-726, 749-51. The only interstate
sanction that the Wallop Act imposes if a state proceeding violates one of its
requirements is found in section 1738A(a) and (g). This section states that
such proceedings are not entitled to the respect that other states must nor-
mally give to foreign proceedings under sections 1738A(a) and (g), see infra
text accompanying notes 343-440, 620-47, because they are not conducted "con-
sistently with the provisions of this section." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(a), (g) (West
Supp. 1980). See Virginia E.E. v. Alberto S.P., 440 N.Y.S.2d 979, 984 (Fam. Ct.
1981).
336. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(e) (West Supp. 1980).
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ings can correct the error of federal law. It thereby leaves such
questions to the law of the rendering state.337
Another legal issue under the Wallop Act is whether the
Act preempts state law provisions governing notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard. Subsection (e) does not prohibit giving no-
tice and opportunity to be heard to persons whom it does not
protect but who are entitled to those procedural protections
under the due process clause or under state law. Neither does
it expressly forbid giving notice and opportunity to be heard in
a manner that is more than reasonable.33 8 This Article dis-
cusses whether the Wallop Act has occupied the field or other-
wise invalidated various state law requirements below, and
reaches the conclusion that the Act preempts state law only if
courts find it literally impossible to comply with both federal
and state law.339 In subsection (e), as elsewhere,34 0 the Wallop
Act merely imposes an express federal statutory requirement
and does not prohibit the application of requirements derived
from other sources of law.
If courts interpret subsection (e) as suggested, it will pre-
clude the jurisdiction of state courts over initial custody pro-
ceedings in only a few instances. 3 41 The Wallop Act's
expansion of notice and hearing requirements should, there-
fore, have only a minor impact on the practices of state courts.
2. Concurrent Exercise of Jurisdiction
Section 1738A(g), a more significant limitation on initial ju-
risdiction than subsection (e), controls simultaneous proceed-
ings in two states. Subsection (g) provides that
a court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for a
custody determination commenced during the pendency of a proceed-
ing in a court of another State where such court of that other State is
exercising jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of this section
to make a custody determination 3 4 2
This provision limits initial jurisdiction in non-U.C.C.J.A. states
337. See generally Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 489, 508 (1954).
338. The law of some U.C.C.J.A. states requires giving notice and opportu-
nity to be heard in a manner that is arguably more than reasonable. See, e.g.,
GA. CODE ANN. § 74-506(b) (1981). The law of some non-U.C.C.J.A. states also
requires this extra effort. See, e.g., TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(b) (Vernon
Supp. 1981).
339. See infra text accompanying notes 647-726.
340. See U.S.C.A. § 1738A(a), (g) (West Supp. 1980).
341. Cf. supra note 96 (discussing the U.C.C.JA. sections governing the
existence and exercise of jurisdiction).
342. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(g) (West Supp. 1980).
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that do not require deference to a sister state in which an ini-
tial case was first filed.343 Subsection (g) should also have a
substantial effect in U.C.C.J.A. states because of two differ-
ences between it and U.C.C.J.A. section 6.344 First, the scope of
the federal duty not to exercise jurisdiction is different from
the scope of the U.C.C.J.A. duty not to exercise jurisdiction.
Second, the applicability of the federal duty depends not on fo-
rum law but on federal law and the law of the other state. Be-
cause of these differences, subsection (g) will prohibit the
exercise of jurisdiction in some cases in which state law per-
mits it. Moreover, the Supreme Court will be able to correct er-
roneous interpretations or applications of this federal duty.345
a. Scope of Statutory Duties
There are four significant differences between the breadth
of the Wallop Act's duty not to conduct concurrent proceedings
and the similar duty under U.C.C.J.A. section 6.346
(1) Conformity with the Statutes
In one respect the Wallop Act is less strict than the
U.C.C.J.A. in prohibiting the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction.
Section 1738A(g) prevents a forum from exercising jurisdiction
only if the state in which a proceeding was already pending "is
exercising jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of this
section to make a custody determination." 47 If the pending
proceeding does not satisfy this fairly rigorous test, then the
new forum can act. In contrast, the U.C.C.J.A. more broadly
commands deference to a pending proceeding. U.C.C.J.A. sec-
tion 6(a) forbids the exercise of jurisdiction even if the first fo-
rum is exercising jurisdiction only "substantially" in
conformity with the U.C.C.J.A.348 Furthermore, section 6(c) re-
quires a stay of the new forum's proceeding, at least tempora-
343. See supra text accompanying note 138.
344. U.C.C.JA. § 6 (1968). See supra text accompanying note 82.
345. See infra text accompanying notes 409-11.
346. U.S.C.A. § 1738A(g) (West Supp. 1980) forbids the exercise of jurisdic-
tion "in any proceeding for a custody determination," while U.C.C.J.A. § 6(a)
(1968) forbids the exercise of jurisdiction "under this Act." The federal lan-
guage perhaps makes it clearer than does the U.C.C.J.A. language that the pro-
hibition is applicable only when both states' proceedings are aimed at the
making or modifying of a custody determination, not also when the proceeding
of one state or the other is one for mere enforcement of a decree, but this
seems clear enough under both acts. See infra text accompanying note 452.
347. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(g) (West Supp. 1980).
348. Paltrow v. Paltrow, 37 Md. App. 191, 200, 376 A.2d 1134, 1140 (1977), affd
on other grounds, 283 Md. 291, 388 A.2d 547 (1978).
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rily, if it learns of a prior proceeding in another state, whether
or not the other state's exercise of jurisdiction conforms sub-
stantially to the U.C.C.J.A. or to any other standards. The Com-
missioners' Note accompanying section 6 also suggests that it
may sometimes be appropriate for a state to defer to another
state in which a proceeding was commenced earlier and is still
pending even if the jurisdictional basis for the pending pro-
ceeding does not substantially conform to the U.C.C.J.A.349 Fi-
nally, section 6(b) requires a court to consult a registry of
interstate cases before hearing a custody case. If the court be-
lieves that a proceeding is pending elsewhere, it must direct an
inquiry to the other state whether or not it believes the pro-
ceeding is consistent with the U.C.C.J.A. These U.C.C.J.A. pro-
visions may preclude or delay an exercise of jurisdiction that
the federal provision does not restrict.
(2) Criteria for the Race to the Courthouse
Differences between the "first-in-time" rule found in the
Wallop Act and the parallel rule in the U.C.C.J.A. can lead to
contrary decisions regarding which proceeding won the race to
the courthouse. The section 1738A(g) prohibition on concur-
rent proceedings applies if the proceeding in the forum state,
state B, was "commenced during the pendency" of a proceed-
ing in another state, state A.350 U.C.C.J.A. section 6(a), on the
other hand, applies if a proceeding was "pending" in state A "at
the time of filing the petition."3 51 Courts should construe sub-
section (g) to allow each state's law to determine when a pro-
ceeding in that state is commenced or begins its pendency,35 2
whether it is upon filing of a pleading,353 delivery of process to
349. Some courts have treated the pendency of foreign proceedings as a rea-
son not to exercise jurisdiction even where section 6(a) has not dictated that
result, see, e.g., Bosse v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 440, 445, 152 Cal. Rptr.
665, 668 (1979) (relying on section 7, not section 6), but such deference is discre-
tionary with the second forum. See Allison v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d
993, 1001, 160 Cal. Rptr. 309, 313 (1979). There have been cases of this kind in
which the second forum has declined to stay or to dismiss its proceeding. See,
e.g., Sharp v. Aarons, 101 Misc. 2d 323, 325, 420 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 1014 (Fam. Ct.
1979); Williams v. Zacher, 35 Or. App. 129, 139-40, 581 P.2d 91, 97 (1978).
350. See supra text accompanying note 342.
351. See supra text accompanying notes 82-90.
352. See, e.g., Lopez v. District Court, 606 P.2d 853, 855 (Colo. 1980) (en
banc) (applying California law to determine whether a California proceeding
was pending when the Colorado petition was filed); Potter v. Potter, 104 Misc.2d
930, 430 N.Y.S.2d 201, 204 (Fain. Ct. 1980) (applying Wisconsin law to determine
whether Wisconsin proceeding preceded New York one).
353. See, e.g., Lopez v. District Court, 606 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1980) (en banc).
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an officer for service,354 or service of process.355 This interpre-
tation is consonant with the general approach of the Wallop
Act, which consistently allows each state to determine whether
its interests in a proceeding are strong enough to deserve and
to receive interstate respect.3 5 6 One can interpret U.C.C.J.A.
section 6(a) as also making state A's law dispositive of whether
a proceeding in A is pending. There is, however, little authority
expressly supporting this interpretation,35 7 and, in any event,
each state is free to interpret its U.C.C.J.A. differently. Thus,
there may be a difference in a particular case between federal
and state law regarding when the pendency of the proceeding
in state A began. It is even more likely that there will be a dif-
ference between the time when the petition in state B was filed
under U.C.C.J.A. section 6(a) and the time when the proceed-
ing in state B was commenced under section 1738A(g). Either
difference may lead the U.C.C.J.A. to declare that one party has
won the race to the courthouse, while the Wallop Act declares
that the other party won the race. This, in turn, may lead to
differing applications of the federal and state prohibitions
against concurrent exercise of jurisdiction.
(3) Differences in Jurisdictional Criteria Incorporated by
Reference
The third difference, or more precisely, set of differences
between section 1738A and the U.C.C.J.A. has the most signifi-
cant effect on the scope of their prohibitions against concurrent
exercise of initial jurisdiction. It is found in the jurisdictional
criteria that section 1738A(g) and its U.C.C.J.A. analogue incor-
porate by reference.358
354. See, e.g., Orlando v. Alamo, 646 F.2d 1288, 1290 (8th Cir. 1981).
355. See, e.g., Potter v. Potter, 104 Misc.2d 930, 430 N.Y.S.2d 201, 204 (Faro. Ct.
1980).
356. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(c) (1), (d) (West Supp. 1980).
357. An Arizona court has indicated without discussion that U.C.C.J.A. sec-
tion 6 precluded an Alaska court from exercising its jurisdiction in a case in
which filing and service of process in the Alaska suit occurred after the filing of
an Arizona proceeding but before service of the Arizona process. Loper v. Su-
perior Court, 126 Ariz. 14, 16, 612 P.2d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 1980). See cases cited
supra note 352.
358. Some differences of terminology seem insignificant. For example, the
difference between "such" state and "this" state, compare 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1738A(c)(2)(A)-(D) (West Supp. 1980) with U.C.C.J._A § 3(a)(1)-(4) (1968),
and the difference between "on the date" and "at the time," compare 28
U.S.CA § 1738A(c) (2) (A) (i) (West Supp. 1980) with U.C.C.JA. §3(a)(1)(i)
(1968), and the difference between "the State whose jurisdiction is in issue,"
and "this State," compare 28 U.S.C-.A § 1738A(c) (2) (D) (i) (West Supp. 1980)
with U.C.C.JA § 3(a) (4) (i) (1968), do not appear meaningful. Another mean-
[Vol. 66:711
INTERSTATE CHILD CUSTODY
Some of these jurisdictional differences between the two
acts are relatively minor. For example, a state may claim juris-
diction under the catchall provision of U.C.C.J.A. section
3(a) (4) if no other state has jurisdiction "substantially" in ac-
cordance with the other section 3 bases of jurisdiction;359 sec-
tion 1738A(c) (2) (D) (i) lacks a comparably flexible term.36o
Also, the U.C.C.J.A.'s "extended home state"36 ' provision,
which gives jurisdiction to a state from which a child is absent
if that state was the child's home state less than six months
before commencement of the proceeding, is applicable only if
"a parent or person acting as parent" continues to live in the
forum state.362 The similar federal provision is applicable only
if a "contestant" continues to live in the forum state.363 Al-
though the definitions of these state and federal terms are
quite similar,364 the differences between them, or the differ-
ences of interpretation that may arise, may in a few cases
cause the U.C.C.J.A. and Wallop Act to treat a state's exercise
of concurrent jurisdiction differently.
The difference between the emergency jurisdiction criteria
in the two acts is likely to be more significant. Section 1738A
limits federal "emergency" jurisdiction to cases in which chil-
dren have been "subjected to or threatened with mistreatment
or abuse."3 65 The similar U.C.C.J.A. provision not only covers
these cases, but also covers children "otherwise neglected" and
gives states the option to cover those who are "dependent."3 6 6
States have enacted various versions of this provision. Some
have included367 and some have omitted 368 coverage of "depen-
dent" children; some have made cross-references to other stat-
ingless difference is the absence in the Wallop Act of a superfluous provision
like U.C.CJ . section 3(c), which says that "[p]hysical presence of the child,
while desirable, is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine his custody."
U.C.C.JA § 3(c) (1968).
359. U.C.C.J.A. § 3(a) (4) (1968).
360. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(c) (2) (D) (i) (West Supp. 1980) reads in part that
custody determinations are consistent with the section only if "no other State
would have jurisdiction under subparagraphs [A-C, El, or another State has
declined to exercise jurisdiction."
361. See Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continu-
ing Jurisdiction under the U.C.C.J.A., 14 FAo. L.Q. 203, 208 (1981).
362. U.C.C.J.A. § 3(a) (1) (ii) (1968).
363. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(c) (2) (A) (ii) (West Supp. 1980).
364. Compare id. § 1738A(b) (2) with U.C.C.J.A. § 2(9) (1968).
365. 28 U.S.C.A § 1738A(c) (2) (C) (ii) (West Supp. 1980).
366. U.C.C.J.A. § 3(a) (3) (ii) (1968).
367. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 5-1003(a) (3) (ii) (1979).
368. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.1308(1) (c) (2) (West Supp. 1981); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 804.1.c. (1981).
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utes on abuse, neglect, and dependency; 69 some have added
further possible categories of endangered children;370 and a few
have required only that there be an emergency requiring pro-
tection of a child present in the state.3 71 In most U.C.C.J.A.
states this basis for concurrent jurisdiction, therefore, is signifi-
cantly broader than the criterion in the corresponding federal
provision. As a result, the U.C.C.J.A. may force state B to re-
spect state A's ongoing exercise of initial jurisdiction over a
child, because state A satisfies the U.C.C.J.A. broad test of
emergency jurisdiction. At the same time, subsection (g) of the
Wallop Act may not require state B to respect state A's pro-
ceeding, because state A has not satisfied the narrower federal
basis of emergency jurisdiction requiring the child to be "sub-
jected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse."372
Finally, the Wallop Act provision that bases jurisdiction on
the state's possessing a "significant connection" with both the
child and the child's parents or a contestant 373 contains two
limiting phrases that the corresponding U.C.C.J.A. paragraph
does not contain. First, the federal provision requires a signifi-
cant connection "other than mere physical presence" in the
state.37 4 U.C.C.J.A. section 3 is similar: "physical presence...
of the child, or of the child and one of the contestants, is not
alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction . . . ."375 This U.C.C.J.A.
provision, however, addresses an issue different from the issue
that the federal provision addresses. The U.C.C.J.A. provision
only notes that jurisdiction requires more than physical pres-
ence.376 It does not address the question of whether physical
369. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.30.020(a) (2) (1977).
370. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-03.1.c.(2) (1971) (covering "deprived"
children).
371. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458-A:3.L(c) (2) (Supp. 1979); N.Y. DoM.
REL. LAw § 75-d.1.(c) (ii) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
372. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) (2) (C) (ii), (g) (West Supp. 1980).
373. Id. § 1738A(c) (2) (B).
374. Compare id. §1738A(c)(2)(B)(ii)(I) with U.C.C.J.A. §3(a)(2)(i)
(1968).
375. U.C.C.J.A. § 3(b) (1968).
376. This provision is superfluous since the only U.C.C.J.A. jurisdictional
bases that refer to presence of the child expressly impose other requirements
as well. See id. §§ 2(5), 3(a) (1), (3). Moreover, U.C.C.J.A. section 3(b) is not
only superfluous but potentially misleading. It excepts from that provision the
"catchall" and "emergency" jurisdictional bases of sections 3(a)(3) and (4).
Section 3(b), therefore, implies that physical presence is sufficient to confer ju-
risdiction under those paragraphs. A sentence in the Commissioners' Note, if
taken out of context, expressly confirms this implication, saying in connection
with paragraph (3) that the "[p]resence of the child in the state is the only pre-
requisite." U.C.C.J.A. § 3 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.LA. 124 (1979). Neverthe-
less, the language of section 3(a) (3) and the Commissioners' Note make it clear
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presence can satisfy the significant connection component of
the jurisdictional standards. The federal provision directly ad-
dressses this question and requires a significant connection
other than "mere" physical presence. On its face this federal
provision, therefore, departs from the U.C.C.J.A. language.377
One should not, however, consider it a significant departure.
Even apart from such a limiting phrase, the U.C.C.J.A. clearly
requires more than mere physical presence to establish a "sig-
nificant" connection. Both the legislative history37 8 and judicial
decisions construing the U.C.C.J.A.379 support this
interpretation.
Second, under the U.C.C.J.A., the home state and signifi-
cant connection bases of jurisdiction are independent; jurisdic-
tion under each can exist regardless of the existence of
jurisdiction in another state on the other basis.38 0 On the other
hand, a state cannot exercise significant connection jurisdiction
consistently with the federal Act unless "it appears that no
other State would have" home state jurisdiction.38 1 Both the
wording of the U.C.C.J.A. provision382 and experience under it
can aid in assessing the significance of this federal-state
difference.
The Commissioners recognized that the flexible criteria of
that physical presence alone is not sufficient under section 3(a) (3), noting that
there must also be an emergency or other specified circumstances. Id. Section
3(b) has not misled the courts in this way. See, e.g., Brock v. District Court, 620
P.2d 11, 14-15 (Colo. 1980).
377. This language was added to the federal legislation after the Senate
passed the measure in the 95th Congress, 124 CONG. REC. 783-87 (1978), and
before it was introduced as a separate bill in the 96th Congress, 1st Sess., 125
CoNG. REC. 740 (1979).
378. See U.C.C.J.A. § 3 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 123-24 (1979).
379. See, e.g., Agnello v. Becker, 440 A.2d 172, 176 (Conn. 1981).
380. U.C.C.J. § 3(a) (1), (2) (1968); R. CROUCH, supra note 70, at 15-16;
Bodenheimer, supra note 7, at 1230. The statement in the text only refers to
the existence of jurisdicion. For discussion of U.C.C.J.A provisions limiting its
exercise, see supra text accompanying notes 74-133; infra text accompanying
notes 573-81.
381. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(c) (2) (B) (i) (West Supp. 1980). Since this federal
provision only refers to the exercise of jurisdiction, it may appear inappropriate
to contrast it to the U.C.C.J.'s treatment of the home state and significant
connection provisions that govern the existence of jurisdiction. It is not. The
federal statute has provisions limiting the exercise of jurisdiction that corre-
spond to some of the U.C.C.J. limitations on such exercise referred to previ-
ously. See supra note 380. There is, however, no U.C.C.J.A. provision similar to
the federal clause making home state jurisdiction exclusive of significant con-
nection jurisdiction for the purposes of the federal Act, neither as a limitation
on the existence of jurisdiction nor as a restriction on its exercise. The differ-
ence is, therefore, real.
382. See supra text accompanying note 71.
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the significant connection basis of jurisdiction, and the validity
of the basis even if a child has a home state, created the possib-
lity that this basis might be overused.383 They and commenta-
tors have thus urged courts to interpret and to apply this
jurisdictional base narrowly.384 Some courts have nevertheless
construed and applied it quite broadly, especially in reaching
results favoring their own jurisdiction.385 This broad construc-
tion of the significant connection provision was criticized dur-
ing the congressional hearings on the Wallop Act.386 The desire
not to build the same problems into section 1738A apparently
motivated Congress to depart from the U.C.C.JA. language on
significant connection jurisdiction.387
It is relatively clear how this federal provision, restricting
significant connection jurisdiction to cases in which "it appears
that no other State would have" home state jurisdiction,388 af-
fects the application of subsection (g).389 If state A meets the
383. U.C.C.J.A. § 3 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.LA. 124 (1979).
384. See, e.g., id.; Frumikes & Elser, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act--The Florida Experience, 53 FLA. B.J. 684, 690 (1979); Note, Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act: An Attempt to Stop Child Rustling, 12 WALAMETrE
LJ. 623, 632-33 (1976).
385. This practice was discussed above in connection with initial jurisdic-
tion. See supra text accompanying note 80. It has affected enforcement and
modification of decrees as well. See cases cited infra notes 575, 581, 583.
386. See, e.g., 1980 Senate Hearing, supra note 4, at 145, Addendum at 270;
1979 Senate Hearing, supra note 299, at 51-52.
387. See 126 CONG. REC. S11,486 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1980).
388. One noteworthy feature of subparagraph (B) that seems to leave no
room for interpretation is its failure to follow subparagraph (D) and to allow a
state to exercise jurisdiction if another state declines to exercise it. Thus, if
state A has home state jurisdiction but has declined to exercise it, state B lacks
significant connection jurisdiction simply because another state has home state
jurisdiction. It cannot hear the case regardless of the extent of its connections
to the child and the parties. Unless state B or another state has jurisdiction
under the catchall of subparagraph (D), the proceeding will not occur. Al-
though this makes no sense, it is not likely to cause significant harm.
389. One faces two difficulties in interpreting the provision restricting sig-
nificant connection jurisdiction, 28 U.S.CJ.A § 1738A(c) (2) (B) (West Supp.
1980), but the resolutions of both appear reasonably clear. The first problem
arises because subparagraph (B), like the catchall jurisdictional provision sub-
paragraph (D), uses the introductory clause "it appears that." One could thus
interpret subparagraph (B) as allowing state A to prove fairly easily that it has
acted consistently with section 1738A, at least in comparison to subparagraphs
(A) and (C) from which this introductory clause is absent.
The phrase, "it appears that," comes from the U.C.C.J.A., which uses it not
only to introduce the catchall jurisdictional base, U.C.C.J.A. § 3(a) (4) (1968),
but also to provide that one state shall not modify another state's decree unless
"it appears to the court of this State that the court which rendered the decree
does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially
in accordance with this Act or has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify
the decree." Id. § 14(a) (1). The U.C.C.J.A., however, omits this phrase in other
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conditions of the significant connection subparagraph but can-
not claim home state jurisdiction, and if state B can claim
key provisions that condition the action of the forum court upon what another
state's court has done or can do. See id. §§ 6(a), 13.
It seems that the drafters of the U.C.C.J.A. used "it appears" not to create
distinctions among degrees of persuasion, but rather to note on random occa-
sions that a court must determine the dispositive facts. A number of other un-
systematic and apparently insignificant variations in language occur in the
U.C.C.J.A. Compare id. § 6(a) ("a court of another state exercising jurisdiction
substantially in conformity with this Act") with id. § 13 ("decree of a court of
another state... which was made under factual circumstances meeting the ju-
risdictional standards of the Act, so long as this decree has not been modified
in accordance with jurisdictional standards substantially similar to those of this
Act"); compare id. § 2(2) (defining "custody determination" to mean "a court
decision and court orders and instructions providing for the custody of a child,
including visitation rights") and id § 12 (referring to modification of a "custody
determination") with id. § 2(4) (defining "decree" to mean "a custody determi-
nation contained in a judicial decree or order made in a custody proceeding")
and id. §§ 13, 14 (referring to modification of a "decree"); compare id. § 2(4)
(providing that the term "decree" includes "an initial decree and a modification
decree") with id. §§ 3(a), 7(a) (expressly covering an 'initial or modification
decree"). The sporadic use of "it appears" thus seems to be simply another
lapse in draftsmanship.
The Commissioners' Notes to both sections 3(a) (4) and 14(a) suggest that
these provisions depend upon the actual facts, not upon appearances.
U.C.C.J. §§ 3, 14 Commissioners' Notes, 9 U.LA. 124, 154-55 (1979). The late
Professor Bodenheimer, the Reporter in the preparation of the Act, did not call
attention to this issue and also treated these sections as depending upon the
facts. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, supra note 7, at 1230, 1236. It thus appears that
this introductory phrase in U.C.C.J.A. sections 3(a) (4) and 14 is not significant.
In adapting U.C.C.JA. language for incorporation in the federal bill, the
drafters of section 1738A eliminated unsystematic variations in language. Com-
pare 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(a), (g) (West Supp. 1980) (referring to custody deter-
minations made "consistently with the provisions of this section" and to cases
in which another state is exercising jurisdiction "consistently with the provi-
sions of this section") with U.C.C.J-.A §§ 6(a), 13 (1968) (using varying lan-
guage quoted supra). Similarly, the introductory phrase "it appears that" was
omitted in the provision forbidding modification. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(a) (West
Supp. 1980). Through a drafting lapse this phrase was not omitted, however, in
the catchall jurisdictional provision, subparagraph (D) (i) of § 1738A(c) (2).
Late in the processing of the federal bill, another lapse led to the use of the
same phrase to introduce the new subparagraph (B) (i) limitation of significant
connection jurisdiction. See 126 CONG. REc. S11,483, 11,486 (daily ed. Aug. 25,
1980).
One should consider the use of this phrase in these two subparagraphs of
section 1738A to be as insignificant as in the provisions in the U.C.C.J.A. There
is a floor statement parroting the language limiting the significant connection
jurisdiction to cases without a home state, id., and there is testimony in hear-
ings that recommends adoption of such a limitation, see authorities cited supra
note 384, but there is no indication that the introductory phrase is of any conse-
quence. It would be inconsistent with the scheme of the Wallop Act, in which
application of the statutory duties depends upon actual facts rather than ap-
pearances, for this phrase in section 1738A(c) (2) (B) to affect the amount of
proof needed to make one state respect another state's proceeding.
The second problem arises because of the use of the word 'Jurisdiction" in
subparagraph (B) (i) and its cross-reference to subparagraph (A). The similar
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home state jurisdiction, then state A cannot exercise initial ju-
risdiction consistently with the federal Act. For that reason, if
a suit for an initial award of custody is brought in state B while
a custody proceeding concerning that same child is pending in
state A, subsection (g) of the federal Act does not require state
B to refrain from exercising its jurisdiction.390
(4) Exceptions to Statutory Duties
Unlike the three differences previously discussed, the
fourth difference in breadth between the federal and state stat-
utory duties not to exercise concurrent jurisdiction is not
rooted in express differences in the language of the acts. In-
stead, it concerns whether one should infer exceptions to the
mandatory duties that each act imposes.
A number of authorities have concluded that the U.C.C.J.A.
language in the catchall provision, subparagraph (D) (i), causes a similar prob-
lem.
The language in subparagraphs (B) and (D) that no state would have juris-
diction under other subparagraphs may imply that the Wallop Act grants or re-
stricts jurisdiction. This implication is incorrect. As mentioned above, the
initial drafts of subsection (c) gave a state court jurisdiction if and only if its
own law so provided and if it complied with one of subparagraphs (A) through
(D), but the revised version of section 1738A makes these two conditions mere
criteria that measure whether a custody determination was consistent with sec-
tion 1738A. See supra note 305. All of these criteria are, however, jurisdictional
rather than substantive or procedural in nature. Thus, with the exception of
subsection (g), references elsewhere in section 1738A to the criteria of subsec-
tions (c) (1) and (c) (2) (A)-(D) are stated in terms of 'Jurisdiction under" those
criteria, see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (c) (2) (B), (D) (West Supp. 1980), and in terms
of a state's "jurisdiction" being "in issue," see id. § 1738A(c) (2) (D), not in
terms merely of consistency with those criteria. Thus, subparagraphs (B) and
(D) say that no state has jurisdiction under other subparagraphs for conven-
ience only, not to imply that subparagraphs (A)-(D) grant or restrict jurisdic-
tion.
The cross-reference to subparagraph (A) is slightly more troublesome. The
obvious intent of subparagraph (B) is to provide that a custody determination
is consistent with subparagraph (B) only if no other state would have jurisdic-
tion consistent with subparagraph (A) and its own state law. Yet the cross-ref-
erence in (B) refers only to (A) and not also to paragraph (1), which requires
jurisdiction under state law. This oversight resulted from the use in subpara-
graph (B) of the term "jurisdiction," which on its face seems to embody the re-
quirement of paragraph (1). It seems appropriate to interpret subparagraphs
(B) and (D) to give them their intended effect since the phrase "have jurisdic-
tion" is broad enough to permit incorporation of paragraph (1)'s requirement of
jurisdiction under state law as well as the requirement demanding consistency
with the specified subparagraphs.
390. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(g) (West Supp. 1980). Subsection (g) would
even allow a state whose jurisdiction is not consistent with the federal stan-
dards to exercise jurisdiction. State A's exercise of jurisdiction does not qual-
ify for the protection of subsection (g), regardless of which state subsequently
begins proceedings.
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exempts certain cases from some of its mandatory duties. 3 91
Most of the cases finding such exceptions in the U.C.C.J.A.
have involved the duties to enforce and not to modify foreign
decrees.392 The rationales of some of these cases, however, ap-
pear applicable to the section 6(a) duty to respect concurrent
proceedings as we1. 393 Indeed, some courts have used recog-
nized exceptions to modify or to delay enforcement of foreign
custody orders in cases to which section 6(a) otherwise ap-
peared applicable. 94
There is no basis in the U.C.C.J.A. text or Commissioners'
Notes for exceptions to the section 6(a) duty to avoid concur-
rent proceedings, 395 the section 13 duty to recognize and en-
force decrees,3 9 6 or the section 14(a) duty not to modify
391. One widely recognized exception involves emergencies. See, e.g., In re
Schwander, 79 Cal. App. 3d 1013, 1020, 145 Cal. Rptr. 325, 329 (1978) (dictum);
Brock v. District Court, 620 P.2d 11, 14-15 (Colo. 1980) (dictum); R. CROUCH,
supra note 70, at 30, 34-36; S. KATZ, supra note 59, at 7, 19, 28, 42-49, 76, 80, 116-17;
Bodenheimer, supra note 361, at 225-26. Some authorities also believe that an
exception exists to the duties to recognize and to enforce and not to modify for-
eign decrees if the decree punishes a parent rather than benefits a child. See,
e.g., Brooks v. Brooks, 20 Or. App. 43, 530 P.2d 547 (1975); Comment, Temporary
Custody Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: Influence Without
Modification, 48 U. CoLO. L. REv. 603, 617-18 (1977). In some cases, courts have
even temporarily modified, see, e.g., Fry v. Ball, 190 Colo. 128, 544 P.2d 402 (1975)
(en banc); Lord v. Lord, 7 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2244 (Conn. Super. 1981), or de-
nied enforcement of foreign decrees, see, e.g., id.; In re McDonald, 74 Mich. App.
119, 253 N.W.2d 678 (1977), merely because there is a local interest in the chil-
dren and a lack of confidence either in past foreign proceedings or in the course
of future proceedings.
392. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 391.
393. See, e.g., Fry v. Ball, 190 Colo. 128, 544 P.2d 401 (1976) (en banc); cases
cited supra note 391.
394. E.g., Mondy v. Mondy, 395 So. 2d 193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Barcus
v. Barcus, 278 N.W.2d 646 (Iowa 1979); In re McDonald, 74 Mich. App. 119, 253
N.W.2d 678 (1977).
395. U.C.C.J-.A § 6(a) (1968); id. Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 134-35
(1979).
396. U.C.C.JA. § 13 (1968); id. Commissioners' Note, 9 U.LA 151-52 (1979).
The Note to section 13 states that courts "may be reluctant to recognize" de-
crees that they consider "punitive or disciplinary" measures. 9 U.L.A. 152
(1979). It also cites a page of a law review article in which Professor
Ehrenzweig approved the practice that he found courts followed before 1965-
which treated disciplinary changes of custody as exceptions to a rule that de-
manded enforcement of foreign decrees against parties deemed to have "un-
clean hands." Id. (citing Ehrenzweig, supra note 34, at 404). This statement
and citation do not, however, suggest that section 13 or any other U.C.C.J.A.
provision contains an exception for punitive decrees. On the contrary, the Note
refers to section 13 as establishing a "mandate." The Note cites Ehrenzweig
only to support the proposition that the mandate "could cause problems" in pu-
nitive cases. The Note concludes by discussing means by which courts can
grant visitation rights without entering punitive decrees.
The Note, therefore, states in effect that section 13 is mandatory, that puni-
tive decrees could cause courts to be reluctant to obey section 13's mandate,
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decrees. 397 The only clear exception to a U.C.C.J.A. duty ap-
plies to the section 15 duty to enforce decrees. 398 Courts and
commentators have found other exceptions3 99 largely because
of the published writings of the late Professor Brigitte
Bodenheimer, whose views of the Act have been widely consid-
ered authoritative.40 0 In some of het writings she favored the
recognition of certain exceptions to the mandates of the
U.C.C.J.A.401
Regardless of the soundness of these exceptions, they are
the law of the states acknowledging them. The Wallop Act's
duties, however, should not be subject to any of these excep-
tions. Section 1738A unambiguously makes its duties
mandatory and unqualified apart from the express conditions
that prior to the U.C.CJ.A. courts denied interstate enforcement to punitive de-
crees, and that the U.C.C.J.A. controls the problem not by excepting such de-
crees from section 13 but by reducing the incentive to enter such decrees
through the provision of improved legal tools for enforcement of visitation
rights. This interpretation of the Note is consistent with the absence of an ex-
plicit exception in the text of section 13 and with the nearly contemporaneous
views of the Reporter for the Act, Professor Bodenheimer. See Bodenheimer,
supra note 7, at 1220, 1238-40. In later years, however, Bodenheimer reversed
her interpretation of this section. See authorities cited infra note 401.
397. U.C.C.J-.A § 14(a) (1968); id. Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. § 154-55
(1979).
398. U.C.C.J. § 15 (1968). The Note to section 15 clearly implies that state
B may, even under the U.C.CJ.A., stay enforcement of a foreign decree in a
dangerous emergency. Id. Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 158 (1979). Although
no such exception appears in the text of section 15, most legal means to enforce
custody decrees are discretionary. See, e.g., Bergen v. Bergen, 439 F.2d 1008,
1015 (3d Cir. 1971) (contempt of court); Baker v. Baker, 93 N.M. 463, 466, 601
P.2d 433, 436 (1979) (posting of performance bond); Brooks v. Brooks, 131 Vt. 86,
92, 300 A.2d 531, 535 (1973) (forfeiture of cash bond); 1979 Senate Hearings,
supra note 299, at 165 (criminal prosecution). Moreover, courts even have
some discretion over when to apply remedies to which parties are entitled as of
right. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Pincock, 99 Idaho 56, 57, 59, 577 P.2d 343, 344, 346
(1978) (habeas corpus). Thus, there is no inconsistency between the Note and
the statutory text.
399. See supra notes 391-94.
400. See, e.g., Beebe v. Chavez, 226 Kan. 591, 600, 602 P.2d 1279, 1287 (1979).
401. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Ju-
risdiction Act and Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody, and
Excessive Modifications, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 978, 992-95 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Progress] (exception to section 14(a) for emergencies); id. at 1003-07 (excep-
tion to sections 6, 13, and 14(a) for punitive modifications); Bodenheimer, The
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 3 FA. LQ. 304, 309-12 (1969) (vaguely
defined exception to sections 13 and 14(a)). But see Bodenheimer, The Rights
of Children and the Crisis in Custody Litigation" Modification of Custody In
and Out of State, 46 U. CoLo. L. REV. 459, 503-04 (1975) (merely suggesting tem-
porary stays of section 13 enforcement of punitive decrees); Bodenheimer,
supra note 7, at 1220, 1238-40 (no exception to sections 13 and 14(a) for punitive
or other unwise decrees).
[Vol. 66:711
INTERSTATE CHILD CUSTODY
restricting their scope.402 The legislative history of the Act also
suggests that its duties are not subject to exceptions. Conver-
sations between the drafter of the Wallop proposal and Profes-
sor Bodenheimer during the proposal's initial drafting40 3 led to
the initial inclusion of exceptions to the duties to enforce and
not to modify decrees. The exceptions covered "punitive" de-
crees and decrees "inconsistent with a strong public policy" of
the state.4o4 Severe criticism of both proposed exceptions 40 5
caused their deletion from the legislation before its enact-
ment.406 This legislative history suggests not only that section
1738A contains no exception for punitive or impolitic decrees,
but also that Congress did not intend the statute's duties to be
subject to any unstated exceptions or conditions. 40 7 These fed-
eral duties, including the duty not to conduct concurrent pro-
ceedings, therefore differ in scope from the similar duties
under the U.C.C.J.A. in states recognizing such exceptions.
b. Application of Subsection (g)
The federal duty not to conduct concurrent proceedings
should have significant nationwide effects on the practices of
state courts. Subsection (g) provides a rule of deference to
ongoing, foreign proceedings that in many cases is broader
than state law.40 8 Furthermore, the federal rule is less subject
to manipulation by the forum to which the rule is addressed.
The duty of a court under U.C.C.J.A. section 6(a) to defer to an-
other state's prior, pending proceeding exists only if the second
forum decides that the first is exercising jurisdiction "substan-
tially in conformity" with the U.C.C.J.A.409 Some courts, how-
ever, have made questionable decisions favoring their own
jurisdiction in such cases.410 The Wallop Act limits such paro-
402. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a), (e), (g) (West Supp. 1980).
403. Original memoranda and correspondence on file with the Minnesota
Law Review.
404. 124 CONG. REC. 785 (1978).
405. See, e.g., Legislation to Revise and Recodify Federal Criminal Laws:-
Hearings on H.R. 6869 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., 1017-18, 2562-63, 2817-18
(1977-78) [hereinafter cited as 1977-78 House Hearings].
406. S.105, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S374, 376 (daily ed. Jan. 23,
1979); see S. REP. No. 553, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1253 (1980).
407. See 1980 Senate Hearing, supra note 4, at 134, 142, 146-50, Addendum at
105-06, 117-19, 268, 278.
408. See supra text accompanying notes 365-72, 391-407. But see supra text
accompanying notes 380-90.
409. See supra text accompanying note 82.
410. See supra text accompanying notes 135-38.
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chialism by making the application of subsection (g) depend
entirely upon federal law and the law and actions of the first fo-
rum. The federal duty to defer to a proceeding already pending
in state A is therefore the same in state B and state C; neither
state can manipulate the scope of that duty.4 11
An example of a case whose outcome would be changed by
application of subsection (g) is Mondy v. Mondy,412 a recent
decision by a Florida District Court of Appeals. The court af-
firmed the trial court's award of temporary custody to the chil-
dren's mother and approved the continuing exercise of
jurisdiction to determine permanent custody. The court af-
firmed the trial court's jurisdiction notwithstanding an Idaho
court's recent award of temporary custody to the children's fa-
ther in apparent conformity with the U.C.C.J.A.413 The Idaho
proceeding was presumably pending when the Florida petition
was filed and acted upon.4 14
The court held that Florida had significant connection juris-
diction. 415 It also cited emergency jurisdiction under section
3,416 quoting the mother's allegations that the "'children had
been abused and [that] they had regressed in their speech pat-
terns and were in an extreme state of emotional distress.' "417
The court held that "[r] egardless of the truth of this particular
allegation, the trial court may, at least temporarily, assume ju-
risdiction to insure that the children are not threatened with
mistreatment, abuse, or neglect."4 18 The court justified its deci-
sion by stating that "neither party comes before this Court with
clean hands, and somewhere someone has to make an attempt
411. In addition, a federal forum is available to correct at least some errors
in interpretation and application of the federal duty. If a state misapplies fed-
eral law insofar as it incorporates the law of another state, 28 U.S.C.
1738A(c) (1) (West Supp. 1980), or imposes requirements independent of state
law, id. § 1738(c) (2) (d), (e), the aggrieved party can seek review in the United
States Supreme Court. A party aggrieved by a custody decree could at least
petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court on the ground that the state court's
exercise of jurisdiction violated section 1738A(g). 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1976); cf.
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 86 (1978) (reviewing on certiorari state as-
sertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent of a minor child dom-
iciled in state that violated due process). Whether other avenues into federal
courts are available to deal with alleged violations of the various duties created
by section 1738A is beyond the scope of this Article.
412. 395 So. 2d 193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
413. See id. at 196-97 (Joanos, J., dissenting).
414. See 395 So. 2d at 195.
415. Id. at 196.
416. See U.C.C.JA. § 3(a)(3) (1968).
417. 395 So. 2d at 196.
418. Id.
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to stop the childnapping and determine what is in the best in-
terests of the children."4 19 Although Florida had enacted the
U.C.C.J.A., the court failed to cite section 6 of the Act.
Application of subsection (g) would probably have pre-
vented the exercise of Florida's jurisdiction.420 Subsection (g)
would have forbidden Florida's exercise of jurisdiction if the
Idaho proceeding was still pending when the Florida proceed-
ing was commenced 42 ' and if the Idaho court continued to exer-
cise jurisdiction,422 provided that the ongoing exercise of Idaho
jurisdiction was consistent with section 1738A. Idaho appar-
ently gave the mother reasonable notice and an opportunity to
419. Id. at 195.
420. The applicability of section 1738A to the Mondy case depends upon the
resolution of two questions of interpretation of the Wallop Act. First is the
question of the effective date of section 1738A. Though there is some authority
that the effective date of the Act was delayed until July 1, 1981, see, e.g., Sher-
mer v. Cornelius, 278 S.E.2d 349, 351 n.1 (W. Va. 1981) (dictum), the better con-
clusion is that the Wallop Act took effect immediately upon its enactment. H.R.
8406, a bill on Social Security coverage of pneumococcal vaccine, H.R. 8406, 96
Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. H12,109 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1980), contained a
delayed effective date of July 1, 1981, when the House of Representatives first
passed it on December 5, 1980. 126 CONG. REC. H12,109 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1980).
When amendments, including the Wallop Act, were later added to the bill, 126
CONG. REC. S16,504-08 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1980), no need was seen to except
these amendments from the provisions of the main bill, which had no applica-
tion to the Wallop Act. The most significant aspect of the legislative history
supporting this interpretation is the absence of any delay in the effective date
of the Wallop Act legislation throughout its processing as part of the Domestic
Violence bill, from August through October of 1980. See H.R. 2977, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. S11,455, 11,465-69, 11,483-99 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1980); id.
at H10,400-08 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980). The House-Senate conference report on
the Domestic Violence bill approved a version of the Wallop measure that
would have taken effect immediately upon enactment. H.R. REP. No. 1401, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 16-22 (1980). The conference committee made substantive and
unique changes in certain aspects of the Wallop Act legislation as a result of
negotiation and compromise between Senate and House members of the com-
mittee. Compare id. at 16-22, 41-43 with 126 CONG. REC. Sll,455, 11,465-69, 11,483-
99 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1980) and H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 458-61 (Sept. 25,
1980). The actions of the Senate and House in precisely incorporating in Public
Law 96-611 the language of the conference committee, rather than any of the
other versions, make it clear that the intention was to enact the Wallop Act in
the form that had been agreed on by representatives of the two Houses in the
conference committee and had been later approved by the whole House. 126
CONG. REc. H10,400-08 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980). The inference is very strong that
both Houses intended the Wallop measure to be immediately effective when
enacted as part of Public Law 96-611 just as it would have been if the confer-
ence report had been approved by the Senate and signed by the President.
The second question, to what extent the section 1738A duties are applicable
to cases pending on appeal when it took effect, is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. See generally Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1973); In re
Leonard, 122 Cal. App. 3d 443, n.10, 175 Cal. Rptr. 903, 912-13 n.10 (1981).
421. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(g) (West Supp. 1980).
422. Id.
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be heard,423 and Idaho apparently had jurisdiction under its
own law.424 Moreover, the Idaho proceeding met the federal
conditions specified by section 1738A(c) (2), because no state
met the home state test,42 5 and Idaho met either the significant
connection test 426 or the catchall test.42 7 The children had been
absent from their former home state of Alabama for well over
six months, and the mother had moved from Alabama to Flor-
ida during their absence. Because no custody proceedings had
occurred before the pendency of the Idaho proceeding, Idaho
acted consistently with the duties created by subsections
1738A(a) and (g). Thus, the Idaho court was apparently "exer-
cising jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of [section
1738A] to make a custody determination." 42 8 It therefore ap-
pears that the Florida court would have been prohibited from
exercising its jurisdiction.
Perhaps under the circumstances, the Florida court should
nevertheless have been permitted to act under an allegation of
emergency. Alternatively, a proceeding in Florida might have
been more effective at stopping the childnapping, the Florida
court might have been better able to determine the children's
best interests, or Florida might simply have been a more appro-
priate forum. Under the federal statute, however, these issues
would have been matters for authoritative decision by the
Idaho court, not for a succession of possibly inconsistent deci-
sions by the courts of both states.
c. Inapplicability to Prior Proceedings
In some cases both subsection (g) and U.C.C.J.A. section 6
fail to erect a mandatory bar to simultaneous litigation. For ex-
ample, simultaneous litigation is not barred if the state in
which proceedings are first commenced lacks jurisdiction con-
sistent with U.C.C.J.A. and federal standards, but acquires it
before another state satisfying those standards can make a cus-
tody order.
A hypothetical case 429 illustrates the operation of the rele-
423. 395 So. 2d at 195. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(e) (West Supp. 1980).
424. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(c) (1) (West Supp. 1980); see 395 So. 2d at 196-97
(Joanos, J., dissenting); IDAHO CODE § 5-1003(a) (2), (4) (1979).
425. 28 U.C.S. § 1738A(b) (4), (c) (2) (A) (West Supp. 1980).
426. Id. § 1738A(c) (2) (B).
427. Id. § 1738A(c) (2) (D).
428. Id. § 1738A(g).
429. The pertinent facts of In re Verbin, 92 Wash. 2d 171, 595 P.2d 905 (1979)
(en banc), are similar in some respects to those of this hypothetical case.
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vant statutory provisions. The prohibitions of the U.C.C.J.A.430
and the Wallop Act43l against simultaneous proceedings apply
only to the state in which proceedings are subsequently filed or
comrmenced. Suppose that a suit for the initial determination
of a child's custody is first filed by the mother in the state of
Washington, where she has very recently relocated the child
from the family's former home in Maryland. At the time of
filing, Washington does not come within the jurisdictional stan-
dards of either the U.C.C.J.A. or the Wallop Act. Assume that
shortly thereafter the father files suit in Maryland, which has
jurisdiction as the extended home state under the U.C.C.J.A.432
and Wallop Act criteria.4 3 3 If more than six months elapse
before the Maryland court makes a custody order consistent
with section 1738A and the U.C.C.J.A., Washington can decide
the child's custody without violating the federal or,
presumedly, the state statute.
The federal prohibition against the exercise of jurisdiction
during the pendency of another case is inapplicable to Wash-
ington, because the Washington case was not "commenced dur-
ing the pendency"434 of the Maryland case. The federal
requirement of enforcement and nonmodification is inapplica-
ble to Washington, because Maryland has not made a "custody
determination."435
The U.C.C.J.A. bar to the simultaneous exercise of jurisdic-
tion is inapplicable to Washington, because the Maryland pro-
ceeding was not pending at "the time of filing the petition" 436 in
Washington. The U.C.C.J.A. duty of recognition and enforce-
ment applies only to decrees, 437 and Maryland has made none.
The only duty imposed by the U.C.C.J.A. in response to a cus-
tody petition filed later in another state is the duty of the state
in which suit was initially ified to "inform the other court [that
the proceeding is pending] to the end that the issues may be
litigated in the more appropriate forum."4 3 8 The U.C.C.J.A.
gives the Washington court discretion to decide which court is
430. U.C.C.J.A. § 6(a) (1968). Another provision requires a stay under cer-
tain circumstances but is likewise applicable only to the state assuming juris-
diction second. Id. § 6(c).
431. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(g) (West Supp. 1980).
432. U.C.C.JA. §§ 2(5), 3(a) (1) (ii) (1968).
433. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(b) (4), (c) (2) (A) (ii) (West Supp. 1980).
434. Id. § 1738A(g).
435. Id. § 1738A(a), (b)(3).
436. U.C.C.A § 6(a), (c) (1968).
437. Id. § 13.
438. Id. § 6(c).
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the more appropriate forum,439 and, of course, the Washington
courts establish the authoritative interpretations of the Wash-
ington U.C.C.J.A.
The result is that, even though the Washington and Mary-
land suits were commenced when Maryland had jurisdiction
consistent with the state and federal standards and Washing-
ton did not, the Washington court could find itself free to de-
cide the case. Since the father failed to reach the Maryland
clerk of court before the mother filed in Washington, and the
Maryland court failed to make a custody order within six
months, Washington could decide the case without violating
the Wallop Act through an application of the U.C.C.J.A. that
was probably reasonable and very clearly within the power of
the Washington courts.
The outcome of the race to the respective courthouses is
thus decisive only when litigation is first commenced in a state
satisfying the relevant statutory criteria. If the first proceeding
is commenced in a state not satisfying those criteria, the out-
come of this race is immaterial, and the only significant race
becomes the race to judgment-to obtain the first custody de-
termination satisfying the statutory standards.44 0
3. Indirect Effects on Initial Jurisdiction
In summary, although the Wallop Act's provision on notice
and opportunity to be heard will have a relatively minor impact
on state court jurisdiction, its provision on concurrent initial ju-
risdiction will have a substantial impact upon the power of
state courts to conduct initial custody proceedings. The Act
may also have an indirect impact upon the inclination of state
courts to exercise initial jurisdiction in cases in which it is not
restricted by the federal statute.
Section 1738A establishes a federal duty of state enforce-
ment and nonmodification of custody orders of other states in
some cases in which state law does not impose such a require-
ment.4 4 ' Although possessing jurisdiction under its own law, a
court in which an initial custody proceeding is filed may con-
sider whether the exercise of that jurisdiction would be consis-
tent with section 1738A. The resulting decree would be entitled
under the federal statute to interstate enforcement only if
439. Id. § 7.
440. See infra text accompanying notes 851-53.
441. See infra text accompanying notes 631-46.
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made consistently with section 1738A.442 A court in state A
may find, for example, that exercise of its jurisdiction would
not be consistent with section 1738A, and that the case involves
state B to the extent that B could exercise jurisdiction consist-
ently with the federal Act.443 The court of state A might con-
sider the possibility that state B could supersede any order it
might make.44 4 That possibility would not, however, be a sub-
stantial one in many cases, because state B might forbid its
courts to exercise their jurisdiction in particular circum-
stances.445 Even an exercise of jurisdiction by state B under
certain circumstances might be unlikely to produce a different
outcome.446 Nevertheless, a court447 may sometimes conclude
that, although it has jurisdiction under its own law and is free
to exercise it, its decree would not be entitled to federally man-
dated enforcement. The court might therefore decline to exer-
cise its jurisdiction. This option clearly is available in
U.C.C.J.A. states,448 and the law of some non-U.C.C.J.A. states
appears to permit it as well.44 9 Because the Wallop Act provi-
sions on enforcement and nonmodification of decrees add this
442. See 28 U.S.C-.A § 1738A(a) (West Supp. 1980).
443. Consistency with section 1738A always depends in part upon the exist-
ence of jurisdiction under the law of a state. Id. § 1738A(c) (1), (d), (f). In this
instance, the applicable law is that of the state of the other possible forum,
state B. Id. § 1738A(c) (1). B would be able to exercise jurisdiction consistently
with the federal Act only if it had jurisdiction under its own law. Application of
the federal duty to A does not, however, depend upon the law of state B
permitting B's exercise of jurisdiction. This hypothetical case, therefore, con-
siders the possibility that the court of A would find that B had jurisdiction
under its own law and thus could act consistently with the Wallop Act, but
would also find that B's own law would not permit it to exercise jurisdiction.
444. See infra text accompanying notes 614-46.
445. See supra text accompanying notes 74-78, 82-90; infra text accompany-
ing notes 573-83.
446. An early and major change in the outcome of a custody case might
seem unlikely in a situation, for example, in which the first court to decide the
case is in a position, through collateral estoppel and perhaps through full faith
and credit, to preclude relitigation of essential factual issues resolved by that
court. See infra text accompanying notes 512-47, 584-618.
447. Although this situation is more likely to arise in a state which has
failed to pass the U.C.C.JA., it can arise in a case involving two U.C.C.JA.
states. For example, the forum in which the initial proceeding is commenced
may have significant connection jurisdiction, but because of the Wallop Act
may decline to exercise it in deference to the home state. See supra text ac-
companying notes 380-90.
448. U.C.C.J.A. § 7 (1968).
449. See, e.g., Schiller v. Schiller, 194 A.2d 665 (D.C. App. 1963); Corliss v.
Smith, 560 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Comment, The Jurisdiction of
Texas Courts in Interstate Child Custody Disputes: A Functional Approach, 54
TEx. L. REv. 1008, 1034 (1976). But see Oubre v. Oubre, 575 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1978).
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federal disincentive to the exercise of jurisdiction in such
cases, they may have a significant indirect impact on the exer-
cise of initial custody jurisdiction.
III. RECOGNITION, ENFORCEMENT, AND
MODIFICATION OF DECREES
After a court has determined the custody of a child, subse-
quent proceedings may result in recognition, enforcement, or
modification 450 of the prior order, or in various combinations of
those dispositions.451 The question of jurisdiction to entertain
such subsequent proceedings can be considered separately for
recognition and enforcement on the one hand, and for modifica-
tion on the other.452 In addition, the existence of jurisdiction to
grant one or more of those kinds of relief can be distinguished
from the propriety of its exercise.45 3 Furthermore, the propri-
ety of exercising modification jurisdiction can be distinguished
from the questions of whether and how, on the basis of sub-
stantive454 or procedural 455 law, a court that has decided to ex-
ercise its jurisdiction should modify a prior award of custody.45 6
Until recently, however, courts have often failed to make
these distinctions. And those jurisdictions that recognize these
distinctions often make them in ways that vary from one state
to another. Assume, for example, that a father violates state
A's prior decree granting custody to the mother by taking the
450. See supra note 18.
451. If the subsequent proceeding occurs in the state which made the prior
decree, there is, of course, no occasion for recognition of the decree. See RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ColmcT OF LAws ch. 5, topic 2, introductory note
(1971). Only enforcement and modification can be at issue. If the subsequent
proceeding occurs in a different state, all three questions can arise.
452. See Bodenheimer, supra note 7, at 1235; Ratner, supra note 37, at 799-
800, 832.
453. See Hawkins v. Hawkins, 264 Or. 221, 235-40, 504 P.2d 709, 716-18 (1972).
454. By "substantive" law this Article refers to standards for deciding cus-
tody between litigating parties. An example of a general standard of this kind
is the best interests of the child. See Foster & Freed, supra note 217, at 435-37.
More specific standards include, for example, the tender years rule, see Jones,
The Tender Years Doctrine: Survey and Analysis, 16 J. FM. L. 695, 697-701
(1977-78), and the rule that violation of another's right to custody or visitation
reflects unfavorably on the relative fitness of a party to have custody. See In re
Walker, 228 Cal. App. 2d 217, 226, 39 Cal. Rptr. 243, 248 (1964) (dictum);
Entwistle v. Entwistle, 61 A.D.2d 380, 384-85, 402 N.Y.S.2d 213, 215-16 (1978).
455. By "procedural" law this Article refers, for example, to rules concern-
ing required degrees of persuasion. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.30-.33
(1981) (requiring "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence" for all findings of fact
in proceeding for termination of parental rights and providing for disposition of
custody upon such termination).
456. See Hawkins v. Hawkins, 264 Or. 221, 235-40, 504 P.2d 709, 716-18 (1972).
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child to state B and petitioning state B to modify custody. As-
sume further that the mother asks state B to dismiss the fa-
ther's petition and to enforce the prior decree. State B might
enforce state A's decree and dismiss the father's claim, con-
cluding that it lacked jurisdiction to modify custody because
the father brought the child to state B in violation of the prior
decree.45 7 If the father had instead taken the child to state C
and petitioned its courts for modification, state A's decree
might be recognized on the ground that, although the courts of
state C possess jurisdiction to modify the decree, it should not
be exercised.458 If, however, the father had taken the child to
state D and petitioned its court for modification, the courts of
state D might have exercised jurisdiction, denied the father's
claim on the merits because his wrongful conduct showed him
to be ill-suited to have custody, and made and enforced a local
award conforming to the foreign custody decree.45 9 As these
examples illustrate, the variety of approaches to cases present-
ing questions of jurisdiction to enforce or to modify custody de-
crees makes a generalization about the. traditional bases of
jurisdiction hazardous. Some basic rules, however, have had
relatively wide acceptance.
A. EXISTENCE OF JURISDICTION
The existence of jurisdiction under state law to make an in-
itial custody decree or to modify a custody decree of another
state has traditionally depended upon the same criteria.4 60
These criteria have also been considered sufficient to support a
state's jurisdiction to modity its own decree.4 6 ' In addition,
many states have claimed that once a court has exercised juris-
diction over the custody of a child, its jurisdiction continues al-
though the circumstances upon which the initial exercise of
jurisdiction was based have ceased to exist.4 62
Federal law placed no limits on subject matter jurisdiction
to enter an initial decree or to modify a custody decree.463 Ini-
tial and modification jurisdiction were, however, arguably sub-
457. See, e.g., Chapman v. Walker, 144 Okla. 83, 84, 289 P. 740, 741 (1930);
Jones v. McCloud, 19 Wash. 2d 314, 325, 142 P.2d 397, 402 (1943).
458. See, e.g., State v. Black, 239 Ala. 644, 647, 196 So. 713, 715 (1940).
459. See, e.g., In re Walker, 228 Cal. App. 2d 217, 225-26, 39 Cal. Rptr. 243, 248
(1964) (dictum).
460. See Ratner, supra note 37, at 796-98. For a discussion of these factors,
see supra text accompanying notes 34-54.
461. See Ratner, supra note 37, at 797.
462. Id.; Stansbury, supra note 36, at 827-28.
463. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
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ject to the requirements of personal jurisdiction.4 64
Nevertheless, when a state hears a petition to modify its own
decree, some courts have considered the existence of personal
jurisdiction in the initial proceeding to be sufficient justification
for the ongoing assertion of personal jurisdiction, regardless of
whether the second action satisfies the jurisdictional
requirements.465
Questions concerning jurisdiction to enforce a custody de-
cree have not been especially troublesome, either practically or
theoretically. Because enforcement seeks to vindicate a court's
dignity and authority in addition to the private interests served
by a decree, the court entering a decree retains jurisdiction to
enforce it despite a parent's removal of a child from the
state.46 6 Moreover, petitions for habeas corpus467 and con-
tempt46 8 proceedings-the principal means of enforcement of
custody decrees-necessarily take place in the jurisdiction
where the child or the violator is found.4 69 The presence of the
child, whose current restraint is the subject of the writ of
habeas corpus, confers jurisdiction on the forum when habeas
corpus is used merely to enforce a prior decree.470 The pres-
ence of the violator similarly provides the court with personal
jurisdiction over him or her in a contempt proceeding. Because
a defendant can only be found in contempt of a foreign custody
decree after the decree is adopted by the enforcing court,4 71 ju-
risdiction to vindicate the authority underlying the adopted de-
cree, coupled with personal jurisdiction over the defendant,
forms a sufficient jurisdictional basis for an adjudication of
contempt.4 72
464. See, e.g., In re Hall, 25 Wash. App. 530, 535-36, 607 P.2d 898, 900-01 (1980).
For a discussion of the requirements of personal jurisdiction, see supra text ac-
companying notes 141-244.
465. See, e.g., Follak v. Brown, 530 S.W.2d 882, 883-84 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
466. See, e.g., Baker v. Baker, 93 N.M. 463, 465, 601 P.2d 433, 435 (1979).
467. See, e.g., Stuard v. Bean, 27 Ariz. App. 350, 352, 554 P.2d 1293, 1295
(1976); Mitchell v. Pincock, 99 Idaho 56, 59, 577 P.2d 343, 346 (1978); State ex rel.
Butler v. Morgan, 34 Or. App. 393, 396-97, 578 P.2d 814, 815 (1978).
468. See, e.g., Bergen v. Bergen, 439 F.2d 1008, 1014 (3d Cir. 1971); Brooks v.
Brooks, 131 Vt. 86, 90, 300 A.2d 531, 533 (1973).
469. See Ratner, supra note 37, at 810-11. See generally RESTATEMENT (SEc-
oND) op JUDGMENTS ch. 2, introductory note at 9-10 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978).
470. See, e.g., Stuard v. Bean, 27 Ariz. App. 350, 352, 554 P.2d 1293, 1295
(1976); Mitchell v. Pincock, 99 Idaho 56, 59, 577 P.2d 343, 346 (1978).
471. See U.C.C.JA § 15(a) (1968); cf. Ehrenzweig v. Ehrenzweig, 86 Misc. 2d
656, 662-53, 668-70, 383 N.Y.S.2d 487, 492-93, 496-97 (Sup. Ct. 1976), affd, 61 A.D.2d
1003, 402 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1978) (Connecticut contempt judgment based on hus-
band's failure to pay arrears not enforceable when divorced husband did not
appear in contempt proceeding).
472. Cf. Ehrenzweig v. Ehrenzweig, 61 A.D.2d 1003, 1003, 402 N.Y.S.2d 638,
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B. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
In practice, the courts' exercise of their jurisdiction in in-
terstate cases has varied considerably. Professor Ehrenzweig
wrote in 1953 that he discerned a long-standing practice of
many courts to decline to modify foreign decrees at the behest
of petitioners with "unclean hands," preferring instead to rec-
ognize and enforce them against such miscreants.473 He never-
theless noted exceptions to that practice. One prominent
exception was the case in which the petitioner's hands were
"unclean" due only to a violation of a custody modification that
in Ehrenzweig's view was entered as a measure of discipline
for disobedience to a previous order. In such a case, he wrote,
courts further modified the order.474 Although his equitable ra-
tionale for the results of such cases has had mixed reception by
commentators,4 75 the literature generally acknowledges that
courts have quite commonly exercised jurisdiction to modify
foreign decrees. 47 6
C. PRE-U.C.C.J.A. OBSTACLES TO APPLICATION OF FuLL FAITH
AND CREDIT TO CUSTODY DECREES
The federal full faith and credit clause 477 and the statute
implementing it478 have not tightly restrained courts from mod-
ifying one another's custody orders. The few United States
Supreme Court decisions on the subject have clearly and firmly
established only one rule-a state may make any modification
of another state's custody decree that the law of the rendering
state would permit its courts to make under the circum-
stances.479 Furthermore, these cases have been interpreted as
639 (1978) (contempt judgment not enforceable when original personal jurisdic-
tion was unclear).
473. Ehrenzweig, supra note 34, at 357-69.
474. Id. at 370-71.
475. See S. KATz, supra note 59, at 66; Bodenheimer, supra note 7, at 1215;
Jarrett, Jurisdiction in Interstate Child Custody Disputes, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 423,
436-38 (1977). See generally Note, Court's Adoption of Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act Offers Little Hope of Resolving Child Custody Conflicts, 60
MINN. L. REv. 820, 825 n.22 (1976).
476. See, e.g., S. KATz, supra note 59, at 11, 13-14; Bodenheimer, supra note
7, at 1216, 1236; Ratner, supra note 37, at 797-98; Stansbury, supra note 36, at 828-
30; Note, Child Custody Decrees-Interstate Recognition, 49 IowA L. REV. 1178,
1185-1200 (1964); Note, supra note 475, at 822-26.
477. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
478. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
479. See Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 194 (1962); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604,
607 (1958); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 534 (1953); New York ex rel. Halvey v.
Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 615 (1947).
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leaving open the question of whether federal law permits a
court under some circumstances to make a modification of a
foreign decree that even a court of the rendering state could
not have made.4 80 In response to the lack of Supreme Court
guidance, state courts have adopted various interpretations of
the full faith and credit clause and statute.48 ' There has thus
existed the opportunity and some need for Supreme Court defi-
nition of the extent to which full faith and credit requires states
to recognize and to enforce foreign custody determinations. 8 2
It is understandable, however, that the Court has been re-
luctant in the past to address the issue. Although dissatisfied
litigants might have presented a question of interstate claim
preclusion which the Court would not have hesitated to an-
swer,48 3 discontented custody claimants have not had to resort
to such extremes. 48 4 State law uniformly allows intrastate
modification of custody decrees at any time on a showing of a
sufficient change of circumstances.48 5 Petitions for modification
on this ground raise different claims from those previously de-
cided.a 6 Claim preclusion is thus ordinarily inapplicable, and
the state-law basis for application of full faith and credit in in-
terstate cases has therefore been collateral estoppel or issue
480. See e.g., Pratt v. Pratt, 431 A.2d 405, 407 (RIL 1981) (dictum); I. LEFLA.,
AmERicAN CoNFLcTs LAw 493 (1977).
481. E.g., compare Mitchell v. Pincock, 99 Idaho 56, 577 P.2d 343 (1978) (full
faith and credit given); Goldsmith v. Salkey, 131 Tex. 139, 145, 112 S.W.2d 165,
168 (1938) (dictum) (same); and Brooks v. Brooks, 131 Vt. 86, 300 A.2d 531
(1973) (same), with Layman v. Dehart, 560 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1977) (full faith
and credit not given when modified decree better protects child's interests);
Dehart v. Layman, 536 P.2d 789 (Alaska 1975) (same); Copple v. Copple, 186
Neb. 696, 699, 185 N.W.2d 864, 848 (1971) (dictum) (same); Borys v. Borys, 76
N.J. 103, 386 A.2d 366 (1978) (child custody decrees not entitled to full faith and
credit); and Bachman v. Mejias, 1 N.Y.2d 575, 136 N.E.2d 866, 154 N.Y.S.2d 903
(1956) (same).
482. In re Giblin, 304 Minn. 510, 517, 232 N.W.2d 214, 219 (1975).
483. For example, a parent who lost a custody contest could sue again on
the same grounds in a different state, merely because in his or her view the
first forum inaccurately determined the facts or made errors of law, the law of
the rendering state changed after the decree, or a different state's law should
be applied to the new proceeding.
484. But see, e.g., Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, 386 A.2d 366 (1978) (full faith
and credit denied Florida custody award in proceeding based on same claim).
485. See H. CLARK, supra note 201, at 599-600; Foster & Freed, supra note
217, at 623-25; Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93
HARv. L. REv. 1156, 1331 (1980). The recent adoption by some jurisdictions of
rules requiring stronger showings for modification of custody decrees than for
initial decrees, see, e.g., ILTl ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 610 (Smith-Hurd 1980), are not
departures from the general principle stated in text, and do not affect the first
conclusion drawn in this Article from that principle; such rules merely change
the extent of showings deemed sufficient to justify modification.
486. Ehrenzweig, supra note 54, at 7.
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preclusion. 487 The changed circumstances doctrine has been a
significant, but loose, prohibition of relitigation of issues.488
The Supreme Court has written that to apply collateral es-
toppel, "we must look to the pleadings making the issues, and
examine the record to determine the questions essential to the
decision of the former controversy."4 8 9 In addition, it once was
thought that collateral estoppel was only very narrowly applica-
ble to issues of law.490 Even today, authorities on the applica-
tion of collateral estoppel in litigation other than custody
proceedings apply different and more narrow preclusive rules
to issues of law.491 Application of collateral estoppel has, there-
fore, depended upon distinctions among questions of law, fact,
and mixed law and fact;492 the degree of similarity between the
issues presented in the two proceedings;4 93 the extent to which
an issue previously decided was actually litigated;494 whether
the factual and legal circumstances of the prior proceeding are
similar enough to those of the subsequent proceeding to justify
preclusion;495 and the extent to which the court actually relied
upon its resolution of particular issues in making its ultimate
487. See United States v. Silliman, 167 F.2d 607, 620-21 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 825 (1948); Shell Oil Co. v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 176 So. 2d
692, 697 (La. Ct. App. 1965). There apparently has been no intrastate applica-
tion of collateral estoppel to unmixed issues of law decided in custody cases.
No occasion has arisen, therefore, for consideration of interstate preclusion of
such issues under the law of full faith and credit. In addition, custody law and
practice have characteristics that make more rigorous preclusion of issues of
fact difficult, even in proceedings to modify a state's own prior decree. See in-
fra text accompanying notes 497-503.
488. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 613-14 (1947);
Randolph v. Dean, 27 Ill. App. 3d 913, 327 N.E.2d 473 (1975); In re Greisamer, 276
Or. 397, 555 P.2d 28 (1976) (en banc). Most courts have also applied the doc-
trine of changed circumstances in interstate cases as a matter of comity or of
their interpretation of federal requirements, Ratner, supra note 37, at 798, fur-
ther obviating the necessity of a Supreme Court announcement of any corre-
sponding federal duty based on full faith and credit.
489. United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 459 (1922).
490. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 70 comments a-f (1942).
491. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 68, 68.1(b) comment
b (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
492. See authorities cited supra notes 490-91. See generally 1B J. MOORE &
T. CURRImR, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.442[1] (1980).
493. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 comment c (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1977); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 comment q (1942).
494. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 comment e (Tent
Draft No. 4, 1977); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 comments d-i (1942).
495. See Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d
494, 504-06 (3d Cir. 1979) (dictum), vacated on other grounds, 448 U.S. 902
(1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1(b)-(d) comments b-f
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 70 comments a-f (1942).
See generally 1B J. MOORE & T. CuRIuux, supra note 492, at 5 0.415, 0.443, 0.448.
1982]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
decision.496 These distinctions and questions are often difficult,
and in custody litigation they have been potentially even more
problematic.
The peculiar characteristics of custody law and practice
have made collateral estoppel especially difficult to apply in
particular cases. Although custody law has traditionally varied
from state to state,497 the following characteristics have been
almost universally shared. The law has given trial courts wide
discretion.498 The legal boundaries of that discretion have been
marked less by explicit rules than by appellate precedents in
similar, but almost inevitably distinguishable, cases and have
therefore tended to be relatively unclear.499 A great variety of
facts has been deemed significant, but their relative legal sig-
nificance and interrelationships have been left largely unspeci-
fied.500 In custody practice and procedure, pleadings and other
pretrial devices have traditionally not defined issues narrowly
496. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGmENTS § 68 comments h-j (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1977); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 comments m-p (1942).
497. See Foster & Freed, supra note 217, at 615; Mnookin, supra note 217, at
234-46.
498. See, e.g., Bordelon v. Bordelon, 390 So. 2d 1325 (La. 1980); L CLARK,
supra note 201, at 578; Mnookin, supra note 217, at 231. But see, e.g., Hugo v.
Hugo, 430 A.2d 1183 (Pa. Super. 1981).
499. See Okpaku, Psychology: Impediment or Aid in Child Custody Casesl
29 RUTGERS L. REv. 1117, 1129-36 (1976).
500. See, e.g., Gallo v. Gallo, 7 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2499 (Conn. 1981)
(proper factors determining appropriate restrictions on father's visitation privi-
leges were the father's extramarital cohabitation, the small size of his living
quarters, his lack of effort to further the child's religious education, and the
child's strained relationship with the child of the father's female companion);
In re Scheidt, 89 Ill. App. 3d 92, 97-99, 411 N.E.2d 554, 559-60 (1980) (proper fac-
tors in an award of guardianship of orphans between their grandparents were
religious beliefs, stability of marriage, length of continuous employment by a
single employer, and previous contributions to the children's support); Farmer
v. Farmer, 109 Misc. 2d 137, 143, 439 N.Y.S.2d 584, 590 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (proper fac-
tors in a custody dispute between parents were the parents' respective races,
their histories of emotional and economic stability, and the degrees of consis-
tency shown in their previous child rearing activities); In re Gomez, 6 Fain. L.
Rep. (BNA) 2903 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (proper factors in a custody dispute be-
tween parents were the seven-year-old child's desire to live with his father, the
father's remarriage, his "good job" with his employer, the child's performance
in school, and the mother's relationship with a male friend who lived at her
home and kept guns there, accessible to the children); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 7
Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 2218 (Ohio App. 1981) (proper factors in a custody contest
between child's father and grandparents were the ages of the child and grand-
parents); In re Tremayne Quame Idress R., 429 A.2d 40, 45-47 (Pa. Super. 1981)
(proper factors in a custody dispute between the two-year-old child's foster
mother and maternal grandmother were the length of the child's residence with
the foster mother and the child's relationships with grandmother and other ma-
ternal relatives); Mnookin, supra note 217, at 234-46, 250-55.
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or specifically.501 Although trial courts often make findings of
fact,502 these findings may be written in vague and conclusory
language or may fail to indicate which specific facts were cru-
cial to the ultimate decision. 503
Given these traditional characteristics of custody law and
practice, even extraordinary attempts to create the kind of rec-
ord necessary to show violations of generally applicable rules
of collateral estoppel would appear unlikely to succeed.
504
Thus, although the Supreme Court could in theory review a
case in which the record showed that a state had failed to give
a custody decree of another state the issue-preclusive effect it
would have had there, the question has been of relatively little
practical importance. The matter therefore has remained un-
501. See, e.g., Easterling v. Caton, 260 Ala. 543, 546, 71 So. 2d 835, 838 (1954);
Capuder v. Misko, 177 So. 2d 592, 596 (La. App. 1965); Kell v. Texas Children's
Home & Aid Soc'y, 191 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
502. See, e.g., Cacic v. Cacic, 164 Colo. App. 103, 487 P.2d 612 (1971). But see,
e.g., Nicpon v. Nicpon, 9 Mich. App. 373, 377, 157 N.W.2d 464, 467 (1968) (trial
courts in Michigan before 1963 did not make explicit findings of fact in divorce
cases); cf. Wagner v. Wagner, 465 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) (approv-
ing implicit, general findings of the trial court in custody modification case in
which no explicit findings had been made); Trudgen v. Trudgen, 134 Mont. 174,
184, 329 P.2d 225, 230 (1958) (in custody modification proceedings "if the evi-
dence justifies but one conclusion, formal findings are unnecessary").
503. See, e.g., Cacic v. Cacic, 164 Colo. App. 103, 487 P.2d 612 (1971);
Mnookin, supra note 217, at 253-54.
In addition to these problems, some courts have declined to preclude the
relitigation of previously decided issues of pure fact in the belief that collateral
estoppel would impair the court's ability to act in the interest of the child when
it is asked to modify a prior order. See, e.g., Layman v. Dehart, 560 P.2d 1206,
1207-09 (Alaska 1977); Dehart v. Layman, 536 P.2d 789, 790-92 (Alaska 1975);
Bachman v. Mejias, 1 N.Y.2d 575, 580-81, 136 N.E.2d 866, 869, 154 N.Y.S.2d 903, 907
(1956). On appeal, the question is ordinarily discussed, not in terms of gener-
ally applicable principles of issue preclusion but, in terms of the changed cir-
cumstances rule for custody proceedings. See, e.g., Prevatt v. Penney, 138 So.
2d 537, 539 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Paintin v. Paintin, 241 Iowa 411, 415-17, 41
N.W.2d 27, 29-30 (1950); Henrickson v. Henrickson, 225 Or. 398, 403-05, 358 P.2d
507, 510 (1961); H. CLARY, supra note 201, at 599-600; Note, The Changed Circum-
stances Rule in Child Custody Modification Proceedings, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 543
(1952). Indeed, some courts have an occasion said that principles of res judi-
cata and collateral estoppel, as such, are inapplicable to custody decrees. See
e.g., In re R.L.L., 487 Pa. 223, 228-31, 409 A.2d 321, 324 (1979) (dictum).
504. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 613 (1947).
Cases in which changes in legal and factual circumstances made preclusion of
particular issues unjust, for example, might be particularly difficult to identify.
Indeed, if the pleadings and records loosely define the factual issues, and the
substantive law makes no particular facts essential to any given outcome,
courts might not find it possible either to rule that an issue was precluded by
the first proceeding or, if they found the issue precluded, to determine that the
ultimate decision in the second proceeding turned on the precluded issue. See
id. at 613.
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settled, and the states have appeared free to apply their vary-
ing views on the subject.
Throughout the first two-thirds of this century, states com-
monly refused to recognize and enforce one another's custody
decrees. By the 1960's, the law of custody enforcement and
modification was viewed as a flawed part of the interstate sys-
tem of justice and as a serious social problem-an inducement
to lawless self-help by parents and a danger to the welfare of
children.505 Development of the U.C.C.J.A. was, among other
things, a response to these concerns.50 6 Its provisions designed
to require interstate enforcement of decrees and to bar their in-
terstate modification were perhaps even more central to the
Act than were the provisions limiting initial jurisdiction.5 0 7 In
the several states where the U.C.C.J.A. has not been
adopted, 08 the law regarding recognition, enforcement, and
modification of foreign custody decrees still generally conforms
to the pattern described above.5 09
D. RECOGNITION, ENFORCEMENT, AND MODIFICATION OF
DECREES UNDER THE U.C.C.J.A.
1. Res Judicata
Section 12 of the U.C.C.J.A. prescribes the extent to which
the Act precludes a court of an enacting state from reconsider-
ing claims and issues earlier resolved by a court of that state.
Section 12 first identifies the persons who are bound by the de-
cree. Its first sentence provides that if the court "had jurisdic-
tion under section 3," then its decree "binds all parties who
have been served in this State or notified in accordance with
section 5 or who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court,
and who have been given an opportunity to be heard."Slo Ad-
dressing the decree's effect on these parties, section 12 estab-
lishes that the decree "is conclusive as to all issues of law and
505. See U.C.C.J.A Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9 U.LA. 111-13 (1979);
Bodenheimer, supra note 7, at 1207-10; Currie, supra note 41, at 116; Hazard,
supra note 146, at 392-95.
506. See U.C.C.J.A. Commissioner's Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 111-13 (1979).
507. See Bodenheimer, supra note 7, at 1235.
508. See supra text accompanying note 60.
509. See supra text accompanying notes 460-503. For a sample of cases in
non-U.C.C.J.A. jurisdictions, see, e.g., Boone v. Boone, 150 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir.
1945); Buchanan v. Buchanan, 353 Mass. 351, 231 N.E.2d 570 (1967); Garza v.
Shoffner, 386 So. 2d 397 (Miss. 1980); Allen v. Allen, 243 Miss. 23, 136 So. 2d 627
(1962); Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 12 V.L 491 (1976); In re Hutchins, 8 V.L 223
(1970).
510. U.C.C.J.A. § 12 (1968).
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fact decided and as to the custody determination made unless
and until that determination is modified pursuant to law, in-
cluding the provisions of this Act."511 It is far from clear, how-
ever, what the Commissioners meant by this provision and how
it will be interpreted by the courts.
a. Claim Preclusion
Section 12 does not appear to incorporate a rule of claim
preclusion. The language making a decree conclusive, as "the
custody determination made," is of little or no significance. A
custody determination is defined in U.C.C.J.A. section 2(2) as a
"court decision and court orders and instructions" providing for
custody and visitation rights.512 The phrase "orders and in-
structions" seems to refer only to the relief granted; it appar-
ently does not refer to the combination of relief and grounds
encompassed by the concept of claims or causes of action.5 13
The word "decision," on the other hand, could have been in-
tended to refer to this concept. It seems more likely, however,
that the word "decision" was intended to refer only to the dis-
position of the case. The provision that a decree is conclusive
"as to the custody determination made" is followed immedi-
ately by, and is clearly governed by, the limiting clause "unless
and until that determination is modified pursuant to law."
There is no apparent reason to limit claim preclusion in this
manner. 14 Conclusiveness of the disposition made, on the
other hand, is so limited. The terms "decision" and "determi-
nation" were therefore probably intended to refer only to the
disposition of the child's custody. This part of the section 12
rule of conclusiveness thus seems to mean only that a custody
disposition is conclusive as to the parties until a different dis-
position is duly made, a proposition hardly in need of
codification.
511. Id.
512. Id. § 2(2).
513. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61 comment a
(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978); McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 YALE I.J.
614, 638 (1925).
514. Suppose, for example, that a court awarded custody of a child to the
mother and visitation to the father, and shortly thereafter reduced the father's
visitation rights due to his improper conduct after the original decree. The fact
that the "determination... [has been] modified pursuant to law," U.C.C.J.A.
§ 12 (1968), hardly justifies treating claim preclusion as inapplicable, thus al-
lowing the father to sue now for a transfer of custody on the very grounds upon
which he relied in the initial litigation.
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b. Issue Preclusion
Interpretation of the provision in section 12 that the decree
is conclusive "as to all issues of law and fact decided" is a more
important and a more difficult problem. It is unclear whether
the limiting language, "unless and until [the custody] determi-
nation is modified pursuant to law," refers to the conclusive-
ness of custody determinations and issues, or refers only to
custody determinations. If the limiting clause is given the for-
mer interpretation, then the rule of conclusiveness does not ap-
ply to any proceeding which could result in modification
"pursuant to law."5 15 Under this interpretation, section 12
would impose no requirement of issue preclusion on a
U.C.C.J.A. state having jurisdiction to modify its own prior de-
cree.516 If, on the other hand, the clause limiting the conclu-
siveness provided by section 12 applies only to the
conclusiveness of determinations, and does not modify the pro-
vision that a decree is conclusive of issues, then this section
takes a remarkable step: it precludes relitigation by the speci-
fied parties of "all issues of law and fact decided" by a court of
515. A modification "pursuant to law" is one which is consistent with the
U.C.C.J.A. and other applicable law. The rule that a decree is conclusive "until
[the] determination is modified," id. (emphasis added), might be interpreted
so that issue preclusion would apply even to a "lawful" modification proceed-
ing. After a modification, however, relitigation of the issues decided in the first
proceeding would not be precluded by section 12, but relitigation of the issues
decided in the modification proceeding might well be precluded. This interpre-
tation appears to be unsound; it is arbitrary and unsupported by the Commis-
sioners' Notes or case law under the U.C.C.J.A.
516. This interpretation would merely incorporate by reference the require-
ments established elsewhere in the U.C.C.J.A. for jurisdiction, notice, and op-
portunity to be heard. The only significant utility of the provision for issue
preclusion, then, would be as an attempt by the U.C.C.J.A. state to require
other states entertaining modification proceedings that were not lawful in this
sense to give issue-preclusive effects to the U.C.C.J.A. state's decrees. The
Commissioners apparently did not, however, intend that section 12 have this ef-
fect. In their Note to section 14(b), which requires a court of an enacting state
to give due consideration to any record it can obtain of the previous proceeding
in another state before modifying that state's decree, see also id. §§ 21, 22, the
Commissioners wrote: "How much consideration is 'due' this transcript,
whether or under what conditions it is received in evidence, are matters of lo-
cal, internal law which are not affected by this interstate act." Id. § 14 Commis-
sioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 155 (1979). This statement of the Commissioners seems,
therefore, clearly to indicate that in successive proceedings in two U.C.C.J..
states, the U.C.C.J-.A leaves the extent of issue preclusion unchanged from
prior law. There is no indication in the U.C.C.J-.A or in the Commissioners'
Notes of an intent to require only nonenacting states to apply broader issue
preclusion to foreign decrees of U.C.C.J.A. states. It therefore must be con-
cluded that, if section 12's provision for issue preclusion is inapplicable to all
lawful proceedings for modifications, then it is intended to restrict neither en-
acting nor nonenacting states, and thus is superfluous.
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the enacting state having jurisdiction under the section 3 stan-
dards. So interpreted, section 12 broadly precludes the relitiga-
tion of factual and legal issues with few of the limitations on
the application of issue preclusion that apply to other areas of
the law.517 This provision could therefore constitute a radical
change in the law affecting custody proceedings.
An analysis of the Commissioners' Notes to section 12 does
not aid the resolution of this important question of statutory
construction. The Note to section 12 states only that the
section
deals with the intrastate validity of custody decrees which provides the
basis for their interstate recognition and enforcement. . . . [S]ince a
custody decree is normally subject to modification in the interest of the
child, it does not have absolute finality, but as long as it has not been
modified, it is as binding as a final judgment.5 1 8
Any rule of issue preclusion contained in section 12 involves
the effect and not the "validity" of a decree. Furthermore, issue
preclusion neither results in "absolute finality" of decrees nor
prevents "modification in the interest of the child." This Note
language therefore does not indicate an answer to the question.
The references in the section 12 Note, and in other parts of
the U.C.C.J.A.519 and Notes,5 20 to recognition of decrees as well
as to their enforcement may be relevant to the question of is-
sue preclusion. The Commissioners' Notes repeatedly cite the
1967 Proposed Official Drat of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws,5 21 which states that the recognition of a for-
eign judgment requires that it be given "the same effect that it
has in the state where it was rendered with respect to the par-
ties, the subject matter of the action and the issues in-
volved. ' 522 The apparent significance of the Commissioners'
references to recognition is belied, however, by their failure to
explain what they meant by the term, or to discuss or cite au-
thorities concerning collateral estoppel.
The only exception to this omission is the statement in the
517. See supra text accompanying notes 489-92.
518. U.C.C.J.A. §§ 13 & 15 Commissioners' Notes, 9 U.L.A. 149-50 (1979).
519. U.C.C.J.A. § 13 (1968).
520. U.C.C.J.A. §§ 13 & 15 Commissioners' Notes, 9 U.L.A. 151, 158 (1979).
521. See, e.g., U.C.C.J.A. §§ 4, 7, 12, 13, 23 Commissioners' Notes, 9 U.LA. 130,
139, 150, 151, 152, 168 (1979).
522. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT OF LAWS ch. 5, topic 2, introduc-
tory note, at 342 (Proposed Official Draft Part I, 1967). See also id. § 95 com-
ment g, at 353. The final draft approved by the Institute kept this language.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFucT OF LAws ch. 5, topic 2, introductory note,
(1969).
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Note to section 14(b)523 that, in an interstate proceeding to
modify a custody decree, a U.C.C.J.A. state's reception and con-
sideration of evidence of a prior proceeding of another state are
matters of local law that are unaffected by the U.C.C.J.A. This
statement does not necessarily indicate that section 12 does not
require intrastate issue preclusion. The statement appears in a
Note to a section dealing only with modification of sister states'
decrees 524 and refers only to consideration of foreign proceed-
ings.525 There would be no inconsistency between, on the one
hand, including in the U.C.C.J.A. a rule that a decree of an en-
acting state broadly precludes relitigation of issues in the same
state and, on the other hand, leaving to other local law of enact-
ing states and to the unsettled constitutional law526 the ques-
tion of the extent to which relitigation of issues decided
elsewhere is precluded in the enacting state. To the contrary,
such possibly disparate treatment of local and sister states' de-
crees may reasonably have been considered useful. It would
make some allowance for the greater confidence judges of an
enacting state are likely to have in the decisions of that state's
courts, or for the greater convenience of applying intrastate is-
sue preclusion. It may even have been a concession to ex-
pected political pressures in states that would consider
enactment of the U.C.C.J.A.
Examination of the statutory context and the Notes seems,
therefore, to produce little evidence relevant to the interpreta-
tion of section 12. The interpretation more probably consistent
with the Commissioners' intent is that section 12 requires
broad intrastate issue preclusion. There are three reasons for
this conclusion.
First, it is the only interpretation under which the second
sentence of section 12 is not essentially superfluous. 27 That
reason is not very persuasive when applied to a statute con-
taining a number of other drafting anomalies,5 28 but it is a
factor traditionally deemed significant in statutory
interpretation. 529
In addition, a requirement of intrastate issue preclusion
523. See supra note 516.
524. U.C.C.JA. § 14(b) (1968).
525. See U.C.C.J.A. § 14(b) Commissioners' Note, 9 U.1.A 154-55 (1979).
526. See supra text accompanying notes 477-82.
527. See supra note 516.
528. See, e.g., supra notes 96, 104, 112, 376, 389.
529. 2A C. SAnDs, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTEUCTioN § 46.06 (4th ed.
1973) (a revision of Sutherland Statutory Construction).
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seems consistent with the language of section 12. A lawful
modification proceeding may result in a new custody disposi-
tion solely on the basis of changed circumstances; no issue of
fact or law that was decided in the prior proceeding need be in-
consistently decided or even challenged in the later proceed-
ing.530 The previous custody disposition would thus cease to be
conclusive, but there is no apparent reason to treat the earlier
determinations of issues as having lost their conclusive effect.
If section 12 were intended to limit the conclusiveness of deter-
minations of issues, the drafters could have used language
clearly expressing that intent.53 ' Instead, by its terms, section
12 acknowledges that custody dispositions can be changed
when other provisions of the U.C.C.J.A. are complied with, and
provides a broad rule of intrastate issue preclusion. 32
Finally, at least some participants in the development of
the Act were deeply committed533 to the stated U.C.C.J.A. pol-
icy of discouraging "continuing controversies over child cus-
tody in the interest of greater stability of home environment
and of secure family relationships for the child. '53 4 Because
broad intrastate issue preclusion would further these policies,
it seems likely that the drafters intended to incorporate such a
rule into section 12.
While these considerations support the conclusion that the
Commissioners meant to establish a broad rule of intrastate is-
sue preclusion, they fall short of establishing that this rule is a
wise one. State courts should evaluate its wisdom. The more
important question, after all, is not what the Commissioners in-
tended when they promulgated section 12, but what each enact-
ing legislature intended and how the courts of each state
should interpret the section.5 35
530. See H. CLARY, supra note 201, at 599.
531. The drafters might have written, for example, that a decree is conclu-
sive as to all issues of law and fact decided, unless and until they are otherwise
decided pursuant to law, and as to the custody disposition made, unless and
until it is modified pursuant to law.
532. The drafting of section 12 would, however, have better indicated the
purpose had there been a comma after the word "decided" or an explanation in
the Notes to indicate that the limiting clause modifies only the provision for
conclusiveness of custody dispositions.
533. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, supra note 7, at 1208-09, 1212.
534. U.C.C..A § 1(a) (4) (1968).
535. There apparently have been no reported decisions determining the ef-
fects of section 12 on intrastate issue preclusion. But cf. Commonwealth ex rel.
Zaubi v. Zaubi, 492 Pa. 183, 188-90, 423 A.2d 333, 336 (1980) (relying on section 12
in holding that relitigation of issues decided by Danish court was precluded);
Commonwealth ex rel. Piggins v. Kifer, 427 A.2d 185, 192 (Pa. Super. 1981) (rely-
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Although a review of the intent of the legislature of each
state that has enacted the U.C.C.J.A. is beyond the scope of this
Article, a broad rule of intrastate issue preclusion would serve
several important state policies. State courts, to one degree or
another, share with the Commissioners the policy favoring sta-
bility of environment and relationships for children.5 36 In addi-
tion, the policies served in other kinds of litigation by collateral
estoppel-parties' repose, protection of courts' prestige, and
conservation of judicial and other social resourcesS37-apply to
custody proceedings.
Moreover, recent legal developments affecting custody liti-
gation should tend to reduce the special problems that in the
past have impeded strict application of principles of issue pre-
clusion to custody cases.538 There has been a trend in recent
years toward the adoption of increasingly specific, substantive
rules of custody law, which in some instances reduce the scope
of judicial discretion and indicate or even require particular de-
terminations under specified circumstances. Examples are Cal-
ifornia's statutory presumption favoring joint custody, 39
several states' statutes restricting custody modifications unless
specified and relatively extreme grounds are established,540
and certain states' narrowing and specifying of the grounds for
state removal of children from their parents' homes.5 41 In addi-
tion, some states require trial courts to express relatively
specific findings of fact.5 42 These developments should often
make determination of whether and how issue preclusion ap-
plies to a particular case more practicable than it formerly has
been.
Inflexible application of the section 12 provision on intra-
state issue preclusion, however, might unduly derogate other
considerations. Even the policy disfavoring repetitive litigation,
particularly in custody litigation because of the effects it can
ing on section 12 in holding that relitigation of issues decided by court of sister
state was precluded).
536. See generally In re Tremayne Quame Idress IL, 429 A.2d 40, 48 n.6 (Pa.
Super. 1981) (collecting authorities reflecting various views on the importance
of such stability).
537. Vestal, Rationale of Preclusion, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 29, 31-35 (1964).
538. For a discussion of these problems, see supra text accompanying notes
497-503.
539. CAi. CIrv. CODE § 4600.5 (West Supp. 1981).
540. E.g., CoLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-131 (1974); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 610
(Smith-Hurd 1980); Ky. REv. STAT. § 403.340 (Supp. 1980).
541. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-574 (1981).
542. E.g., Nicpon v. Nicpon, 9 Mich. App. 373, 377-78, 157 N.W.2d 464, 467
(1968).
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have on the stability of a child's life, would not inevitably be
served by issue preclusion. Suppose, for example, that a court
awarded custody of a child to the father and later changed cus-
tody in a decision clearly dependent upon the court's ruling
that modification is proper whenever shown to be in the best
interests of the child.543 Assume that the legislature then en-
acted a statute preventing modifications in the absence of proof
that the existing custodial arrangement is harmful to the health
of the child.54 4 If the father thereafter sought a new modifica-
tion, the court would apparently be required by the terms of
U.C.C.J.A. section 12 to treat as conclusive the earlier decision
that only a showing as to the child's best interests is necessary
for modification. 545
Moreover, in some situations the policies favoring parties'
repose, courts' prestige and efficiency, and children's stability
may be outweighed by other important policies. It may serve a
child's interest as well as his or her parent's to allow relitiga-
tion of an issue if, for example, the parent has not had ade-
quate opportunity and motivation to litigate it,546 the factual or
legal context of the issue has substantially changed, 547 or the
circumstances otherwise indicate that the likely impact upon
the child of a result dictated by issue preclusion justifies re-
laxing its application.54 8 If the rule that section 12 seems to es-
tablish is inflexible, these countervailing policies may be
sacrificed.
These competing policy concerns may lead some states to
reject the interpretation of section 12 that establishes a broad
and inflexible rule of issue preclusion, and to develop instead a
common law doctrine of issue preclusion that incorporates the
required degree of flexibility.549 Other states might give section
543. See, e.g., Trunik v. Trunik, 179 Conn. 287, 426 A-2d 274 (1979); Howell v.
Howell, 391 So. 2d 1304, 1305-06 (La. App. 1980).
544. See, e.g., ILT. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 610 (Smith-Hurd 1980).
545. See generally Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child. A Reap-
praisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. I.J. 887,
928-30 (1975) (discussion of effects of state intervention in child placement).
546. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1(a), (e) (ii),
(iii) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
547. See generally id. § 68.1(b).
548. See generally id. § 68.1(e) (i).
549. If the legislative history of the U.C.C.J.A. in that state and its law con-
cerning statutory interpretation allowed it to do so, techniques are readily
available for reaching the desired end. A state could reasonably interpret sec-
tion 12 as making the statutory requirement of issue preclusion inapplicable to
a proceeding in which a court of the enacting state properly considers modifica-
tion of its own prior decree. See supra note 516. That state could then hold
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12 an interpretation generally similar to the one the Commis-
sioners seem to have intended and nevertheless secure some of
the benefits of a flexible rule. The courts of such a state might
read "conclusive" to mean in effect "as conclusive as collateral
estoppel otherwise is" and "decided" to mean in effect "decided
after full litigation."
2. Enforcement
Sections 13 and 14 of the U.C.C.J.A. contain the crucial pro-
visions on interstate recognition, enforcement, and modification
of decrees. Section 13 provides that the courts of the enacting
state
shall recognize and enforce an initial or modification decree of a court
of another state which had assumed jurisdiction under statutory provi-
sions substantially in accordance with this Act or which was made
under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the
Act, so long as this decree has not been modified in accordance with
jurisdictional standards substantially similar to those of this Act.550
Although application of this duty depends on whether the de-
cree in question has been modified, cases can arise in which
section 13 is applicable, yet modification is not an issue. That
is, a party may ask an enacting state to recognize and to en-
force a foreign decree, modification of which neither has oc-
curred nor is requested by the opponent of recognition and
enforcement.5 5 ' For example, a mother may win an award of
custody in state A. She may then ask a court of state B, in
which the father is withholding the child, to cause delivery of
the child to her and to impose sanctions on the father for con-
tempt of court. Rather than asking for modification of the ini-
tial custody award, the father may simply oppose the mother's
petition.552 Although in this situation the duties established by
U.C.C.JA. section 13 seem clear, they may actually depend
upon three questions which warrant further consideration-
whether the decree satisfies the alternative jurisdictional tests
of section 13, whether the decree is punitive, and whether an el-
ement of discretion tempers the duty to enforce the decree. 53
that since section 12's provision of issue preclusion is, consequently, superflu-
ous, it does not displace other law the state has or might subsequently develop.
550. U.C.C.J.A. § 13 (1968).
551. For a discussion of the significance of a mere request to modify a de-
cree, see infra text accompanying notes 573-75.
552. See, e.g., State ex rel. Butler v. Morgan, 34 Or. App. 393, 578 P.2d 814
(1978).
553. Application of section 13 can also present a fourth question: whether
and to what extent it requires interstate issue preclusion. See infra text ac-
companying notes 584-600. It should be noted also that section 13, like sections
[Vol. 66:711
INTERSTATE CHILD CUSTODY
Failure to satisfy the criteria implicit in these questions may
render a decree unenforceable.
The test for jurisdiction under section 13 establishes in the
alternative a statutory and a factual test. Under the statutory
test, a decree of state A does not qualify for recognition and en-
forcement in state B unless, at the time that state A's court
"assumed jurisdiction,"554 state A had enacted the U.C.C.J.A.
jurisdictional provisions in a form "substantially in accordance
with" state B's version of them.555 The determination of
whether state A has "assumed jurisdiction under statutory pro-
visions substantially in accordance" with state B's version of
the U.C.C.J.A. can be analyzed in three different ways.
First, state B may interpret this test as requiring state A to
have enacted satisfactory versions not only of section 3, which
contains the criteria for the existence of jurisdiction, and sec-
tion 14, which sets forth the basic prohibition of modification of
foreign decrees, but also of other U.C.C.J.A. sections. It was ar-
gued above5 56 that the interstate duties created by section 13
should be interpreted as conditional only on the specified de-
grees of conformity to the section 3 criteria of jurisdiction, the
section 4 and 5 requirements of notice and opportunity to be
heard, and the section 14 standards for modification. Those du-
ties are not also conditional, it was argued, on conformity to the
mandatory or discretionary standards in sections 6, 7, and 8 for
6 and 14, leaves an enacting state free to show greater deference to other states'
proceedings than the mandatory duty created by the statute. See
Bodenheimer, supra note 7, at 1235. But see Roundtree v. Bates, 630 P.2d 1299,
1302-03 (Okla. 1981).
554. One U.C.C.J.A. provision appears to treat the term to "assume" juris-
diction as synonymous with the term to "exercise" jurisdiction. Compare
U.C.C.J.A. §§ 7(a), 8(a), (b) (1968) (dealing with a prohibition of and authority
for declining the exercise of jurisdiction to modify custody decrees) with id.
§ 14 (exempting from the prohibition against modification of foreign decrees
cases in which foreign courts have declined to assume jurisdiction to modify
the decrees). Exercise of jurisdiction seems to include not only the making of
custody decisions, but also the taking of any judicial step in the process that
can lead to such decisions, including the hearing and consideration of a case.
See id. § 6(a) (prohibiting exercise of jurisdiction in a case in which the peti-
tion was fied when a proceeding "was pending in a court of another state exer-
cising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this Act."). Other
provisions appear, hoWever, to treat the assumption of jurisdiction not as sy-
nonymous with its exercise, but as referring only to the beginning of its exer-
cise. See id. §§ 6(c); 7(i). Ascribing one meaning or the other to the term
"assumption" of jurisdiction could determine the applicability of the statutory
test to a decree rendered in a state where the U.C.C.J.A jurisdictional provi-
sions were enacted during the pendency of the proceeding leading to the
decree.
555. rd. § 13.
556. See supra text accompanying notes 91-134.
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the exercise of jurisdiction. In at least one state, however, the
statutory test of section 13 has been interpreted as requiring
enactment of at least some of the latter sections.557
In addition, application of the statutory test may depend
upon interpretation of sections 3 and 14. Although the language
of sections 3 and 14 as enacted does not vary substantially
among the states,55 8 there is significant variation among state
court interpretations of the provisions of these sections. Some
states have construed these sections to implement a preference
for their own jurisdiction and to expand their authority to mod-
ify foreign decrees to a greater extent than others view the
U.C.C.J.A. as permitting.5 9 The argument, therefore, could be
made that the authoritative interpretations of sections 3 and 14
by the courts of state A have rendered those sections not "sub-
stantially in accordance" with the perhaps identically worded
statutes of state B. State A's decrees, therefore, are not auto-
matically qualified for recognition and enforcement under the
statutory test of section 13. Courts, however, seem to have ig-
nored this argument and appear to read other states' U.C.C.J.A.
enactments literally in determining whether they satisfy the
statutory test of section 13.560
Finally, Professor Sanford Katz has argued that section 13
requires enforcement of decrees entered in U.C.C.J.A. states
only it the decrees were 'issued in accordance with the Act's
provisions."561 Professor Katz suggests that this determination
will fall to the forum court's discretion.5 62 This discretionary
test represents a third conceivable interpretation of the statu-
tory test.
In the alternative, the factual test for section 13 jurisdiction
applies if state A lacks a jurisdictional statute "substantially in
557. Pasqualone v. Pasqualone, 63 Ohio St. 2d 96, 104-05, 406 N.E.2d 1121,
1127 (1980) (referring apparently to sections 7 and 8).
558. See R. CROUCH, supra note 70, at 75-83; 9 U.L.A. 125 (1979); id. at 15-16
(Supp. 1981). See also State ex rel. Butler v. Morgan, 34 Or. App. 393, 578 P.2d
814 (1978) (applying section 13 statutory test on the basis of foreign conformity
to section 3, despite foreign statutory reference to domicile).
559. E.g., compare In re Weinstein, 87 111. App. 3d 101, 408 N.E.2d 952 (1980)
(preference for own jurisdiction); Fernandez v. Rodriguez, 97 Misc. 2d 353, 411
N.Y.S.2d 134 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (same) and Haynes v. Willock, 431 A.2d 341 (Pa.
Super. 1981) (same) with Both v. Superior Court, 121 Ariz. 381, 590 P.2d 920
(1979) (en banc) (greater deference to foreign decrees) and Terrill v. Terrill,
431 A.2d 1194, 1198 (RI.L 1981) (same).
560. See, e.g., State ex rel. Butler v. Morgan, 34 Or. App. 393, 578 P.2d 814
(1978).
561. S. KATz, supra note 59, at 32.
562. Id.
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accordance with" state B's Act or if A's statute was enacted
after A assumed jurisdiction in the proceeding that led to the
decree. In either situation, the decree is not qualified for recog-
nition and enforcement unless "made under factual circum-
stances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the Act."5 63 In
contrast to other sections of the U.C.C.J.A., this requirement is
not modified by the word "substantially";5 6 4 thus, the factual
circumstances must conform exactly to the jurisdictional stan-
dard. Moreover, it is the law of B that determines whether the
applicable jurisdictional standard consists only of sections 3, 4,
5, and 14 or also includes sections 6 through 8.565 In addition,
A's action is measured against B's version of the applicable
sections, and B's court applies these standards to the factual
circumstances. The court of B therefore has some latitude to
hold that A's decree is not qualified for recognition and en-
forcement under the factual test, even though a court of A or
another state might reach a different conclusion if presented
with a very similar case.566 There have indeed been cases in
which foreign decrees were held not qualified for recognition
and enforcement in this manner.5 67
Notwithstanding satisfaction of one of the alternative juris-
dictional standards of section 13, a sister state may deny an ac-
tion for enforcement if the foreign decree is punitive within the
meaning of any exception for such decrees. Some authority
supports the existence of such an exception568 despite the con-
trary language and legislative history of the U.C.C.J.A.569
Finally, even if a decree qualifies for recognition and en-
forcement under section 13's statutory or factual test and is not
deemed to fall within an exception for punitive decrees, a ques-
tion can arise as to the meaning of the duty to enforce it. En-
forcement is mandatory5 7 0 if a certified copy of the decree has
been filed with the clerk of the court of the enforcing state "in
like manner as a custody decree rendered by a court" of the en-
563. U.C.C.JA § 13 (1968).
564. Compare id. § 13 ("factual" test) with id. §§ 3(a), (4)(i), 6(a), 13 ("stat-
utory" test and test concerning modification), 14(a).
565. See supra text accompanying notes 90-133.
566. If the court of A actually decided issues that are also presented in B,
the questions of interstate issue preclusion and full faith and credit that are
discussed infra text accompanying notes 584-619, 753-805 arise.
567. See, e.g., In re Weinstein, 87 fll. App. 3d 101, 308 N.E.2d 952 (1980); Fer-
nandez v. Rodriguez, 97 Misc. 2d 353, 411 N.Y.S.2d 134 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
568. See supra notes 391, 396-98.
569. See supra text accompanying notes 395-96.
570. U.C.C.J.A. § 13 Commissioners' Note, 9 UJ.A. 151 (1979); see U.C.C.JA.
§ 13 (1968).
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acting state.571 Judicial application of some of the principal
techniques for enforcement of custody decrees is, however, dis-
cretionary. 72 Through the exercise of its discretion, an enforc-
ing court could therefore mitigate section 13's mandatory duty
of interstate enforcement by providing relatively weak enforce-
ment to foreign decrees of which the court disapproved.
Courts do not appear, however, to have had many occa-
sions for resort to any of these methods of blunting the section
13 duty. When interstate enforcement of a decree is opposed
under the U.C.C.J.A., there is almost always an issue concern-
ing modification; a court inclined not to enforce a foreign de-
cree thus can often completely avoid its enforcement by
modifying it.
3. Modification
The U.C.C.J.A. duty of recognition and enforcement is ap-
plicable only "so long as [the foreign] decree has not been
modified in accordance with jurisdictional standards substan-
tially similar to those of" the forum's U.C.C.JA.573 Section
14(a) provides:
If a court of another state has made a custody decree, a court of this
State shall not modify that decree unless (1) it appears to the court of
this State that the court which rendered the decree does not now have
jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accord-
ance with this Act or has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the
decree and (2) the court of this State has jurisdiction.574
If a foreign decree is modified pursuant to this provision, the
original decree need not be enforced. Moreover, when a court
first considers a request for modification of a foreign decree, it
can, consistently with section 14(a), make a temporary order
which remains pending during the suit, thereby deferring the
question of enforcement of the decree until it decides whether
to order a permanent modification.575 The vital issues in
U.C.C.J.A. litigation after the initial decree thus have typically
been the interpretation and application of the section 14(a)
571. U.C.C.JA. § 15(a) (1968).
572. See supra note 390.
573. U.C.C.J.A. § 13 (1968).
574. Id. § 14(a).
575. See, e.g., Wenz v. Schwartze, 598 P.2d 1086, 1089-90 (Mont. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980). Similarly, a court can simply decide to hear simulta-
neously the petitions for enforcement and for modification, and leave the status
quo, which may be physical possession of the child by one party in violation of
a foreign decree, unchanged in the meantime. See, e.g., Howard v. Howard, 378
So. 2d 1329, 1330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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standards for the exercise of jurisdiction to modify foreign
decrees.
The Commissioners clearly intended those standards to al-
low modification of a foreign decree only on the basis of the
rendering state's lack of jurisdiction at the time of the proposed
modification, and not also on the basis of its earlier lack of ju-
risdiction when the decree was rendered. The Commissioners
stated in the Note to section 14 that the rendering state's fail-
ure to satisfy the Act's jurisdictional standards when it first as-
sumes jurisdiction to make a decree is not a ground for
modification of the decree by a sister state at a later time if the
rendering state has become able to satisfy the criteria of the
Act.5 76 The Note is entirely consistent with the language of sec-
tion 14(a), which excepts from the prohibition against modifica-
tion only cases in which the rendering court "does not now
have jurisdiction." 577
Interpretation of sections 13 and 14 according to their terms
and the clearly expressed intent of the Commissioners can cre-
ate the anomalous result that a foreign decree cannot be modi-
fied consistently with section 14, but need not be recognized or
enforced under section 13. This limbo can be the fate of a de-
cree made by a state that did not satisfy the statutory or factual
test of section 13 when the decree was made, but that does sat-
isfy the jurisdiction test of section 14 when modification is later
sought. In such a case a sister state must reject a request for
modification, yet it is also free to reject a request for enforce-
ment of the foreign decree.57 8
There are many more cases, however, in which state B can
not only refuse enforcement but also modify a decree of state
A. Under section 14(a), state B has several avenues, analogous
to those available under section 13, through which it can avoid
facing a duty not to modify state A's decree. The law of B de-
termines whether B has jurisdiction and whether A's potential
jurisdiction to modify is to be measured only against section 3
or also against one or more of sections 4 through 8, and 14.579
The law of state B also supplies the authoritative version of the
applicable sections and determines whether A's potential juris-
diction is "substantially in accordance" with B's jurisdictional
576. 9 U.LJ.A 155 (1979).
577. U.C.C.J.A. § 14(a) (1968) (emphasis added). There is in this respect an
important difference between the U.C.C.JA. and the Wallop Act. See infra text
accompanying note 630.
578. But see S. Katz, supra note 59, at 77, 85, 89.
579. See supra text accompanying notes 90-133.
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requirements. The court of B makes all findings of fact con-
cerning B's jurisdiction and A's potential jurisdiction that are
not precluded by previous findings in A,580 and applies its rele-
vant law to these facts. There have indeed been cases in which
courts have modified foreign decrees on one or more of these
bases.5 81 Some courts have even ignored the difference in the
scope of the duty of enforcement in section 13 and the duty of
nonmodification in section 14.582 These courts have modified
custody decrees of a sister state on the ground that the state's
past jurisdiction was defective, without regard to the sister
state's jurisdiction at the time of the modifications. 583
4. Recognition
To modify a foreign decree, a sister state must determine
whether it is collaterally estopped from litigating any of the fac-
tual and legal issues presented. Many states have required a
form of interstate issue preclusion through application of the
changed circumstances rule or of general principles of collat-
eral estoppel.584 In addition, the U.C.C.J.A. may be interpreted
to create a stricter requirement of interstate issue preclusion.
Section 13 provides that an enacting state shall "recognize and
enforce" a foreign decree meeting specified criteria.585 Further-
more, section 15(a) provides that, upon proper filing, a foreign
decree "has the same effect and shall be enforced in like man-
ner" as a domestic decree.5 86 It is unclear, however, what the
Commissioners meant by this language.
According to the 1967 Proposed Official Draft of the Restate-
580. See infra text accompanying notes 584-619, 753-805.
581. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 575; Commonwealth ex rel. Piggins v.
Kifer, 427 A.2d 185, 186-88, 192 (Pa. Super. 1981).
582. See supra text accompanying notes 576-78.
583. See, e.g., Howard v. Howard, 378 So. 2d 1329, 1331 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980); Baird v. Baird, 374 So. 2d 60, 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); of. Webb v.
Webb, 245 Ga. 650, 266 S.E.2d 463 (1980), cert. dismissed for want ofjurisdiction,
451 U.S. 493 (1981) (noting that Florida court had violated its duty to confer
with Georgia court, in opinion justifying exercise of jurisdiction by Georgia
court to modify Florida decree); In re Weinstein, 87 Ill. App. 3d 101, 109, 408
N.E.2d 952, 958 (1980) (relying on failure of Montana court to cooperate with Il-
linois court, in opinion justifying exercise of jurisdiction by Illinois court to
modify Montana decree). See also Haynes v. Willock, 431 A.2d 341 (Pa. Super.
1981).
584. See supra note 488 and accompanying text.
585. U.C.C.J.A § 13 (1968) (emphasis added).
586. Id. § 15(a) (emphasis added). This section is not by its terms made ap-
plicable only to decrees meeting the criteria of section 13 for recognition and
enforcement, but the Note accompanying section 15 implies such a limitation.
See U.C.CJ.A. § 15 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 158 (1979).
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ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws, on which the Commission-
ers relied in several of the Notes, 58 7 recognition and
enforcement were separate topics.588 Enforcement of a judg-
ment was said to occur "when, in addition to being recognized,
a party is given the affirmative relief to which the judgment en-
titles him."589 Recognition of a judgment was said to be "a con-
dition precedent to its enforcement," 590 which was satisfied
when the judgment was "given the same conclusive effect that
it has in the state of rendition with respect to the persons, the
subject matter of the action and the issues involved." 9 1 The
Draft also noted that under some circumstances a judgment
can or must be recognized, even if it need not or cannot be
enforced.592
It is conceivable that the Commissioners intended to im-
plement these principles through the term "recognize" in sec-
tion 13 and the language quoted above from section 15(a). If so,
section 13 would require a court otherwise permitted to modify
a foreign decree under section 14 to treat as precluded every is-
sue that would have been precluded in the rendering state, pro-
vided that the rendering state originally had met section 13's
jurisdictional standards.593 Under this interpretation, section
13 would in some instances add to the rigor of interstate preclu-
sion of factual issues in custody litigation. 94
Nevertheless, the Commissioners do not appear to have
contemplated the creation of such a rigorous rule of interstate
587. See, e.g., U.C.CJA. §§ 4, 7, 12, 13, 23 Commissioners' Notes, 9 U.LA. 130,
139, 150, 151-52, 168 (1979).
588. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 5, topic 2, introduc-
tory note (Proposed Official Draft 1967). The Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws, finally approved by the American Law Institute, is the same as the
Proposed Official Draft with respect to the principles noted in the text accom-
panying notes 566-70 infra. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws ch. 5,
topics 2 & 3 introductory notes, § 93 comment b, § 102 comments a-c (1969).
589. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws ch. 5, topic 2 introduc-
tory note (Proposed Official Draft 1967).
590. Id.
591. Id. § 93 comment b.
592. Id., ch. 5, topic 2 introductory note; id., ch. 5, topic 3 introductory note;
id. § 102 comments a-c.
593. The state would, of course, remain free under section 13 to determine
for itself the jurisidictional issues upon which the application of section 13 de-
pends. See U.C.C.J.A. § 13 (1968). See generally Progress, supra note 401, at
998-1000.
594. This could occur particularly when the state so interpreting section 13
has traditionally applied the changed circumstances rule loosely, but now is
considering modification of a decree duly made by a court of a U.C.C.J.A. state
where, under section 12 or other law, there is relatively strict intrastate preclu-
sion of issues of fact in custody cases.
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issue preclusion. The term "recognize" appears only in sec-
tions 13 and 23, which require an enacting state to "recognize
and enforce" the decrees of sister states and of other nations,
respectively.595 Although the Commissioners' Notes frequently
use both the terms "recognize" and "enforce," 596 neither the
Notes nor the statute defines either* term. The Notes' use of
these two terms separately and together, however, makes it
quite clear that the Commissioners treated recognition as noth-
ing more than a necessary and sufficient precondition of en-
forcement, having no significance if a decree was not
enforced.5 97
The Note to section 15 appears to support the conclusion
that the Commissioners did not intend to incorporate a rule of
issue preclusion in that section's reference to the interstate ef-
fect of a custody decree. The Note refers nine times to "en-
forcement" of decrees, but uses the word "effect" only in saying
that, upon its filing with the court clerk, a decree "becomes in
effect a decree of the state of filing and is enforceable."5 98 The
Note's failure to mention any particular effects other than en-
forcement suggests that section 15 does not create a rule of is-
sue preclusion.
Moreover, the section 13 clause terminating the duty to en-
force a properly made foreign decree when the decree is later
modified also applies to the duty of recognition. If section 13
required interstate issue preclusion, there would be no appar-
ent reason to cease requiring it when a decree was modified.59 9
The appropriate conclusion is, therefore, that the Commission-
ers did not intend to require interstate issue preclusion at all,
much less to require it for an artificially limited period of time.
It must again be noted, however, that the Commissioners'
views may not prevail in the interpretation of every state's ver-
595. U.C.C.J.A. §§ 13, 23 (1968).
596. U.C.C.J.A. Commissioners' Prefatory Note & §§ 4, 12, 13, 15, 23 Commis-
sioners' Notes, 9 U.L.A. 112, 114, 130, 149-52, 158, 168 (1979).
597. See U.C.C.J.A. § 13 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 151-52 (1979) (Note
using various forms of the word "recognize" interchangeably with various
forms of the phrase "recognize and enforce"); id. § 15 Commissoners' Note, 9
U.L.A. 158 (1979) (Note stating that "out-of-state custody decrees which are re-
quired to be recognized are enforced by other states"). The Note to section 14
comes closest to explicit treatment of issue preclusion, yet it fails to use the
word "recognize." See id. § 14 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 155 (1979). Sec-
tion 14 also fails to mention recognition. As discussed previously, section 14
does not affect interstate issue preclusion. See supra note 516.
598. U.C.C.J.A. § 15 Commissioners' Note, 9 ULJ.A 158 (1979).
599. Cf. supra note 515 (interpretation of section 12 applying issue preclu-
sion to "lawful" modification proceedings).
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sion of the U.C.C.J.A. Indeed, the courts of one state appear to
have found in the language of sections 12, 13 and 15 a rule limit-
ing interstate relitigation of issues.600
E. ISSUE PRECLUSION UNDER FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
The other possible source of legal limitations on interstate
relitigation of issues is, of course, the federal full faith and
credit clause and statute. The enactment of relatively specific
and partially uniform federal and state criteria of custody juris-
diction and enforcement has given new significance to the
question of the possible application of full faith and credit. Full
faith and credit could conceivably limit interstate relitigation of
findings made in applying these criteria. Moreover, the in-
creased likelihood that in a given case intrastate issue preclu-
sion will be required 601 and will be feasible602 has increased the
significance of full faith and credit.
The question often has been framed as whether full faith
and credit requirements apply to custody decrees, as if a sim-
ple yes or no would suffice. 60 3 It is unlikely, however, that the
answer is a flat negative; the affirmative answer is probably the
qualified one that full faith and credit requires that many cus-
tody decrees be given some interstate effects under most cir-
cumstances. Although it is impossible within the scope of this
Article to chart all the contours of these requirements, it is pos-
sible and appropriate to establish one point concerning them-
in custody cases, full faith and credit ordinarily forbids relitiga-
tion of issues of fact unmixed with legal questions when such
relitigation is precluded under the law of the state duly render-
ing a custody decree. Some exceptions to this rule may be jus-
tifiable,604 but no policy supported by authority or reason
600. See Commonwealth ex rel. Piggins v. Kifer, 427 A.2d 185, 192 (Pa.
Super. 1981); cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Zaubi v. Zaubi, 492 Pa. 183, 190, 423 A.2d
333, 336 (1980) (U.C.C.JA. section 13 makes conclusive all issues determined by
valid foreign nation custody decree).
601. See supra text accompanying notes 510-49.
602. See supra text accompanying notes 483-504, 538-42.
603. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT OF LAWS § 103 comment
b & reporter's note (1971); Currie, supra note 41, at 109-18; Stansbury, supra
note 36, at 831-32; Stumberg, supra note 39, at 58-59; Note, supra note 475, at 824-
25, 837-38; Comment, supra note 449, at 1024-26.
604. For example, relitigation may not be precluded by a previous judgment
if the rendering court lacked jurisdiction, cf. Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946)
(absence of procedural due process resulting in no personal jurisdiction ren-
ders judgment unenforceable in foreign jurisdiction), or if a state that lacked
adequate connections with the child or access to crucial evidence decided the
factual issues. Cf. Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 613-14 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
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dictates wholesale exclusion of custody decrees from the full
faith and credit requirement of interstate preclusion of factual
issues.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet squarely faced
this issue,605 the Court has in various other contexts treated
full faith and credit as requiring claim and issue preclusion rel-
atively broadly and inflexibly, even in the face of competing
state, federal, and individual interests. 606 An example is the re-
cent workers' compensation case of Thomas v. Washington Gas
Light Company.607 The opinions in Thomas indicated that five
Justices currently on the Court view the full faith and credit
statute as requiring strict interstate preclusion of claims, 608 de-
spite the unique policy underlying workers' compensation,
which arguably justifies relaxation of the full faith and credit
mandate. 609 Even more pertinent to the matter of issue preclu-
sion in custody proceedings is the opinion of the other four Jus-
tices. Although they considered workers' compensation awards
exempt from one aspect of interstate claim preclusion under
the full faith and credit statute, they described as "unexcep-
tionable" the "full faith and credit principle that resolutions of
dissenting) (minimum nexus between rendering court and child, i.e., the
child's presence, should exist before foreign court must honor custody decree).
605. The opinions of the Supreme Court in the custody cases in which full
faith and credit questions have been decided or avoided have not contained
any dicta on the specific matter of interstate preclusion of issues of unmixed
fact. See cases cited supra note 479. The separate opinions of Justice Frank-
furter in two of those cases, reasoning that courts should not give custody de-
crees the same full faith and credit that other judgments receive, were written
in cases presenting questions of interstate enforcement of dispositions and in-
terstate claim preclusion. See Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 611-14 (1958)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting). The opinions, therefore, may not have represented a con-
sidered and total rejection of interstate preclusion of pure questions of fact.
Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Kovacs argued that in a custody case the wel-
fare of the child is "more important" than the full faith and credit clause's pol-
icy that precludes relitigation of decided issues. 356 U.S. at 611-12. A reading of
both his opinion and the opinion of the Court, however, suggests that Justice
Frankfurter was using the word "issues" to refer generally to claims as well as
issues, not to distinguish issues from claims and dispositions of custody. Under
any interpretation, his opinion fails to address separately preclusion of issues
of fact and preclusion of issues of law and issues of mixed law and fact. Id. at
609-16. Neither of those opinions was joined by any other Justice.
606. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980); Thomas v. Washington
Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
607. 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
608. See id. at 286-90 (White, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Bur-
ger, C.J., and Powell, J.), 290-96 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall,
J.).
609. See id. at 277-86 (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan,
Stewart, and Blackmun, JJ.).
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factual matters underlying a judgment must be given the same
res judicata effect in the forum State as they have in the ren-
dering State."610
That principle is unexceptionable even as applied to cus-
tody proceedings; indeed, none of the many analyses of the ap-
plication of full faith and credit to custody decrees published in
the past fifty years specifically object to it. Though a number of
commentators have predicted or supported special treatment of
child custody, they have relied on the interests of each state in
applying its own law and retaining discretion to determine the
disposition of a case, and not on any interest in contradicting
prior findings of fact.611 Those who have addressed the inter-
state preclusion of factual issues in custody proceedings have
concluded that full faith and credit and sound policy require
such preclusion.612 Professor Ehrenzweig specifically approved
the application of full faith and credit to preclude the relitiga-
tion of factual issues in interstate custody cases, 613 after having
earlier "hoped" that the Supreme Court would approve what he
called "a clear trend against full faith and credit and for full
discretion."614
Nevertheless, a state as parens patriae does have special
obligations to protect the young, and states use various laws
and patterns of discretion to discharge that duty. They there-
fore arguably have especially strong interests in custody pro-
ceedings that should be balanced against the full faith and
credit obligation to recognize foreign custody decisions embod-
ying another state's legal standards and exercise of discre-
tion.615 There is no legitimate state interest, however, even
610. Id. at 281 (dictum).
611. See, e.g., R. WEmTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONLFICT OF LAWS 259,
535-37 (2d ed. 1980); Currie, supra note 41, at 109-18; Stansbury, supra note 36,
at 831-32; Stumberg, supra note 39, at 58-59; Note, Custody Awards and Their
Recognition in Other Jurisdictions, 80 U. PA. L REV. 712, 714-15 (1932).
612. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 54, at 7-8; Reese & Johnson, The Scope of
Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 153, 173-75 (1949). See
also Goodrich, supra note 187, at 6-7 (courts should interpret full faith and
credit clause as forbidding relitigation of the question of a child's custody
under certain circumstances).
613. Ehrenzweig, supra note 54, at 7-8.
614. A. EHRENzwEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFICT OF LAws 292 (1962). See
also id. at 295 n.14.
615. Whether those interests qualify a general constitutional duty to en-
force or give preclusive effects to decrees is a question beyond the scope of this
Article. Cf. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 213 (1933) (reserving ques-
tion whether South Carolina could impose further child support obligations on
a father domiciled in that state despite a prior Georgia judgment that ex-
hausted his duty of child support under Georgia law and that is entitled to full
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when children are concerned, in reexamining an issue of pure
fact that has already been decided through fair procedures by a
court properly exercising jurisdiction over the parties and the
controversy. Although the first court's finding of fact may have
been inaccurate or biased,6 1 6 there is no assurance that a sec-
ond court's contrary decision of the issue will be less biased or
more accurate. No policy warrants a departure from the consti-
tutional and congressional mandates of the national unification
of the judicial system.6 1 7
It must be acknowledged, however, that there are issues as
to which the distinction between facts and the application of
law to facts is elusive. 61 8 Because of states' special interests in
applying their own law and discretion in custody cases, the re-
quirement of interstate preclusion of fact issues should argua-
bly be confined to the clearest questions of pure fact.
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this discussion, it is sufficient
to conclude that full faith and credit applies to many decisions
of factual issues in custody proceedings and may also apply to
decisions of legal issues, mixed questions of law and fact, and
entire claims.
F. ENFORCEMENT AND MODIFICATION UNDER THE WALLOP ACT
To the preexisting federal and state law on interstate rec-
ognition, enforcement, and modification of custody decrees,
section 1738A(a) adds: "The appropriate authorities of every
State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not modify
except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, any child
custody determination made consistently with the provisions of
this section by a court of another State."619 Like section 14(a)
faith and credit). It should be- observed, however, that a proper analysis bal-
ances those interests against the policies that full faith and credit serves as a
"nationally unifying force" in the administration of justice, Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943), and perhaps also more specific policies to
protect children and their custodians from the instability, expense, and incon-
venience of repetitive litigation. See generally cases cited supra note 481.
616. Cf. Autry v. Autry, 359 S.W.2d 272, 277-78 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (per
curiam) (most courts profess that the proper place to raise children is in their
state).
617. There are precedents for treating full faith and credit as requiring that
a foreign judgment be given issue-preclusive effects even though, due to a lack
of finality, see In re Burns, 49 Hawaii 20, 407 P.2d 885 (1965), or a lack of jurisdic-
tion to grant a particular kind of relief, see Cuevas v. Cuevas, 191 So. 2d 843
(Miss. 1966), full faith and credit does not require recognition and enforcement
of every aspect of the judgment.
618. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1 comment b (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1977).
619. 28 U.S.C-. § 1738A(a) (West Supp. 1980).
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of the U.C.C.J.A.,620 this provision allows a court to deny en-
forcement to a foreign decree at the virtual outset of a proceed-
ing by entering a temporary modification. The modification
provisions of subsection (f) must therefore be considered in
conjunction with the basic mandate of subsection (a). Subsec-
tion (f) provides:
A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody of
the same child made by a court of another State, if-
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determi-
nation; and
(2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or
it has declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such
determination. 6 2
1
Examination of the operation of section 1738A should be-
gin, however, with the observation that the statute does not by
its terms do certain things that it conceivably might have done.
First, it does not purport to require recognition of decrees. The
omission of such a requirement should not be deemed inadver-
tent in a federal statute which closely follows the language of
the U.C.C.J.A. in several other important respects, 622 and which
nevertheless departs from the U.C.C.J.A.'s uniform references
to "recognition and enforcement." 623 This omission can be
viewed as a decision to commit questions of interstate issue
preclusion to state law624 and federal constitutional law.626
Whether intentional or not, congressional reticence regarding
interstate issue preclusion is prudent given the unsettled char-
acter of the law of issue preclusion in general,626 the somewhat
limited role it traditionally has played in custody litigation,62 7
and the uncertainty as to whether U.C.C.J.A. section 12 has in
some states unduly expanded the scope of intrastate preclusion
620. See supra text accompanying notes 573-75.
621. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(f) (West Supp. 1980).
622. E.g., compare id. § 1738A(b) (2), (4), (6), (7), (c) (2) (A), with U.C.C.J.A.
88 2(1), (5), (8), (9), 3(a) (1) (1968) (similar language).
623. U.C.C.J.A. §§ 13, 23 (1968).
624. See supra text accompanying notes 584-600.
625. See supra text accompanying notes 601-18. There is no indication in
the text or legislative history of the Wallop Act that Congress intended to
render the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976) inapplicable to custody proceed-
ings, or to supplant any requirements imposed in such proceedings by the full
faith and credit clause itself. See 124 CONG. REC. 787 (1978); infra text accompa-
nying notes 771-805. In addition, it can be doubted that Congress would have
the power to take the latter step. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448
U.S. 261, 272 n.18 (1980); infra text accompanying note 780.
626. See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS reporter's memo-
randum, §§ 68, 68.1 & accompanying comments & reporter's notes (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1977).
627. See supra text accompanying notes 483-505.
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of issues of law as well as fact in custody proceedings. 628 In ad-
dition, section 1738A does not by its terms expressly require a
state to modify or forbid it to enforce a foreign custody order
that was not made consistently with the federal statutory
standards. 629
Having identified the significant omissions in section 1738A,
the duties affirmatively created by the Wallop Act can be ex-
plored. The duties of enforcement and of nonmodification cre-
ated by subsection (a) are coextensive. Both exist only as to a
custody determination made consistently with section 1738A,
and both expire when the determination is modified in the
manner authorized by subsection (f). There is therefore no
limbo under federal law similar to the one created by the
U.C.C.J.A.,630 in which a decree cannot be modified but need
not be enforced. Every decree either is entitled under section
1738A to interstate enforcement or can be modified without vio-
lation of the provisions of that section. The Wallop Act does
not, however, attempt to eliminate the limbo created by the
U.C.C.J.A. If, for example, the law of state B does not permit
its court to modify a decree of state A, but neither B's law nor
section 1738A requires enforcement of the decree, then the
Wallop Act also permits the anomalous result permitted by the
U.C.C.J.A.
The criteria that determine whether a custody determina-
tion was made consistently with section 1738A differ in several
additional ways from the U.C.C.J.A. criteria for recognition, en-
forcement, and nonmodification of decrees. Although some of
these differences were discussed as they relate to subsection
1738A(g)'s prohibition of concurrent exercise of jurisdiction,
they are also significant for subsection (a)'s requirement of en-
forcement and nonmodification. The federal duty of enforce-
ment and nonmodification depends upon the law of state A
rather than state B631 and upon federal criteria that give a spe-
cial role to the "home state"632 and limit "emergencies" to
those involving "mistreatment or abuse."633 The federal duty is
not, however, made dependent upon an evaluation of the sub-
628. See supra text accompanying notes 512-49.
629. But see infra text accompanying notes 647-726 for a discussion of
whether section 1738A preempts state law by implication.
630. See supra text accompanying notes 576-78.
631. Virginia E.E. v. Alberto S.P, 440 N.Y.S.2d 979, 982 (Fain. Ct. 1981); see
supra text accompanying note 409.
632. Virginia E.E. v. Alberto S.P., 440 N.Y.S.2d 979, 982 (Fain. Ct. 1981); see
supra text accompanying notes 380-81.
633. See supra text accompanying notes 365-72.
[Vol. 66:711
INTERSTATE CHILD CUSTODY
stantiality of a state's conformity to the applicable criteria. 63 4
Nor is it made subject to exceptions for emergencies, for other
temporary stays and modifications, or for punitive decrees.63 5
Three other federal departures from the U.C.C.J.A. criteria
will often be significant in applying the federal duty of enforce-
ment and nonmodification. One is the rejection, for purposes of
the federal Act, of the proposition that every decree made by a
state that has enacted a suitable statute is entitled to
mandatory interstate enforcement without regard to whether
the provisions of the statute were properly applied. The federal
statute thus has no statutory test like that in U.C.C.J.A. section
13;636 whether section 1738A requires enforcement of a decree
depends upon whether it was made consistently with the provi-
sions of that section in addition to relevant state law. 637
Another such departure appears in subsection (d), which
provides that
the jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child custody
determination consistently with the provisions of this section contin-
ues as long as the requirement of subsection (c) (1) of this section con-
tinues to be met and such State remains the residence of the child or
of any contestant.
6 38
The "requirement of subsection (c) (1)" referred to is that
"such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State."63 9
The function, therefore, of subsection (d) is neither to confer
jurisdiction nor to broaden the federal statutory duty of
nonmodification, but to limit that duty according to a specific
federal test.640 In effect, subsection (d) provides that, even if
the state that rendered a custody decree still has jurisdiction
634. See supra text accompanying note 348.
635. See supra text accompanying notes 391-407 and infra text accompany-
ig notes 885-88.
636. Virginia E.E. v. Alberto S.P., 440 N.Y.S.2d 979, 983 (Fain. Ct. 1981); see
supra text accompanying notes 554-61.
637. Whether a custody order was made consistently with section 1738A de-
pends, by the terms of the statute, not only upon conformity to the specified,
federal criteria, but also upon the court making the order having had jurisdic-
tion under its own law. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) (1), (d) (West Supp. 1980). The
state law in effect when the rendering state acted is, therefore, significant
under section 1738A. Even in this respect section 1738A is, however, different
from the statutory test of U.C.C.J-.A section 13. Consistency with the federal
statute depends in this respect upon whether the circumstances required by
state law existed; satisfaction of the statutory test in section 13 depends only
upon what statute was in force.
638. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(d) (West Supp. 1980).
639. Id. § 1738A(c)(1).
640. See Virginia E.E. v. Alberto S.P., 440 N.Y.S.2d 979, 983 (Fain. Ct. 1981).
When the test of subsection (d) is satisfied, the state need not also meet the
test of subsection (c) (2).
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under its own law when a modification is later sought, if that
state no longer "remains the residence of the child or of any
contestant,"641 then it "no longer has jurisdiction"642 in this
sense: section 1738A does not forbid another state to modify its
decree.64 3 This provision thus establishes a threshold criterion
of continuing jurisdiction to modify a state's own decree,
thereby preventing abuse by a rendering state of the concept
that its jurisdiction, once exercised, continues to the exclusion
of other states.
The Wallop Act's final departure from U.C.C.J.A. criteria
for interstate enforcement of decrees bases the federal duty of
interstate enforcement and nonmodification on the subsection
(g) prohibition against the simultaneous exercise of jurisdic-
tion. In this respect the federal Act differs from U.C.C.J.A. sec-
tion 6(a) as the Commissioners intended it644 and as some
states have interpreted it.645 Even in states that regard compli-
ance with section 6(a) as a condition of the duty of interstate
enforcement, there may be differences between the scope of
the section 6(a) duty not to exercise concurrent jurisdiction
and the scope of the similar federal duty created by section
1738A(g).646 Thus, section 1738A may make a state's exercise of
jurisdiction during the pendency of a prior proceeding in a sis-
ter state determinative of whether interstate respect must be
given to the resulting decree, while under state law interstate
respect for the decree may not depend upon this factor, or may
depend upon it according to a different set of rules.
IV. RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE VARIOUS FEDERAL
AND STATE REQUIREMENTS
A. WALLOP ACT PREEMPTION OF STATE LAw
This Article has thus far assumed that the Wallop Act
641. 28 U.S.C-.A § 1738A(d) (West Supp. 1980).
642. Id. § 1738A(f) (2).
643. It may be questioned, as a matter of interpretation of section 1738A,
whether the jurisdiction of the court of the rendering state continues in the
sense described in the text only as long as that state continuously remains the
residence of the child or a contestant, and continuously possesses jurisdiction
under its own law, or also does so when there has been an interruption and
then reestablishment of such residence or jurisdiction. The use of the terms
"continues" and "remains" in subsection (d) seems to imply that the former in-
terpretation was intended. See 1980 Senate Hearing, supra note 4, at 151 n.34
(statement of Russell M. Coombs).
644. See supra text accompanying notes 91-133.
645. See authorities cited supra note 135.
646. See supra text accompanying notes 345-407.
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preempts state law only to the extent that compliance with
both federal and state law is literally impossible.64 7 It now is
necessary to discard this assumption. Foster and Freed have
asserted that the Wallop Act broadly "preempts the field" and
permits a court, regardless of its own law, to disregard a foreign
decree that does not satisfy the federal criteria.648 Since the
question appears to be substantial, a complete analysis must
determine the extent to which the Wallop Act preempts state
law.
The Supreme Court recently reiterated the well-estab-
lished649 principle that "consideration under the Supremacy
Clause starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not
intend to displace state law."650 Search for a contrary intent
would, of course, begin with the statute and its legislative his-
tory. If the legislative record indicates with relative clarity that,
except for literally irreconcilable state law, preemption was not
intended by Congress, the Court can be expected to acquiesce
in the demonstrated congressional intent. The legislative his-
tory of the Wallop Act does not reveal an intention to preempt
state law, and the text of the Act seems to give the same
indication.
1. Relevant Statutory Language
The Act contains no provision explicitly addressing the pre-
emption of state law. It does contain an express finding, how-
ever, that it was necessary
to establish national standards under which the courts of [the states,
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the territories and posses-
sions of the United States] will determine their jurisdiction to decide
[custody and visitation] disputes and the effect to be given by each
647. See generally Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142-43 (1963).
648. Foster & Freed, supra note 297, at 1, col. 1.
649. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
650. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981). The court noted, how-
ever, that-
Such a purpose [to displace state law] may be evidenced in several
ways. The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for States to
supplement it. Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed
to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject. Likewise,
the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of
obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose. Or the state
policy may produce a result inconsistent with the objective of the fed-
eral statute.
Id. at 746-47 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)
(citations omitted)).
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such jurisdiction to such decisions by the courts of other such
jurisdictions.6 5 1
The express finding does not indicate whether the national
standards are to be comprehensive in the sense that they
would preclude the application of supplementary state
standards.
The Act also states its six general purposes. These include
promoting cooperation between states in making custody deter-
minations, promoting the interstate exchange of information
and mutual assistance, facilitating interstate enforcement of
custody decrees, discouraging continuing interstate controver-
sies, avoiding jurisdictional competition, and deterring inter-
state abductions of children.652 Section 1738A serves all of the
stated purposes to one degree or another without implicitly
preempting state law. Each of the stated purposes is a very
close paraphrase of one of the nine stated purposes of the
U.C.C.J.A.653 Three of the U.C.C.J.A. purposes are, however,
omitted from the federal Act. Examination of the nature of the
omitted purposes and of the specific U.C.C.J.A. provisions that
serve these purposes suggests that the federal omission reflects
a congressional decision to leave various important matters to
state law.
One omitted purpose is to "assure that [custody] litigation
take place ordinarily in the state with which the child and his
family have the closest connection and where significant evi-
dence ... is most readily available." 65 4 Among the U.C.C.J.A.
provisions designed to serve this purpose are the section 3 limi-
tation of jurisdiction, the section 7 guidelines on forum non
conveniens, and the section 8 standards on unclean hands.655
The Wallop Act's failure to adopt this purpose, coupled with its
failure to limit initial jurisdiction per se,65 6 and its omission of
federal forum non conveniens and unclean hands provisions
seems to reflect a decision to leave these matters to state law.
The Wallop Act is also silent on the U.C.C.J.A.'s purpose to
avoid "relitigation of custody decisions of other states."657 In-
deed, section 1738A creates federal bars to interstate relitiga-
tion of decisions that in many instances are narrower than the
651. Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 7(b), 94
Stat. 3569.
652. Id. § 7(c).
653. Compare id. with U.C.C.J.A. § 1(a) (1), (2), (4), (5), (7), (8) (1968).
654. U.C.C.J.A. § 1(a) (3) (1968).
655. See supra text accompanying notes 69-78.
656. See supra text accompanying notes 295-305.
657. U.C.C.J-6A § 1(a) (6) (1968).
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state bars created by the U.C.C.J.A.658 The federal statute thus
appears to be designed to leave state law free to impose addi-
tional limits on relitigation.
The final omitted purpose is to "make uniform the law of
those states which enact" the U.C.C.J.A.659 Although the fed-
eral Act necessarily creates uniformity on the specific points
covered by its express commands and prohibitions, its failure
to incorporate a paraphrase of this U.C.C.J.A. purpose suggests
a federal tolerance of interstate variation on other points.
2. Legislative History
There are numerous references in the Wallop Act's legisla-
tive history to broad purposes ascribed to the legislation, 660 and
the legislative history contains many understandably oversim-
plified and inaccurate summaries of its provisions.66 1 The more
technical analyses presented to the Congress, however, noted
that the bill created only a limited role for federal law.662 The
analysis indicated that passage of the Wallop Act would not
eliminate the need for further state enactments of the
U.C.C.J.A.;663 on the contrary, it would stimulate additional
state legislation.664 These analyses urged that section 1738A
and state laws,665 including the U.C.C.J.A.,666 would comple-
ment each other, each performing vital functions.
Perhaps the most significant part of the legislative history
is a section-by-section analysis of the measure submitted to a
658. See supra text accompanying notes 619-46.
659. U.C.C.J.A. § 1(a) (9) (1968).
660. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. 787 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond). Iden-
tification of the purposes of legislation in preemption analysis should be based
primarily upon the congressionally stated findings and purposes, rather than
on the legislative history. See United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 345
U.S. 295, 315 (1953).
661. See, e.g., 1980 Senate Hearing, supra note 4, at 4 (statement of Senator
Cranston).
662. See, e.g., id. at 133, 144-45, 149-50 (testimony and statement of Russell
M. Coombs); id., Addendum at 117-18 (footnotes to Justice Department's pro-
posed revision of legislation); Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Part XIV, at
10,671-72 (1979) (statement of Russell M. Coombs); 1979 Senate Hearing, supra
note 299, at 64 (submission of Professor Brigitte Bodenheimer), 279-80 (re-
printing published article).
663. See, e.g., 1979 Senate Hearing, supra note 299, at 64 (submission of Pro-
fessor Brigitte Bodenheimer).
664. See, e.g., id. at 280 (reprinting published article).
665. See, e.g., 1980 Senate Hearing, supra note 4, at 133 (testimony of Russell
M. Coombs).
666. See, e.g., 1979 Senate Hearing, supra note 299, at 64 (submission of Pro-
fessor Brigitte Bodenheimer).
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joint hearing of two Senate subcommittees 667 by Senator Wal-
lop, who, as the original668 and principal sponsor of the legisla-
tion, wrote with special authority concerning the legislation.
This submission described section 1738A as adopting the "prin-
ciple [sic] jurisdictional provisions of the Uniform Child Cus-
tody Jurisdiction Act,"669 a characterization which accurately
noted by implication that not all of the U.C.C.J.A. jurisdictional
provisions were incorporated in the federal bill. It predicted
that if enacted, section 1738A would induce states to enact the
U.C.C.J.A. The submission stated that, "assuming all fifty
states and the District of Columbia do adopt the act, this stat-
ute will retain its usefulness in those cases in which a court
might ignore the state law but would be hard pressed to ignore
both the state and federal law."670 Senator Wallop wrote in
conclusion that "once all ... have enacted the law, we should
then reassess the scope and usefulness of the federal law."671
His clear implication was that the scope of the federal law
might then be further narrowed.
The principal sponsor of this bill thus apparently foresaw
additional states enacting the entire U.C.C.J.A., rather than a
version of it truncated by implicit federal preemption. Further-
more, he considered it possible that such universal adoption of
the U.C.C.J.A. would permit a further narrowing of the scope of
section 1738A. It is inconceivable that such further state and
federal enactments would eventuate if section 1738A implicitly
preempted the provisions of the U.C.C.J.A. that can be applied
without violating the express provisions of the federal statute.
3. Application of Preemption Principles and Precedents
Even if the statutory language and legislative history did
not signal the intended relationship between federal and state
law, application of the analysis used by the Supreme Court in
other recent preemption cases 672 would lead to the conclusion
that section 1738A creates no implicit preemption. The Court
has articulated two general ways in which state law can be pre-
empted, even though it is not literally inconsistent with federal
law. One is for Congress fully to occupy a field of regulation;
the other is for Congress to enact provisions whose effective
667. 1980 Senate Hearing, supra note 4, Addendum at 138-43.
668. 124 CONG. REC. 783-88 (1978).
669. 1980 Senate Hearing, supra note 4, Addendum at 138.
670. Id. at 139-40 (emphasis in original).
671. Id. at 140.
672. See supra notes 649-50 and accompanying text.
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operation is obstructed by certain state laws.673
a. Occupation of the Field
(1) Pervasiveness offederal regulation
The Court has on some occasions treated the pervasiveness
of a scheme of federal regulation as a factor supporting the con-
clusion that Congress has completely occupied the regulated
field. It is worthwhile, therefore, to examine in some detail the
extent and limitations of the requirements expressly created
by section 1738A, and to determine whether they pervade the
subjects of custody jurisdiction, recognition, enforcement, and
modification.
The statute imposes three requirements. One is that
"before a child custody determination is made, reasonable no-
tice and opportunity to be heard shall be given" to specified
classes of persons.674 The Act fails to incorporate related provi-
sions that are found in the U.C.C.J.A. or other state law. Mis-
sing are: a provision granting or limiting judicial power to give
notice and opportunity to be heard to additional classes of per-
sons or to give them in a manner that is more than reason-
able;675 specific requirements for the timing and manner of
giving notice;676 a provision specifying the consequences of a vi-
olation of the stated federal notice requirement;677 and, a provi-
sion describing the extent of contacts, if any, that must exist
between a defendant and the forum state in order to render a
decree immune from a subsequent charge of inadequate
notice.67 8
673. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157-58 (1978); Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977). The recent preemption decisions
of the Supreme Court in the area of family law are inapposite, because they
concern not implicit preemption but the scope of explicit preemption. See
Ridgway v. Ridgway, 50 U.S.L.W. 4006, 4009 (1981) (No. 80-1070); McCarty v. Mc-
Carty, 101 S. Ct 2728, 2762 (1981); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581
(1979).
674. 28 U.S.C.A § 1738A(e) (West Supp. 1980).
675. Compare id. (reasonable notice) with statutes cited supra note 338 (30
day notice).
676. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(e) (West Supp. 1980) (reasonable notice)
with U.C.C.J.A. § 5 (1968) (notice must be given in prescribed manner ten to
twenty days before hearings).
677. See supra text accompanying notes 335-37. Compare 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1738A(a), (e) (West Supp. 1980) (states must enforce foreign decrees if made
consistent with federal law; reasonable notice required) with Allison v. Supe-
rior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 993, 999-1001, 160 Cal. Rptr. 309, 312-13 (1979) (court
not bound by Texas default judgment, because Texas three day notice period
does not conform to U.C.C.JA ten day period).
678. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(e) (West Supp. 1980) (no provision) with
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In addition, the federal statute forbids a state court under
specified circumstances to exercise its custody jurisdiction dur-
ing the pendency of a prior proceeding in another state con-
cerning the same child.679 Here, too, the Act fails to regulate
various related matters. Section 1738A does not require the
state in which proceedings were first commenced to: defer to
the second state;680 grant, limit, or provide standards for the ex-
ercise of either state's power to defer to the other in the event
the circumstances specified in section 1738A do not exist;6 8' or
prescribe consequences of forbidden concurrent proceedings
beyond exclusion of any resulting decree from the federal stat-
utory duty of interstate enforcement and nonmodification.682
Section 1738A also provides that "the appropriate authori-
ties of every State" shall enforce and not modify foreign cus-
tody decrees under specified circumstances. 683 Although there
are related provisions which section 1738A might have in-
cluded, the statute omits: a prohibition against interstate en-
forcement of decrees that do not satisfy the federal criteria684 a
provision for interstate modification of noncomplying decrees
despite contrary state law; a provision specifying the required
modes of enforcement; 685 a requirement of interstate claim or
issue preclusion;686 a prescription of the consequences of a vio-
lation of the federal statutory requirement of nonmodification,
beyond exclusion of an offending modification decree from the
protection of section 1738A; and a provision describing the con-
sequences of a failure to give a foreign decree the required
enforcement.
TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1982) (contacts must meet
one of three requirements).
679. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(g) (West Supp. 1980).
680. See supra text accompanying notes 430-40.
681. Compare 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(g) (West Supp. 1980) (no provision) with
U.C.C.J.A. § 6(b), (c) (1968) (prescribing procedure for selecting appropriate fo-
rum through communication between courts of separate jurisdictions).
682. For example, section 1738A does not purport to deprive such proceed-
ings of any protection they may have under the full faith and credit clause and
statute. 28 U.S.CA. § 1738A (West Supp. 1980).
683. Id. § 1738A(a).
684. Compare id. (no provision) ith Roundtree v. Bates, 630 P.2d 1299,
1301-03 (Okla. 1981) (U.C.C.J.A. forbids deference to foreign decree not made
consistently with U.C.C.J.A. standards).
685. Compare 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(a) (West Supp. 1980) ("appropriate au-
thorities ... shall enforce") with U.C.C.J.A. § 15(a) (1968) (foreign decree filing
required; enforced as if local decree). See also supra text accompanying notes
570-72.
686. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (West Supp. 1980) (no provision) with
U.C.C.J.A. § 13 (1968) (recognition of foreign custody decrees).
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Not only does the Wallop Act expressly fail to regulate
these matters, but it also fails to address a number of other is-
sues that arise in the creation and administration of rules for
custody jurisdiction, recognition, enforcement, and modifica-
tion. For example, the Act does not proscribe the exercise of
jurisdiction by a state lacking the federally specified connec-
tions with a case; instead it merely treats such an exercise of
jurisdiction as not entitled to the affirmative protection of the
Act.687 Its commands apply only to determinations of the cus-
tody of persons under the age of eighteen, 688 though the some-
what different and more extensive commands and guidelines
established by the U.C.C.J.A. apply in at least one state to
young persons over that age.689 The federal statute does not re-
quire, forbid, or in any other way deal with recognition and en-
forcement of custody decrees of other nations, despite the
explicit treatment of such decrees in the U.C.C.J.A.690 Unlike
the U.C.C.J.A., section 1738A also fails to address the circum-
stances under which courts of different states must or may
communicate with each other 691 or assist with one another's
proceedings, 692 the ways in which jurisdictional facts are to be
pleaded 693 and proved,694 the propriety of taking depositions in
one state by order of the court of another,695 expedited proce-
dures for litigation concerning interstate jurisdictional is-
sues, 696 the manner in which a court can obtain physical
possession of a child from outside the state,69 7 registration of
one state's decree in the court of another state,698 and the as-
sessment of parties' expenses of interstate litigation.699 Indeed,
in the congressional hearings on this legislation, the bill was
687. See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
688. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(a), (b) (1), (e), (g) (West Supp. 1980).
689. See Wyo. STAT. §§ 8-1-102, 20-2-112 (1977).
690. Compare 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (West Supp. 1980) (no provision) with
U.C.C.J.A. § 23 (1968) (foreign custody decrees recognized and enforced if af-
fected persons received reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard). A de-
cree of another nation could, however, if used by a state as the basis of a
decree made consistently with section 1738A, be indirectly a subject of the du-
ties created by section 1738A(a).
691. See U.C.C.JA §§ 6(b), (c), 17, 21, 22 (1968).
692. See id. §§ 19, 20.
693. See id. § 9(a).
694. See id. § 9(b).
695. See id. § 18.
696. See id. § 24.
697. See id. §§ 11(b), 19(b), 20(c).
698. See id. § 15(a).
699. See id. §§ 11(c), 15(b), 19, 20(c). But cf. Parental Kidnaping Prevention
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 8(c), 94 Stat. 3571 (encouraging state courts to
give priority to custody cases and to award expenses to parties in such cases).
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commended for leaving such questions to state law.700 The
Congress was told that the U.C.C.J.A. in particular, and other
state law generally, would continue to perform important func-
tions if the Wallop proposal were enacted.7 01
Section 1738A thus is certainly not pervasive according to
the ordinary meaning of the word. That it was intended to be
interstitial seems clear from the nature of its provisions and
the statute's accompanying legislative history. The statute's in-
terstitial nature is especially significant, because the legal test
of pervasiveness appears to be a strict one. Supreme Court de-
cisions that in recent years have found implicit preemption on
this basis have typically involved federal regulatory schemes
that have not only touched virtually every aspect of the activity
regulated, but have included both restrictions on the activity
and affirmative grants of federal authority to engage in the ac-
tivity under specified conditions, such as licenses to operate
aircraft7 0 2 and to trade with Native Americans.7 0 3 Section
1738A, however, is entirely silent on a number of important
matters related to its general subject7 04 and does not contain
affirmative grants of authority which complement the prohibi-
tions it does establish. It should, therefore, not be deemed per-
vasive in the sense in which preemption cases have used that
term.
In any event, pervasiveness seems today to be of less im-
portance than other considerations. As federal regulation of
commercial and other activities has become increasingly exten-
sive and detailed in recent years, the Court seems to have be-
come more solicitous of states' interests in concurrently
regulating the same matters and skeptical of the argument that
the pervasiveness of a body of federal law establishes its pre-
emptive effect.7 05
(2) Character of the federal purpose and provisions
According to the United States Supreme Court, a second
factor that bears upon federal occupation of a field is "the ob-
700. See, e.g., 1979 Senate Hearing, supra note 299, at 279 (reprinting pub-
lished article).
701. See supra Hearings cited in note 662.
702. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 628-32
(1973).
703. See Warren Trading Post Co.v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 688-
90 (1965).
704. See supra text accompanying notes 674-701.
705. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359-60 (1976); New York Dep't of So-
cial Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 415 (1973).
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ject sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character
of the obligations imposed by it.o706 Although the cases seem
to employ this factor to determine whether state law impedes
attainment of a federal purpose,7 07 its application to the ques-
tion whether section 1738A occupies the field supports the con-
clusion that the field is not occupied. The narrowness of the
expressed federal purposes and of the obligations created by
the Act suggests that there is no implicit preemption.7 0 8 The
same observations suggest that it would be inappropriate to
deem preemptive a federal statute which states such limited
objects and establishes such limited duties.
(3) Dominance of the federal interest
Preemption may also be indicated if the legislation touches
"a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system will be assumed to preclude -enforcement of
state laws on the same subject."17 0 9 The Supreme Court has not
articulated and consistently applied criteria for determining the
dominance of the federal interest in a subject. 10 Furthermore,
in cases in which occupation of fields has been found, there has
been considerable variation in the characteristics of the partic-
ular subjects of regulation. These subjects have ranged from
relations between labor unions and businesses7 1 1 to regulation
of air traffic,7 12 and none of the regulatory schemes has resem-
bled the requirements for state judicial conduct contained in
section 1738A. There are thus no authoritative precedents or
rules that clearly establish whether the federal interest imple-
mented by this statute is so dominant as to preempt all similar
state law.
The traditional relationship between federal and state law
in this area leaves little doubt, however, as to this matter. As
an aspect of domestic relations, the law of child custody is pe-
culiarly within state control, usually to the virtual exclusion of
federal influence.713 Interstate jurisdiction, recognition, en-
forcement, and modification of custody decrees were controlled
706. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
707. Wiggins, Federalism Balancing and the Burger Court: California's Nu-
clear Law as a Preemption Case Study, 13 U.C.D. L. REV. 3, 40 (1979).
708. See supra text accompanying notes 651-701.
709. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 311 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
710. See Wiggins, supra note 707, at 34-35.
711. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959).
712. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 625 (1973).
713. See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890).
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almost solely by the states until enactment of the Wallop
Act.714 Indeed, even outside the field of domestic relations, fed-
eral regulation of the conflict of laws has been interstitial, and
state law has been of real significance. This has been true not
only as to rules governing choice of law,7 1 5 but also as to juris-
diction, recognition, and enforcemefit of judgments.716 Thus,
regardless of whether the field touched by the Act is described
as child custody adjudication, the conflict of laws in such adju-
dication, or the interstate effects of judicial proceedings of this
kind, it cannot be considered one in which the federal interest
is "so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to pre-
clude enforcement of state laws on the same subject."717
b. State Law Obstacles
It remains, however, to consider whether features of state
law that are not literally inconsistent with section 1738A are
nevertheless preempted because they produce results "incon-
sistent with the objective of the federal statute."7 18 The appli-
cation of this standard varies according to the purpose ascribed
to the legislation.719 The Supreme Court has treated a differ-
ence between federal and state purposes as a reason not to
hold that a state law obstructs the objective of a federal stat-
ute.72 0 The state purposes underlying the U.C.C.J.A. are very
broad,721 as are those underlying the law of non-U.C.C.J.A.
states, and include the comprehensive regulation of custody ju-
risdiction, recognition, enforcement, and modification. Al-
though narrower objectives underly the Wallop Act, Congress
intended to establish certain national standards to apply to in-
terstate child custody disputes. 722 Therefore, some overlap ex-
ists between these federal and state purposes.
714. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41, 462-65, 477-81.
715. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 499 U.S. 302, 307-08 & n.10 (1981).
716. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 2, introductory
note, at 1-2 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) (jurisdiction); id. at 11 (recognition); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 102 comment c (1971) (foreign en-
forcement of equity decrees); UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
ACT (1964).
717. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 311 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
718. Id.
719. Wiggins, supra note 707, at 48 n.215.
720. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 441-46
(1960); cf. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 161-65 (1978) (identity of
federal and state purpose as a reason for contrary holding).
721. See U.C.C.J.A. § 1 (1968); id. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A.
111-14 (1979).
722. See supra text accompanying notes 651-71.
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That overlap should not, however, be held to create any im-
plicit preemption. When the Court has held state law pre-
empted on the ground that it obstructs a federal statute merely
by regulating activities not restricted by federal law, the Court
has identified the federal interests in permitting those activi-
ties.7 23 The federal statutory objectives in such cases have in-
cluded, in other words, both purposes to be served by
establishing certain regulations, such as promoting vessel
safety,7 2 4 and purposes to be served by avoiding more extreme
regulations, such as facilitating eventually uniform interna-
tional standards for vessel safety.7 25 The language and legisla-
tive history of the Wallop Act, however, contain no indication of
any federal purpose to be served by the lack of legal require-
ments beyond those of section 1738A. On the contrary, the leg-
islative history indicates that the Act's many silences were
meant to leave the regulation of state conduct to state and
other federal law. It should be concluded, therefore, that enact-
ment of section 1738A has preempted state law only to the ex-
tent that compliance with both federal and state requirements
is impossible.7 26 When section 1738A commands a court to give
723. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 165-68 (1978) (fed-
eral law imposing certain requirements for vessel safety features and omitting
others facilitated future adoption of uniform, international standards, a federal
purpose impeded by state regulation); Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132,
148-51 (1976) (state law preempted when absence of federal regulation served
purpose of maintining balance of labor-management economic power); Minne-
sota v. Northern States Power Co., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972) (memorandum opinion),
afg 447 F.2d 1143, 1153-54 (8th Cir. 1971) (preemption of state restrictions on
emission of radiation is based on the federal purpose of encouraging atomic en-
ergy development). See also Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n,
38 U.S. 685 (1965).
724. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 165 (1978).
725. Id. at 165-68.
726. A decision that may appear to be to the contrary is Virginia E.E. v. Al-
berto S.P., 440 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Fain. Ct. 1981). The New York court concluded
that section 1738A did not require enforcement or forbid modification of a prior
decree of California, and ruled without discussing New York law that "there-
fore" the court would not decline to exercise its jurisdiction. Id. at 983. The
court apparently concluded that because modifying an Illinois decree made af-
ter a California decree would not violate § 1738A, it therefore was free to do so.
Id. at 984. It is not clear, however, that the court decided that any restrictions
imposed by New York law on the court's exercise of jurisdiction were pre-
empted. The opinion of the court, before stating these rulings, set forth at unu-
sual length the arguments made by the parties for and against the declination
to exercise jurisdiction. Id. at 980-82. None of the arguments favoring declina-
tion relied upon New York law. The possible application of New York law to
disposition of the motion thus appears to have been waived or overlooked. The
only reference to preemption in the opinion appears in a quotation from Foster
& Freed, supra note 297, at 1, col. 1. See 440 N.Y.S.2d at 983. Other language in
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someone notice and opportunity to be heard or to enforce a for-
eign custody determination, and state law permits or requires a
court not to do so, the state law is preempted. Likewise, when
the federal statute forbids a court to modify a custody determi-
nation or to exercise concurrent jurisdiction, and state law per-
mits or requires the court to do so, the state law is preempted.
The Wallop Act does not otherwise preempt state law.
B. CONCURRENT OPERATION OF VARIOUS PRESCRIPTIONS
Given the assorted legal requirements of various state and
federal custody laws, it is important to understand their opera-
tion in relation to one another. The subject can be con-
founding. Professor Katz has suggested that "the most
accurate approach ... is probably to presume that the Act
[U.C.C.J.A.] makes the issue of full faith and credit irrelevant,"
for if it were interpreted as requiring full faith and credit, the
U.C.C.J.A. would be unconstitutional.727 This Article argues
that the interaction among the U.C.C.J.A., the Wallop Act, and
full faith and credit is comprehensible and sensible, though
complex. Differences between the kinds of duties created re-
spectively by section 1738A and the U.C.C.J.A. on one hand,
and by the full faith and credit clause and statute on the other,
as well as differences between the jurisdictional conditions for
application of those duties, are the main aspects of this
interaction.
1. Distinctions Among and Independence of Particular Duties
The Wallop Act and the U.C.C.J.A., under certain circum-
stances, require states to enforce other states' awards or
changes of custody and forbid states to make awards or
changes of custody. The Wallop Act is entirely silent, however,
on the question whether a state which it does not forbid to
make or to change a custody award must, when it does take
such action, apply any rule of claim or issue preclusion. The
full faith and credit clause and statute, on the other hand,
surely require some interstate issue preclusion, may well re-
quire claim preclusion, and perhaps even require enforcement
the opinion seems to indicate approval of other views of Foster and Freed on
the preemptive effect of the Wallop Act. Id. at 983-84. Because the court pub-
lished only part of its opinion, assessment of precedential value is difficult. The
case, however, should not be considered as a significant precedent on the ques-
tion of preemption of state law by the Wallop Act.
727. S. KATZ, supra note 59, at 74-75.
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of awards or changes of custody.728 They do not, however,
otherwise determine whether a state can make or change an
award of custody. In short, application of the Wallop Act can
determine whether a court can make or change a disposition of
a child's custody. If the court is free to do so, however, then
full faith and credit determines what claims and issues the
court cannot reexamine, and within the boundaries set by
those sources of federal law, the U.C.C.J.A. or other state law
may further restrict the court.
These various restrictions can operate independently of
one another. For example, the second state to consider a case,
state B, may be permitted under the Wallop Act and the
U.C.C.J.A. to modify a custody decree previously made by the
flrst state, state A, because A has lost or declined to exercise
jurisdiction; 29 yet the full faith and credit clause and statute
may nevertheless require that B apply A's law of claim and is-
sue preclusion. 30 Conversely, a custody proceeding in state B
may present a different claim and different essential issues
from those earlier decided by A, and the court in B may there-
fore be able to decide de novo everything of importance in the
case without violating the requirement of full faith and
credit;731 yet the Wallop Act or the U.C.C.J.A. may require state
B to enforce, and forbid it to modify, A's disposition of the
prior claim.732
2. Differences Among Jurisdictional Criteria for Application
of Duties
Not only are the duties drawn from the various sources of
child custody law different, but also the jurisdictional criteria
for their application may be different. This Article previously
concluded that the criteria governing application of section
1738A and of the U.C.C.J.A.733 are the criteria stated within
those statutes and are probably subject for most cases to a con-
stitutional prohibition against interstate enforcement of a de-
728. See supra text accompanying notes 603-19; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFUCT OF LAWS § 102 comment e (1971).
729. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(f) (West Supp. 1980); U.C.C.J-.A §§ 13, 14(a)
(1968).
730. See supra text accompanying notes 603-19. See also supra text accom-
panying notes 585-600, concerning the possibility that U.C.C.J.A. § 13 also re-
quires this result.
731. See supra text accompanying notes 484-87, 603-19.
732. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(a) (West Supp. 1980); U.C.C.J.A. §§ 13, 15(a)
(1968).
733. See supra text accompanying notes 285, 550-83, 619-46.
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cree made by a forum lacking sufficient contacts with the
defendant, other parties, the child, and the evidence. Other cri-
teria similarly condition the requirement of full faith and
credit. Judgments in general are not entitled to full faith and
credit unless a court possessing jurisdiction rendered them. 34
The question, therefore, is which rule or rules determine
whether a court had jurisdiction such that its custody decree is
entitled to interstate recognition.
If a court of a state lacks jurisdiction according to the law
of that state, and if its law therefore permits intrastate collat-
eral attack on a resulting custody decree, then full faith and
credit clearly does not require interstate recognition of the de-
cree.7 35 The same conclusion follows if contacts between the
forum state and the parties or controversy required by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment are lacking.736
There are, however, two ways in which federal law may con-
ceivably impose a further jurisdictional prerequisite for full
faith and credit.
First, the Supreme Court could adhere to its May v. Ander-
son decision7 37 and confirm the interpretation given to that
case by some commentators that full faith and credit to custody
decrees depends upon the existence of defendant-forum con-
tacts beyond any required by the due process clause.7 38 That
outcome is unlikely, because the Court will probably hold that
even in custody proceedings due process requires either some
defendant-forum contacts or, in exceptional cases, other cir-
cumstances that make litigation in a forum lacking such con-
tacts fair.739 If the Court so holds, it will incidentally deprive
decrees made in violation of this due process requirement of
their claims to full faith and credit. Once the Court definitely
holds that custody litigation, like other proceedings, must sat-
isfy the due process contact requirements, it will probably
equate the requirements of defendant-forum contacts for due
734. Reese & Johnson, supra note 612, at 165.
735. See Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 469 (1873); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 (1976); cf. New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 615 (1947)
(New York modification of Florida decree not shown to have exceeded limits
permitted by Florida law).
736. Pasqualone v. Pasqualone, 63 Ohio St. 2d 96, 101-04, 406 N.E.2d 1121,
1126-28 (1980); see Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189,
196-97 (1915) (dictum); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733-36 (1877); supra text
accompanying notes 141-52.
737. 345 U.S. 528 (1953); see supra text accompanying notes 141-51.
738. See supra text accompanying note 148.
739. See supra text accompanying note 285.
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process and full faith and credit purposes in custody cases as it
has done in other kinds of cases.740
Second, courts could possibly hold that, to give full faith
and credit to custody decrees, federal law requires connections
between the forum state and what many have loosely labeled
the "subject matter"74 1-- the child, one or more of the claimants
to custody and visitation, and the evidence bearing on the
claims. It is possible to view the rule entitling a divorce decree
to full faith and credit only if it is rendered by the state of dom-
icile of one of the parties, 742 and the rule giving full faith and
credit to a judgment determining title to land only if the court
of the state in which the land lies renders the judgment,7 43 as
federal requirements.7 4 4 The courts have applied these rules,
however, in lieu of a requirement for defendant-forum contacts,
rather than in addition to one.7 45 This application is based
upon a conceptual distinction between actions in rem and in
personam that recent Supreme Court decisions have under-
mined.746 The Court may eventually complete the process of
unifying the rationale of territorial jurisdiction and may charac-
terize all the rules governing this jurisdiction, including the
rules for divorce and land cases to the extent that they are de-
rived from federal rather than state law, as applications of the
general rule of due process, weighing fairness to defendants
against other individual, state, and interstate interests.7 4 7 In
the meantime, the Court will probably provide a flexible re-
quirement of defendant-forum contacts in custody proceedings
and rationalize this requirement through the general approach
to due process that it has recently used in other kinds of
cases.7 48 If so, the Court will probably defer to Congress not
only the question whether full faith and credit should depend
upon a forum having contacts with the defendant beyond those
required by due process, but also the question whether full
faith and credit should depend upon additional forum contacts
with other parties, the child, or the evidence in the case.
740. See supra text accompanying note 736.
741. See, e.g., Loper v. Superior Court, 126 Ariz. 14, 17, 612 P.2d 65, 68 (Ct.
App. 1980).
742. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 238 (1945).
743. See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909).
744. See authorities cited supra note 196.
745. See authorities cited supra notes 196, 743.
746. See supra text accompanying notes 169-72.
747. See generally Clermont, supra note 182; Hazard, A General Theory of
State.Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241; Von Mehren & Trautman,
supra note 250.
748. See supra note 159 and text accompanying note 740.
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Within the limits that the Wallop Act imposes, and in the ab-
sence of further congressional action, it will thus continue to
be, as it has been in the past, a function of state law and the
discretion of state courts to determine which of several states
that have sufficient connections with a custody case under the
due process clause should decide the case. Such a decision will
determine the extent of issue preclusion in that state and,
through full faith and credit, in other states as well.
Some might suggest, however, that as a result of enactment
of section 1738A, the full faith and credit clause and statute are
now applicable to custody proceedings only when they are con-
ducted consistently with section 1738A.749 Congress may have
lacked power to give the new Act that effect.7 5 0 In any event,
neither the statutory text nor any specific language in the legis-
lative history supports such an interpretation of the Act.75 ' In-
stead, it appears that, in adding new statutory duties to those
duties which the courts have already held the full faith and
credit clause and statute establish, the Wallop Act provides cri-
teria only for application of its newly created duties.
A result of the Wallop Act's limitation on the application of
its criteria is that the duties it creates are inapplicable, as are
those created by the U.C.C.J.A., to some cases to which the full
faith and credit requirements of issue preclusion, and perhaps
claim preclusion, do apply. This difference in scope could be of
practical importance if litigants frequently fail to ask courts to
comply with the duties that the U.C.C.J.A. and section 1738A
create, or fail to pursue appellate review to remedy errors.
Such failures by litigants could permit decrees made in viola-
tion of section 1738A or of the U.C.C.J.A. to become final and,
under the full faith and credit clause and statute, perhaps na-
tionally preclusive of the claim and issues decided. Although
constitutional preclusion of claims would rarely be of great
practical importance,V2 to allow a decree made in violation of
section 1738A or of the U.C.C.J.A. to preclude relitigation of is-
sues could have significant consequences in later litigation.
749. The possibility that section 1738A in effect may make the requirements
of the full faith and credit clause and statute applicable only to proceedings
consistent with the new law's provisions differs from the possibility mentioned
supra note 625, that this section eliminates those requirements entirely.
750. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
751. See supra note 625. But cf., e.g., 1980 Senate Hearing, supra note 4, at
140 (statement of Wallace J. Mlyniec & Nancy Lynn Hiestand) (literal language
of full faith and credit clause allows Congress to define the scope of full faith
and credit in custody cases).
752. See supra text accompanying notes 484-87.
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3. Preclusion of Jurisdictional Issues Presented by Statutes
The consequences of the failure of a litigant to assert and
pursue his or her rights under the U.C.C.J.A. or the Wallop Act
could sometimes affect the merits of custody decisions by pre-
cluding, for example, relitigation of particular issues bearing on
the suitability of a proposed custodian. In other cases, how-
ever, the failure to assert rights under the U.C.C.J.A. or the
Wallop Act could allow federal preclusion of jurisdictional is-
sues upon which later application of these statutes may
depend.
A hypothetical case under the U.C.C.J.A. illustrates this sit-
uation. U.C.C.J.A. section 13 does not entitle a decree of one
state to recognition and enforcement in another unless it
passes either a statutory or a factual test.7 53 The latter test re-
quires that the decree "was made under factual circumstances
meeting the jurisdictional standards" of the U.C.C.J.A. The sec-
ond court, in applying this test, must consider to what extent it
may make findings of fact inconsistent with those already made
by the first court. Assume, for example, that a mother seeks
Colorado enforcement of an Arizona decree. Both states have
enacted the U.C.C.J.A.754 Under the Arizona version of the Act,
however, the home state basis of jurisdiction is applicable
either if the criteria in that provision of the U.C.C.J.A., as en-
acted by Colorado755 and most other states, 75 6 are met or if Ari-
zona is the domicile of the child when the proceeding is
commenced.75 7 Assume that the Arizona court found that,
when the proceeding was commenced, Arizona was not the
domicile of the child but was, in terms used in both Arizona's
and Colorado's definition of a home state,75 8 the state in which
the child immediately preceding the time involved- 9 lived with
a parent for at least six consecutive months. Assume further
that in making these findings, the Arizona court considered
conflicting evidence regarding whether the child had been ab-
753. See supra text accompanying notes 554-67.
754. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-401 -424 (Supp. 1981); CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 14-
13-101 -126 (1974 & Supp. 1981).
755. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 14-13-104(1) (a) (1974).
756. See U.C.CJ.A- § 3 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.LA. 125 (1979); id. at 11
(Supp. 1981).
757. Loper v. Superior Court, 126 Ariz. 14, 16, 612 P.2d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 1980);
Am. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-403A1 (Supp. 1981).
758. Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-402.5 (Supp. 1981); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 14-13-
103(5) (1974).
759. In this hypothetical case, the time involved is the time of commence-
ment of the Arizona proceeding. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-403.1 (Supp. 1981).
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sent from Arizona during the six-month period and the length
of the child's absence. The Arizona court found that the child
had been absent for only one short period, which the court con-
cluded had been temporary, and therefore treated by the Act 760
as part of the required six-month period. The Colorado court
might rule that the Arizona decree fails the statutory test of
section 13 on the basis that Arizona's statutory provisions deal
with domicile and, therefore, are not substantially in accord-
ance with Colorado's U.C.C.J.A. In applying the factual test,
the issue is whether the Colorado court can hear evidence and
decide, despite the contrary Arizona findings, that the child in
fact was absent from Arizona for two long periods, that neither
absence was temporary, and that, therefore, the Arizona decree
was not "made under factual circumstances meeting the juris-
dictional standards" shared by the Colorado and Arizona acts.
Colorado law might, of course, preclude such relitigation.
The Commissioners probably 'did not intend that U.C.C.J.A.
section 13 require interstate issue preclusion,7 61 and certainly
did not intend that it require preclusion of the very issues upon
which its application depends.7 62 The court, however, may in-
terpret the U.C.C.J.A. in this respect in a way contrary to the
intent of the Commissioners,763 and Colorado may treat juris-
dictional issues as precluded on the basis of comity or other
state law.7 64 Regardless of the Colorado state law on interstate
preclusion of jurisdictional issues, federal law may require Col-
orado to defer to the Arizona findings. If Arizona's U.C.C.J.A.
section 12 or other state law precludes intrastate relitigation of
jurisdictional issues of fact decided in custody proceedings, 765
then the full faith and credit clause and statute ordinarily re-
quire7 66 that Colorado also preclude relitigation.767
760. Id. § 8-402.5.
761. See supra text accompanying notes 584-99.
762. See supra text accompanying notes 592-94.
763. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Piggins v. Kifer, 427 A.2d 185, 194 (Pa. Super.
1981) (U.C.C.J_.A § 13 prevents a court from exercising independent judgment
on facts that determined a foreign court's jurisdiction); Commonwealth ex rel.
Zaubi v. Zaubi, 492 Pa. 183, 188-90, 423 A.2d 333, 336 (1980) (same); See also Note
supra note 475, at 836-38.
764. See Lopez v. District Court, 606 P.2d 853, 856 (Colo. 1980) (en banc)
(Colorado court applying U.C.C.J.A. § 6 found "no reason to dispute" specific
finding by California court that it had jurisdiction). See also Agnello v. Becker,
7 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 2565 (Conn. 1981); Mixon v. Bullard, 217 So. 2d 28 (Miss.
1968).
765. See supra text accompanying notes 512-49;
766. See supra text accompanying notes 603-18.
767. See, e.g., In re McDonald, 74 Mich. App. 119, 126-29, 253 N.W.2d 678, 682-
84 (1977); supra text accompanying notes 601-19; cf. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S.
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The same general question can arise under various provi-
sions of the Wallop Act. For example, state B is under the fed-
eral statutory duty to enforce and not to modify a decree of
state A only if state A issued its decree in a manner consistent
with the provisions of section 1738A.768 Whether that condition
is met will in some cases partially depend upon whether state
A had jurisdiction under the law of A and upon whether A was
the child's home state when the proceeding commenced. 769 If
the law of A defines "home state" as section 1738A does, and
permits jurisdiction to be based on A's status as the home
state, which the U.C.C.J.A. does in almost every state,770 then
state A in the course of applying its law may have decided
some of the very issues upon which B's application of section
1738A turns. If the law of A bars the relitigation of these is-
sues, the next question is whether contrary decisions on these
issues by state B would constitute a denial of full faith and
credit to state A's decree.
Professor Henry Foster and Dr. Doris Freed have sug-
gested that "there may be little or no room under the [Wallop
Act] for the res judicata and collateral estoppel principles re-
lated to jurisdictional facts," because in their view "the policy
expressed in the [Wallop Act] has priority and preempts the
field."771 Section 1738A is silent, however, on this and every
other aspect of issue preclusion. Nor does the Act's legislative
history indicate that it would affect the law of collateral estop-
pel. 772 If Congress had intended to change the law, it should
have clearly indicated that intent, for two reasons. The change
would have departed not just from general common law princi-
ples, but from the long-standing Supreme Court interpretation
of the full faith and credit statute, and it would have raised dif-
ficult constitutional questions.
The Court has historically interpreted the full faith and
106, 116 (1963) (full faith and credit precludes relitigation of jurisdiction issue
in a different state); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 583-85 (1950) (same).
768. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(a) (West Supp. 1980).
769. Id. § 1738A(c) (1), (2) (A) (i).
770. See U.C.C.JA §§ 2 & 3 Commissioners' Notes, 9 U.L.A. 121, 125 (1979);
id. at 10-11 (Supp. 1981).
771. Foster & Freed, supra note 297, at 2, col 5.
772. Cf. 124 CONG. REC. 787 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond) (provisions
merely limit application of full faith and credit statute that Congress has power
to enact). But cf., e.g., 1980 Senate Hearing, supra note 4, Addendum at 117-18
(footnotes to Justice Department's proposed revision of legislation), 274 (sub-
mission of Russell M. Coombs) (a custody decree will be entitled to interstate
enforcement only if it meets the procedural criteria of the Wallop Act on juris-
diction and notice).
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credit statute to require interstate preclusion of issues, even ju-
risdictional issues. 773 Although it appears that some flexibility
in interstate issue preclusion exists, at least when a party lack-
ed an adequate opportunity to litigate an issue when it first
arose7 74 and perhaps under other circumstances,7 75 the courts
generally compel preclusion. The Supreme Court will not rule
that a federal statute creates an exception to this compulsion
unless the statutory language or clear legislative history indi-
cates such a congressional intent.7 7 6
Furthermore, the adoption of the full faith and credit stat-
ute was contemporaneous with the ratification of the Constitu-
tion,777 and since its adoption, the statute's treatment of
judicial proceedings has remained essentially unchanged.7 8
There has consequently been little need for thorough elabora-
tion of the differences in scope between the constitutional and
statutory requirements of full faith and credit.7 79 Interpreting
the Wallop Act as a partial abrogation of the prior federal law
on interstate issue preclusion would probably require further
elaboration of those differences. Indeed, this interpretation
might present the issue of whether Congress has the power to
prescribe that judgments receive less interstate credit than that
to which they are entitled under the self-executing provisions
of the constitutional clause. The scope of Congress's power to
limit the requirements of full faith and credit seems to be a
much more difficult constitutional issue7 8 0 than its power,
which it certainly attempted to exercise in the Wallop Act, to
expand the requirements.7 8 ' The willingness of Congress to
773. Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1938).
774. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980) (dictum).
775. See id. at 95 n.7 (dictum); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162-63
(1979); supra note 605 and accompanying text.
776. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 97-99 (1980).
777. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122, as amended by Act of March 27,
1804, ch. 56, 2 Stat. 298 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976)).
778. Whitten, supra note 159, at 505.
779. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1938).
780. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 n.18 (1980).
781. Congress, in enacting the Wallop Act, purported to exercise at least its
powers under the full faith and credit, due process, and commerce clauses. See
Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 7(a), (b), 94
Stat. 3568-69. The question whether Congress thereby exceeded its powers is
beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Thomas v. Washington Gas
Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 (1980) (dictum) (full faith and credit power); Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (commerce power); RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND) or JUDGMENTS § 7 comment e & accompanying reporter's
note (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) (commerce power); Currie, supra note 41, at 115-
18 (full faith and credit power); Jackson, supra note 1 (full faith and credit
power); Whitten, supra note 159, at 505 n.26, 851-52 (full faith and credit power);
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raise the one constitutional question is, therefore, not an indi-
cation of its intent to raise the other. On the contrary, the
doubtful constitutionality of limiting interstate issue preclusion
is, like the coverage of the subject by the full faith and credit
statute and like the silence of the Wallop Act and its legislative
history, a strong reason to find the absence of any congres-
sional intent to change the law in this respect.
Foster and Freed, however, based their argument not on
legislative interpretation, precedent, and general policy, but on
specific policies concerning child custody litigation that they
believed underlie the Wallop Act. They identified "the para-
mount public policy consideration" as "stability, continuity,
and security of the child's home environment." 82 If the Act
were primarily based on these policies, important questions
would remain regarding the inferred congressional weighing
and implementation of the policies. The Supreme Court re-
cently held in Allen v. McCurry783 that when Congress pro-
vided a statutory damage remedy in federal district courts to
redress violations of constitutional rights, it did not implicitly
restrict the preclusive effects in federal courts of prior state
court judgments.7 8 4 The Court did note that "one strong mo-
tive" behind creation of the federal remedy "was grave congres-
sional concern that the state courts had been deficient in
protecting federal rights."785 Nevertheless, it cited with ap-
proval a recent "emphatic reaffirmation" by the Court of its
confidence in the ability of state courts to uphold federal law,7 86
and held that their decisions preclude relitigation even of con-
stitutional issues. Thus, the Court in Allen held that Congress
did not implicitly prefer policies derived in part from the Bill of
Rights-policies clearly fundamental and primarily of federal
Note, Congressional Power to Enforce Due Process Rights, 80 COLUm. L. REV.
1265 (1980).
782. Foster & Freed, supra note 297, at 2, col. 5.
783. 449 U.S. 90 (1980). Respondent McCurry moved to suppress evidence
seized by police in his state criminal trial under the fourth and fourteenth
amendments. The trial court denied the motion in part, and McCurry's subse-
quent conviction was affirmed on appeal. State v. McCurry, 587 S.W.2d 337 (Mo.
App. 1979). Since he failed to assert that the state courts denied him a full and
fair opportunity to litigate his search and seizure claim, he was barred from
seeking a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976). McCurry sought damages for the alleged constitutional violation under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), raising the issue of whether the state courts' disposition
of respondent's search and seizure claim precluded relitigating that issue in a
section 1983 action in federal court. 449 U.S. at 91.
784. 449 U.S. at 97-98.
785. Id. at 98-99.
786. Id. at 105.
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concern-over the policies underlying res judicata. Given the
Allen Court's holding, it does not appear reasonable to infer
that Congress, in enacting the Wallop Act, preferred certain
policies on child rearing, primarily a matter for state policy
making and less obviously fundamental than policies derived
from the Bill of Rights, to policies underlying res judicata. It
also appears unreasonable to infer that Congress, though will-
ing to bind a federal court to a prior state court decision on a
federal question, was unwilling, in enacting the Wallop Act, to
leave a second state court bound by a decision of the first, or a
third state court bound by a decision of the second.7 87 It is
doubtful that Congress silently made the unwarranted assump-
tion that a rule permitting repeated litigation of jurisdictional
issues, rather than a rule applying the principles of res judicata
designed to avoid the "vexation of multiple lawsuits,"788 to "en-
courage reliance on adjudication," 789 and to minimize "the pos-
sibility of inconsistent decisions,"7 9 0 better serves the policies
787. The Court in Allen specifically rejected the argument "that every per-
son asserting a federal right is entitled to one unencumbered opportunity to lit-
igate that right in a federal district court." Id. at 103. It is arguable, however,
that a decision of an issue made in a context in which review of the decision in
a federal court was not available should not preclude relitigation of the issue in
another proceeding in which the issue bears upon a federal question. In the
context of the Wallop Act, the argument would be that a finding, for example,
that a child had lived in state A for a given seven-month period made by a
court of A in deciding that it had jurisdiction under the U.C.C.J.A. should not
preclude relitigation of that fact in the course of state B's application of section
1738A, because an eventual petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court is pos-
sible in the latter context, but was not in the former. There seems, however, to
be no authority establishing such a rule as a matter of constitutional law. Noth-
ing in the Wallop Act or its legislative history indicates that the Act was so in-
tended to limit issue preclusion. As a matter of policy, the argument seems to
ignore the unlikelihood that in practice the Supreme Court would often grant
certiorari to review the sufficiency of evidence to support such factual findings.
Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976) (suggesting that despite the
unlikelihood of certiorari, state courts are fully competent to decide claims of
search and seizure violations). The argument also seems to underestimate the
effectiveness of review of such questions in state appellate courts. Certainly,
the language the Supreme Court recently used in interpreting the full faith and
credit statute does not include such a limitation on issue preclusion. But cf. Al-
len v. McCurry, 449 U.S. at 95 n.7 (certain traditional exceptions to collateral es-
toppel doctrine may defeat such a defense in a section 1983 action).
Furthermore, Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1938), most likely should be viewed
as an application of the full faith and credit statute to preclude relitigation of a
mixed issue of fact and law previously decided by a state court in a context not
permitting Supreme Court review of the decision, see generally supra notes
195-96 and accompanying text, when the issue later became significant to a fed-
eral claim of full faith and credit in a court of the District of Columbia.
788. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. at 94.
789. Id.
790. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154 (1979).
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identified by Foster and Freed as stability, continuity, and se-
curity of the child's home environment.
Regardless of these questionable inferences, the essential
point is that Congress did not primarily base the Wallop Act
upon the child rearing policies attributed to it by Foster and
Freed. The purposes of the Act are limited and commensurate
with the narrow scope of the provisions of section 1738A. The
general purposes stated in the Act refer to "stability of home
environment" and "secure family relationships" only as rea-
sons to "discourage continuing interstate controversies over
child custody,"79 1 an evil that the principles of res judicata
largely inhibit rather than aggravate. The Act does not inter-
fere with the states' tasks of selecting and implementing sub-
stantive policies, such as the policy of promoting continuity of
home environment or the conflicting policy of placing custody
of young children with their fulltime homemaking parent even
at the cost of disrupting a previously stable placement of the
children with their other parent.792
Nor do the policies on which the Act truly rests require a
departure from prior federal law on interstate issue preclusion.
If the Wallop Act had comprehensively attempted to establish
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and exer-
cise of jurisdiction, and to dispense with any additional juris-
dictional requirements such as forum-defendant contacts, as
the U.C.C.J.A. purported to do,7 93 then it might have been ap-
propriate to attribute to Congress an intent, similar to the ap-
parent intent of the Commissioners, 94 to leave states free to
reexamine each other's jurisdictional decisions. The theory of
the Act might then have been that no bases would exist, other
than those described in section 1738A, for authority to decide
jurisdictional questions in custody cases. The Wallop Act, how-
ever, does not create criteria for the existence of jurisdiction,
and only imposes interstitial restrictions on the exercise of ju-
risdiction. 95 Congress confined itself to imposing duties on
state B not to conduct proceedings, and to enforce rather than
modify a decree of state A under certain circumstances. It fur-
thermore made those duties narrow, permitting cases in which
state B can modify the decree.
791. Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. I No. 96-611, § 7(c) (4),
94 Stat. 3568, 3569.
792. See Randolph v. Dean, 27 M App. 3d 913, 327 N.E.2d 473 (1975).
793. See supra text accompanying notes 166-67.
794. See supra text accompanying notes 595-97.
795. See supra text accompanying notes 302-03, 674-701.
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Due to the nature of the Wallop Act's criteria for governing
application of the duties it creates, a court often must receive
evidence and decide factual and legal issues to determine that
the Act bars the court's consideration of the merits of a case.796
Whether the power of a court to make those jurisdictional deci-
sions is labeled "jurisdiction to deternine its own jurisdiction"
or something else,797 it is distinguishable from jurisdiction to
make or to modify a custody award on the merits of a case and
is useful in this context as in other areas of the Act.7 98 There is
no justification to presume that Congress considered, or should
have considered, that the interest in strict conformity to the
new statutory requirements so predominated over the interests
served by res judicata that Congress implicitly rejected conclu-
siveness for jurisdictional decisions affecting custody.799 In-
stead, Congress, in drafting the Wallop Act, did not provide any
rules governing these jurisdictional issues or any other aspects
of claim and issue preclusion. The Act thereby leaves to state
law and to other federal law the responsibility for defining the
limits on a state's power to make decisions on claims and is-
sues binding inside and outside of the state.
4. Legislative Silence on the Last-in-Time Rule
These conclusions regarding the general interstate preclu-
sion of jurisdictional issues are also applicable to the more spe-
cific problem of recognition, enforcement, and modification of
successive, contrary decisions in different states. It is possible,
under the rules of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and full faith
and credit, that one court having jurisdiction could erroneously
deny respect to a judgment of another court also having juris-
diction, and that a third court would then have to decide
whether and how it would recognize or enforce each of the
prior judgments. A last-in-time rule resolves such conflicts
when they occur within a single state under principles of res
judicata.800 Because the full faith and credit clause and statute
796. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C-.A § 1738A(a), (b) (4), (c), (d), (f), (g) (West Supp.
1980).
797. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, ch. 2, introductory note, at 1-2
(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978).
798. Cf. id. §§ 13, 15 (court's power to determine questions of subject matter,
or territorial jurisdiction, or adequacy of notice).
799. Cf. id. § 14 comment d, at 115-16 (objections to subject matter jurisdic-
tion can be raised any time prior to final judgment to prevent attack subse-
quent to judgment on subject matter grounds).
800. Ginsburg, Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The Last.in-
Time Rule for Conflicting Judgments, 82 H~Av. L. REv. 798, 798 (1969).
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give interstate effect to such principles, courts have held that
the last-in-time rule governs application of the requirements of
full faith and credit subject perhaps to certain exceptions.SO'
Application of the Wallop Act can present a similar prob-
lem. Assume, for example, that in a custody proceeding in
state C, the mother invokes section 1738A, claiming that state C
must enforce and not modify a prior decree of state B, and that
the father also invokes section 1738A, claiming that state C
must enforce and not modify a still earlier decree of state A.
State A will not have had occasion to decide whether its own
decree was consistent with section 1738A.802 In applying any
aspects of its state law that are identical to provisions of the
Act, state A may, however, have decided particular issues that
arose later in state B. If both A and B had jurisdiction, and if
their internal rules of issue preclusion and the requirements of
full faith and credit were such that state C would have been
bound to recognize each of these contradictory decisions on the
issue had it stood alone, then C's recognition of one decision
rather than the other may determine to which prior decree the
section 1738A duties apply.
Foster and Freed have suggested that "the [Wallop Act]
... may have changed [the] ... familiar rules" giving recogni-
tion to the latest judgment.803 Neither the Act nor its legisla-
tive history specifically indicates such a change in rules. An
implicit departure from the last-in-time rule should not be at-
tributed to Congress; if the self-executing provisions of the full
faith and credit clause8 O4 require the interstate application of
the rule, it may be beyond the power of Congress to alter the
rule.805 The policies underlying the Wallop Act do not require
this implication. Consequently, the Act does not affect the
prior law on conflicting judgments as it similarly does not affect
the law on intrastate and interstate claim and issue preclusion
in general. Congress therefore supplemented, not supplanted,
preexisting federal and state law affecting interstate custody
proceedings. The law of child custody jurisdiction and judg-
ments is currently a system of cumulative requirements and
standards primarily derived from the U.C.C.J.A., the due pro-
cess and full faith and credit clauses, and the old and new fed-
eral statutes.
801. Id. at 799-800, 831.
802. See supra notes 303-05 and accompanying text.
803. Foster & Freed, supra note 297, at 2, coL 4.
804. See Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 554 (1947).
805. See supra note 780 and accompanying text.
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V. A PERSPECTIVE ON CURRENT AND FUTURE LAW
A general evaluation of this body of law may cause some
surprise at the extent to which it consists of statutory law
rather than decisional law. Until quite recently, decisional law
predominantely governed conflicts in child custody cases,806 as
it does certain other facets of conflict of laws.807 To some crit-
ics, the wisdom and adequacy of conflicts statutes are automat-
ically suspect. Brainerd Currie criticized prior congressional
legislation on conflict of laws as varying from "meaningless and
ineffectual" 80 8 to "vastly oversimplified." 809 He expressed more
foreboding thai confidence when he considered future use of
this avenue of law reform, and stated that "in view of the appal-
ling suggestions that are sometimes made when legislative in-
tervention in matters of conflict of laws is contemplated, one
mentions congressional action with grave misgivings, and only
because of faith that reason and industry may ultimately pre-
vail even in the field of conflict of laws." 810 The Wallop Act has
apparently confirmed these misgivings, according to Foster and
Freed. They view its enactment as posing a "serious problem"
due to its significant departures from the language of the
U.C.C.JA.811 This Article offers a contrary assessment of the
merits of the Wallop Act, and expresses general approval of the
current body of custody conflicts law, largely because of the
limited purposes claimed by Congress in the Wallop Act and
the narrow means selected by Congress to serve those
purposes.
A. AN AssEssMENT OF THE WALLOP ACT
A discussion of the means used by Congress in the Act is
the best beginning for its evaluation. Because this Article pre-
viously identified the specific provisions which Congress did
and did not include in section 1738A,812 it is only necessary to
abstract the two important characteristics common to the Act's
vital provisions.
806. See supra authorities cited notes 35-54, 457-76.
807. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 5 comment c
(1971).
808. B. CuRRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 659 n.121
(1963).
809. Currie, supra note 41, at 90.
810. B. CuRm supra note 808, at 281-82 n.345.
811. Foster & Freed, supra note 297, at 2, coL 1.
812. See supra text accompanying notes 303-05, 619, 622-29, 674-701.
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1. Limited Selection of Federal Statutory Duties and Relative
Neutrality of Criteria for Their Application
First, section 1738A addresses only selected aspects of cus-
tody jurisdiction and judgments. Most public comment con-
cerning section 1738A has loosely described it as requiring full
faith and credit to custody decrees, 813 and some commentators
have discussed it as if it comprehensively controls custody ju-
risdiction.14 Actually, the new Act does not require recogni-
tion of decrees 8 1 5-a function of the full faith and credit clause
and statute.816 Instead, it commands enforcement of decrees,
which may not be a command of the full faith and credit clause
and statute.817 Regarding jurisdiction, the Wallop Act similarly
provides not comprehensive regulation, but interstitial bars to
the exercise of jurisdiction.818
The second noteworthy general characteristic of section
1738A relates to the criteria which the Act uses to govern appli-
cability of the principal duties it creates.8 1 9 In essence those
criteria have a dual nature. Each criterion is a first-in-time rule
according the protection of one of the statutory duties to one
judicial action or another depending upon their timing.820 In
addition, each criterion is a set of jurisdictional standards
whose violation deprives the state having temporal priority of
the protection the Act would otherwise give to its
proceeding.821
There are two distinct sets of jurisdictional standards. One
set limits statutory protection of the pending proceeding of a
813. See, e.g., R. CROUCH, supra note 70, at 83; S. KATZ, supra note 59, at 122;
Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, Part XIV, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 10,627 (1980) (testimony of Rus-
sell M. Coombs). The heading of section 1738A itself refers to full faith and
credit, identifying one of the congressional powers relied upon, though it does
not define the scope of the provisions.
814. See, e.g., Foster & Freed, supra note 297, at 2, col. 1.
815. See supra text accompanying notes 622-28.
816. See supra text accompanying notes 603-19.
817. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFucT Or LAws § 102 comment c
(1971).
818. See supra text accompanying notes 301-02, 619-20, 629, 651-59, 674-704.
819. The discussion in infra text accompanying notes 819-58 refers only to
the subsection (a) duties to enforce and not to modify decrees and the subsec-
tion (g) duty not to conduct simultaneous proceedings. The duty created by
subsection (e), to give specified persons notice and opportunity to be heard, is
of lesser importance and of a special nature, because it is applicable to all pro-
ceedings for custody determinations without regard to the satisfaction of juris-
dictional criteria.
820. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(a), (g) (West Supp. 1980).
821. Id. § 1738A(a), (c)-(g).
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state that was the first to commence a proceeding concerning
the child, but that has not yet made a custody determination.822
The other set restricts statutory protection of the proceeding of
a state that has made a custody decision. 23 They reflect two
quite different approaches to implementation of the role of fed-
eral legislation because of differences between initial and modi-
fication jurisdiction in the foundation of state law upon which
Congress built the Wallop Act.
With regard to initial jurisdiction, the federal standards re-
flect and implement some of the same value judgments that un-
derlie the U.C.C.J.A., and they reject values implicit in
competing schemes of custody jurisdiction.824 Thus, the stan-
dards by which section 1738A measures the appropriateness of
initial jurisdiction for the purpose of preventing concurrent ini-
tial proceedings are quite similar to those that serve the same
purpose in the U.C.C.J.A.825 The only major respect in which
these standards vary from the U.C.C.JA.-the federal provision
that initial jurisdiction based on a significant connection is not
consistent with section 1738A if another state would have home
state jurisdiction 8 26-merely makes more explicit and
822. Id. § 1738A(a), (c), (e)-(g).
823. Id. § 1738A(a), (d), (e)-(g).
824. See generally supra text accompanying notes 137-38, 460-76.
825. Compare 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(a)-(c), (e), (g) (West Supp. 1980) with
U.C.C.JA_ §§ 2-6 (1968) (similar language). See generally supra text accompa-
nying notes 91-134.
826. See supra text accompanying notes 380-90. The narrowness of the fed-
eral criteria for emergency jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(c) (2) (C) (West
Supp. 1980), in comparison with the similar criteria of U.C.C.J-.A § 3(a) (3)
(1968) is not of major importance as a federal departure from U.C.C.J.A. stan-
dards for concurrent initial proceedings. This provision affects initial jurisdic-
tion only by narrowing the scope of the federal prohibition against
simultaneous proceedings. See supra text accompanying notes 301-02, 365-72. It
leaves intact the similar U.C.CJ. prohibition. See supra text accompanying
notes 649-726. Even under the U.C.C.J.A., initial jurisdiction wholly resting
upon the emergency basis is intended to be temporary. Bodenheimer, supra
note 361, at 225-26; ef. Brock v. District Court, 620 P.2d 11, 14-15 (Colo. 1980) (ini-
tial jurisdiction based upon emergency may be permanent in extreme situa-
tion). It is not a crucial departure from these features of the U.C.C.J-.A for
section 1738A to leave to state law the question whether deference is due a
pending proceeding based solely, for example, on the neglect branch of a
state's emergency jurisdiction.
Neither is the absence from section 1738A of provisions on clean hands and
inconvenient forums an important departure from U.C.C.J. standards for ini-
tial jurisdiction. Here, again, their absence affects initial jurisdiction only in
the context of concurrent proceedings. See supra text accompanying notes 301-
02. Even in concurrent proceedings, it leaves states free to decline to exercise
jurisdiction because of inconvenience, unclean hands, or pending proceedings,
although section 1738A may not require declination. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 648-726. Compliance with U.C.C.J. sections 7 and 8, which deal
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mandatory a feature that the U.C.C.J.A. was clearly intended,827
and generally has been interpreted,82 8 to possess 829 in the con-
text of initial proceedings. This federal acceptance of the
U.C.C.J.A. approach to initial jurisdiction seems to have been
appropriate in view of the accelerating adoption of the Act by
the states,830 and in view of the relatively high degree of uni-
formity and low incidence of conflict among the states' inter-
pretations and applications of the Act concerning concurrent
initial proceedings. 31
State law relating to jurisdiction to modify decrees, on the
other hand, has displayed less uniformity and more conflict
even in U.C.C.J.A. states. This disparity has resulted from dis-
agreements on substantive policies, disagreements that were
built into the U.C.C.J.A. and the Commissioners' Notes and
therefore would not likely subside. Some courts have inter-
preted the U.C.C.J.A. as causing a relatively early shift of juris-
diction from a state that had made a decree to another state
that had since become the child's home.832 They have been
able to cite language from the Commissioners' Notes 83 3 and
writings by Professor Ratner 834 in support of their views. Other
courts have read the Act as conferring continuing, exclusive ju-
risdiction on a state that had made a decree even after a long
with these bases for declining to exercise jurisdiction, probably was not in-
tended as a condition of the section 6 prohibition of simultaneous proceedings.
See supra text accompanying notes 91-134. Section 1738A thus conforms in this
respect to the U.C.C.JA.
For identification of other differences between section 1738A and the
U.C.C.J.A. that do not appear to be of major importance in affecting the federal
treatment of initial jurisdiction, see supra text accompanying notes 306-34, 348-
64, 374-79.
827. U.C.C.J.A § 3 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.LA. 123-24 (1979).
828. See S. KATz, supra note 59, at 17-18; Bodenheimer, supra note 361, at
205-08.
829. The point made here concerning the federal preference for home state
over significant connection jurisdiction relates only to the criteria governing
concurrent exercise of initial jurisdiction by the courts of two states. The crite-
ria governing modification of custody orders, a context in which preferences be-
tween a home state and another state are more controversial, see, e.g., Leslie
L.F. v. Constance F., 441 N.Y.S.2d 911, 914 n.1 (Fain. Ct. 1981); Foster & Freed,
supra note 297, at 2, col 2; Ratner, supra note 159, at 395-401, are discussed be-
low. See iffra text accompanying notes 832-50.
830. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
831. See authorities cited supra notes 135, 828.
832. See, e.g., Hegler v. Hegler, 383 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Fer-
nandez v. Rodriguez, 97 Misc. 2d 353, 411 N.Y.S.2d 134 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
833. See U.C.CJ-.A §§ 3, 14 Commissioners' Notes, 9 U.L.A. 124, 154 (1979).
834. See, e.g., Ratner, supra note 159, at 398-99, 412-13.
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absence of the child from the state.835 The Commissioners'
Notes 836 and Professor Bodenheimer's writings837 contain lan-
guage supporting those courts' positions. The result has been
that states have continued to render conflicting decrees in
some cases, 838 and there has been little reason for confidence
that the problem would disappear in the foreseeable future.
Congress might have responded to this situation by decid-
ing that one view was preferable as a matter of public policy. It
thus might have provided, for example, either that the state
rendering a decree must retain continuing jurisdiction until it
ceases to be the residence of any contestant, or that it must re-
linquish jurisdiction as soon as contacts between the rendering
state and the child, the parties, or the evidence fall below a
specified level, or the contacts of another state arise to a given
level.839 Some of the comments of Foster and Freed on the
Wallop Act seem to suggest that Congress did make such a
value judgment and enacted the former position into law.840 It
is true that section 1738A makes a state's continuing jurisdic-
tion inconsistent with the statute only when the state has lost
jurisdiction under its own law or has ceased to be the residence
of the child or of any contestant.841 Foster and Freed have de-
scribed that treatment of continuing jurisdiction as "inexora-
ble" and as curtailing the "flexibility and discretion" of
continuing jurisdiction available under the U.C.C.J.A.842 The
Wallop Act, however, does not affect the discretion of a state to
limit its own continuing jurisdiction. The statute only curtails
the freedom of another state to modify the decree for the pe-
riod of time the rendering state's jurisdiction continues under
its own law. Flexibility and discretion remain, but they reside
with one state rather than with two or three, in order to avoid
conflict.
835. See, e.g., Palm v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App. 3d 456, 158 Cal. Rptr. 786
(1979).
836. See U.C.C.J.A. § 3 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L-. 124 (1979) (cited in
Palm v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App. 3d 463 n.4, 158 Cal. Rptr. 789 n.4 (1979)).
837. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, supra note 7, at 1237 (quoted in Palm v. Supe-
rior Court, 97 Cal. App. 3d 467, 158 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1979)).
838. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Rodriguez, 97 Misc. 2d 353, 411 N.Y.S.2d 134 (Sup.
Ct. 1978).
839. See Ratner, supra note 159, at 398-99, 412-13.
840. See Foster & Freed, supra note 297, at 2, col. 1 ('The PKPA, in effect,
confers exclusive and continuing child custody jurisdiction on the home
state"); id. at 2, col. 3 (the rule of § 1738A on continuing jurisdiction is "inexora-
ble"). But see id. (even under the Wallop Act a state that has made a decree
can later defer to another state).
841. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(d) (West Supp. 1980).
842. Foster & Freed, supra note 297, at 2, cols. 2, 3.
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Rather than resolving the disputed policy question con-
cerning the duration of jurisdiction, Congress in the Wallop Act
allocated control over the question to the state that had already
determined custody of the child. There is no reason to suppose
that any other state would be better qualified than the render-
ing state to decide when jurisdiction should shift from itself to
another state. Allocating authority over this question to the
law of the rendering state has the advantage that the rendering
state is identifiable and singular. Two states might compete to
supersede the rendering state's jurisdiction; a federal act mak-
ing their laws dispositive, as the U.C.C.J.A. does,84 3 would have
created yet another legal arena for interstate conflict. Thus, if
congressional allocation of control over this matter to a state
was the appropriate solution, the rendering state certainly
seems to have been the right choice. Having made this choice,
all that was necessary was congressional establishment of a
minimal federal criterion of continuing jurisdiction to prevent a
rendering state from maintaining continuing jurisdiction even
beyond the most extreme position the U.C.C.J.A. can be inter-
preted to support. The provision for "residence of the child or
of any contestant" serves that purpose. 44
The issue remains whether it would have been advisable
for Congress to have taken a position on the policy question.
Although the subjects of the legislation are jurisdiction and
judgments, the policies that have led states and commentators
to differing views on the appropriate extent of continuing juris-
diction are not wholly the product of concerns for the conven-
ience of adult litigants, the territorial limitations on states in
our federal system, and the promotion of respect for judicial
proceedings. Those latter concerns are often appropriate for
federal response, but it is thought that more substantive poli-
cies should also influence the law of child custody jurisdiction
and judgments. 845 Underlying the various U.C.C.J.A. interpre-
tations on continuing jurisdiction are differences of opinion on
the relative importance of certain substantive considerations
for jurisdictional purposes. These substantive considerations
include preventing kidnaping by parents and "the harm done to
children by shifting them from state to state to relitigate cus-
tody, 8 46 "discourag[ing] continuing controversies over child
843. U.C.C.JA. § 14(a) (1968); see supra text accompanying note 579.
844. See U.C.C.J.A. § 14 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 154 (1979);
Bodenheimer, supra note 7, at 1237.
845. See, e.g., authorities cited infra notes 846-49.
846. Bodenheimer, .supra note 361, at 213-14; see U.C.C.J-.A § 1(5) (1968);.id.
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custody in the interest of greater stability of home environment
and of secure family relationships for the child,"847 promoting
negotiated settlement of custody disputes,84 8 and facilitating
visitation between a child and his other noncustodial parent.849
In the face of this diversity of law and views on the implica-
tions of such substantive matters, and in light of the primary
responsibility of the states in our federal system for controlling
substantive aspects of domestic relations,85 0 Congress took the
most appropriate action. It confined itself to the essential fed-
eral role of providing a rule to resolve conflicts between states.
It chose for that purpose a rule that primarily consists of an al-
location of authority among states, subject only to a minimal
standard below which virtually no U.C.C.J.A. state would seek
to go. It also stated the allocation of authority and the minimal
standard in relatively clear and objective terms. As a result of
this legislation, each state that renders a decree can establish
and apply its own policies on continuing jurisdiction. Congress
quite firmly performed the necessary function of the federal
government to resolve interstate conflicts, while avoiding un-
necessary federal intrusion into state policy making.
This view of the federal legislation provides the basis for
the evaluation of the feature of section 1738A(g) discussed
above. 851 Subsection (g) makes a "race to the courthouse" dis-
positive when the first action commenced occurs in a state sat-
isfying the Wallop Act criteria, with the result that the second
state must not exercise jurisdiction during the pendency of the
prior action.852 If, on the other hand, the first action is com-
menced in a state where the Wallop Act standards are not met,
and the second action is commenced in a state where they are,
neither state wins at that point. The race to the courthouse be-
comes immaterial, and the Act requires deference by one state
to the other only after one state enters an order consistent with
section 1738A. The Wallop Act in this respect conforms to the
U.C.C.J.A. It seems anomalous for the uniform Act, though
purporting to regulate custody jurisdiction comprehensively, to
have allowed states to conduct simultaneous proceedings. Pol-
Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 111-12 (1979); Ratner, supra note 159,
at 390, 398.
847. U.C.C.J.A. § 1(4) (1968); Bodenheimer, supra note 7, at 1208-12, 1236-38.
848. See Ratner, supra note 159, at 399; Ratner, supra note 37, at 810.
849. See Ratner, supra note 37, at 810.
850. See supra text accompanying note 713.
851. See supra text accompanying notes 430-40.
852. See supra text accompanying note 440.
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icy considerations can, however, support priority for either
state in this type of case.85 3 Given the silence of the U.C.C.J.A.
on this point, Congress had either to adopt an original resolu-
tion of the conflicting policies in the Wallop Act, departing from
the narrow role it otherwise played in this legislation, or to
maintain a silence on the point similar to the uniform Act, and
to leave deference between states prior to any award to the dis-
cretion of state courts in such cases. The latter course seems to
have been the wiser one, because it is more consistent with the
self-restraint Congress exercised in other provisions of the
Wallop Act.
The extent to which state courts and legislatures similarly
exercise self-restraint in the amendment, interpretation, and
application of the U.C.C.J.A. will largely determine the degree
to which the various federal and state purposes of child cus-
tody law will be served in coming years. Foster and Freed have
warned that the Wallop Act creates a "strong incentive.., to
assert a continuing jurisdiction."85 4 The same general argu-
ment could, of course, be made regarding the Act's treatment of
concurrent initial jurisdiction-conceivably each state in which
the U.C.C.J.A. has been interpreted as requiring more self-de-
nial and comity of the courts than the Act requires will dilute
its law and sink to the lowest common denominator of paro-
chial self-indulgence. There is little reason, however, to expect
any widespread reaction of this kind.
Legislative amendment of the U.C.C.J.A. to claim, for exam-
ple, broader continuing jurisdiction is not likely to be politically
worthwhile or even attractive on the merits in most states. 855
Most of the legislatures have enacted the U.C.C.J.A. within the
past five years.8 56 They did not pass this legislation primarily
to earn respect for their own custody jurisdiction and proceed-
ings in other U.C.C.J.A. states; such respect is not conditioned
on reciprocal enactments.857 Instead, they adopted the Act to
require local deference to the jurisdiction and proceedings of
other states in a spirit of self-restraint and comity. When there
has been more time for study of the Wallop Act, and reflection
853. See U.C.CJ.A. § 1(a) (1) (1968); id. § 6 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.LA.
135 (1979).
854. Foster & Freed, supra note 297, at 2, col. 3.
855. Illinois has recently enacted such a statute. Act of Aug. 14, 1981, 1981
Ill. Laws ch. 82, § 190. The new law does not, however, preclude Illinois courts
from declining to exercise continuing jurisdiction. See generally IL.T ANN. STAT.
ch. 40, § 2108 (Smith-Hurd 1980).
856. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
857. U.C.C.J.A. § 1 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 114 (1979).
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upon the limitations of its provisions and purposes, most legis-
lators will probably realize that its enactment has neither elim-
inated the occasion for comity and self-restraint on the part of
states nor reduced their importance.
Future judicial behavior, on the other hand, can be ex-
pected to vary from chauvinism to statesmanship, however, as
it has under each successive system of jurisdiction in the
past.8 58 Under the Wallop Act, however, there is at last a floor
below which no state court can go. Furthermore, the probable
response of most courts, perhaps after a period of becoming ac-
quainted with the new laws, will be to view the broader effec-
tiveness that the statute gives to a proper custody proceeding
as an additional reason for responsible decision making when
questions of jurisdiction arise.
This analysis of the nature of the criteria governing appli-
cation of the Wallop Act duties and of the reasons why it was
appropriate for Congress to select criteria of that nature assists
in evaluating the wisdom of the congressional decision to im-
pose certain duties and not to impose others. The duties in-
cluded in the Act relate to successive proceedings in two or
more states, and thus deal not with potential, but with actual,
interstate conflicts; the need for federal legislation seems par-
ticularly great in that context. For actual conflicts, it was feasi-
ble for Congress to impose sensible restrictions upon one
state's assumption of jurisdiction after another state had done
so, without either intruding into substantive areas of state pol-
icy making or destroying state flexibility to accommodate vari-
ous policies. These federal restrictions, since they are
applicable to a state only when the case had earlier been in a
court of another state, can employ the politically neutral rule of
first-in-time. It was necessary that some jurisdictional require-
ments qualify the first-in-time rule, but the U.C.C.J.A. provided
a nearly uniform set of requirements for initial jurisdiction and
a minimal requirement for modification. These are the factors
that permitted the devising of a federal statute that would be
effective, yet not substantive or mischievous.
It might not have been possible to place neutral and wise
limits on a congressional attempt to establish specific require-
ments for a state's initial jurisdiction applicable even in the ab-
sence of a proceeding in another state, or to specify the extent
of required interstate claim and issue preclusion in custody
cases. Legislating in the former area would have meant impos-
858. See supra notes 42-54, 79-80, 135-38, 473-76 and accompanying text.
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ing U.C.C.J.A. standards on a non-U.C.C.J.A. state, even when
no proceeding in another state evidenced an actual conflict be-
tween parties or states over the location of the forum. As to the
latter area, the uncertainty of current state and federal law on
claim and issue preclusion would have rendered hazardous an
attempt either to limit or strictly to require its interstate appli-
cation. It seems that the pitfalls in creating further federal stat-
utory requirements would have been considerable. Congress
wisely confined its recent effort to establishing interstitial re-
strictions on the exercise of jurisdiction and to requiring en-
forcement of decrees.
The Wallop Act may be an exception proving the rule, es-
tablished by the experience of two centuries, that the congres-
sional full faith and credit power is of limited utility. Section
1738A is a useful and harmless addition to child custody law
precisely because it narrowly treats a few aspects of conflicts in
a single type of litigation. Perhaps, then, its enactment illus-
trates reasons why there has not been more sweeping congres-
sional reform of the conflict of laws.
Discussions of proposed reforms in conflict of laws have
touched such varied facets of conflicts as choice of law,85 9 rec-
ognition of state court civil process, 860 recognition of foreign
child support 861 and divorce 862 judgments, and the execution of
judgments.8 63 In at least some areas, unclear or restrictive con-
stitutional law might hamper the formulation of legislation. For
example, legislating on divorce recognition would be difficult in
light of certain Supreme Court cases,864 and the precedents on
due process would place uncertain limits on legislation giving
extraterritorial effects to state process. 865 Furthermore, some
subjects eligible for possible congressional reform are governed
859. See, e.g., B. CuRuuu, supra note 808, at 281; Stimson, Simplifying the
Conflict of Laws: A Bill Proposed for Enactment by the Congress, 36 A.B.A. J.
1003, 1003 (1950).
860. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 22.
861. See Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 215 n.2 (1933) (Stone J.,
dissenting).
862. See Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 371,
388 (1933).
863. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 1, at 21.
864. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945) (divorce decree
rendered in one state may be collaterally impeached in another by proof that
court which rendered decree had no jurisdiction, even though the record of the
proceedings purports to show jurisdiction); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S.
287, 299 (1942) (when a court of one state grants a divorce decree to a bonafide
domicilliary, even though spouse is absent, that decree is binding upon courts
of other states).
865. See Hazard, Revisiting the Second Restatement of Judgments: Issue
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by state laws of jurisdiction, judgments, and conflicts involving
substantive legal and policy considerations which are not es-
sentially uniform among states. This is true of choice of law866
and preclusion of issues of law;867 it is arguably true of divorce
jurisdiction as well. 868 In areas such as jurisdiction and choice
of law in divorce cases, 869 congressional action would therefore
necessarily involve further federal intrusion into a primarily
state policy making function. Although there are subjects for
which substantive, national policies and rules would be appro-
priate, there may be no nationwide consensus on the direction
of these policies and rules. 870 Federal legislation on such topics
would tend to impede states' experimentation in the formula-
tion and implementation of substantive as well as conflicts poli-
cies, sometimes a better mode of law reform than the
congressional one.
Present constitutional and state law thus may present few
opportunities for Congress to resolve interstate conflicts with-
out unduly federalizing or hampering the development and re-
finement of substantive policies. Congress could undoubtedly
improve the law of some subjects other than custody through
its use of the full faith and credit power. Still, if the Wallop Act
illustrates the utility of this power, it probably equally illus-
trates the need for Congress's careful selection of the goals
which such legislation would serve and the means which it
would employ to attain those goals.
2. Application of the Fundamental Approach of the Act to an
Issue of Interpretation
This Article resolves most of the substantial questions of
interpretation of section 1738A in preparation for this evalua-
Preclusion and Related Problems, 66 CoRNELL .L RE V. 564, 572 (1981); Jackson,
supra note 1, at 22.
866. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 480, at 116-20.
867. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1 comment b, re-
porter's note, at 43-44 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
868. See Freed & Foster, supra note 217, at 232, 257-58; Garfield, The Transi-
tory Divorce Action: Jurisdiction in the No-Fault Era, 58 TEx. L. REV. 501, 527
(1980).
869. See generally Baade, Marriage and Divorce in American Conflicts Law:
Governmental-Interests Analysis and the Restatement (Second), 72 CoLuM. L.
REV. 329 (1972); Garfield, supra note 868, at 535-39.
870. An example is choice of law in commercial litigation. See RESTATE-
MENT (SEcOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 8, introductory note (1971) (contract
issues are governed by law of state with most significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties). See also Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice
of Law, 78 MicH. L REV. 872, 881 (1980).
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tion of the Act as a whole, because answers to these questions
could be discerned, although with some difficulty, in the lan-
guage and legislative history of the Act. One issue was, how-
ever, deferred to this part of the Article, because it is necessary
to draw upon the general considerations regarding the role of
congressional legislation in the interstate child custody area to
reach a satisfactory resolution of the issue. The requirement of
section 1738A(e) that notice and opportunity to be heard be
given to one who "claims a right to custody or visitation" needs
interpretation to determine whether it requires state B to give
notice and opportunity to be heard to a person who would have
standing to assert his or her claim under the law of state B, but
lacks such standing under A's law.8 71 Courts could have ex-
plored a very similar question as a matter of interpretation of
parallel U.C.C.J.A. provisions, 872 but the question has been ig-
nored 73 in the U.C.C.J.A. context and, in any event, would be
subject to different resolutions by various states. As a question
of interpretation of the federal statute, however, it is of
suffcient importance to require discussion and is, of course,
susceptible to authoritative judicial resolution with nationwide
effect.
The Wallop Act and its legislative history are silent on this
question. Included, however, among the stated purposes of the
Act are to "facilitate the enforcement" of decrees interstate, to
"discourage continuing interstate controversies over child cus-
tody," and to "avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict be-
tween State courts."874 The practices of affording notice and
opportunity to be heard to every potential party to custody pro-
ceedings will affect the extent to which section 1738A serves
those purposes. Assume, for example, that state A awarded
custody of a child to the father without giving notice or an op-
portunity to be heard to the child's cousin, who under the law
of A lacked standing to seek custody. If the cousin later de-
tained the child in state B, where the law gave the cousin
standing, and began a proceeding in state B to obtain custody
or visitation rights, the father might wish to invoke the require-
ment of section 1738A(a), that every state enforce and not mod-
ify the state A decree.
The statute does not expressly prescribe against whom en-
871. See supra text accompanying notes 332-34.
872. See U.C.C.J. §§ 4, 5, 10 (1968).
873. See, e.g., S. KATz, supra note 59, at 28-30.
874. Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 7(c) (3)
-(5), 94 Stat. 3566, 3569.
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forcement is required or in favor of whom modification is pro-
hibited. Enforcement against a person who is not notified of
the prior proceeding or given an opportunity to be heard in it,
such as the cousin, would probably violate that person's due
process rights.875 The courts, therefore, should not hold that
the Act requires enforcement under these conditions. It is pos-
sible that application of the bar on modification would violate
the cousin's due process rights, even assuming that the Consti-
tution subjects the cousin to the territorial jurisdiction of A.
The cousin can sue for modification in A, and obtain an adjudi-
cation according to procedural due process requirements. The
adjudication on the merits, however, will be of little value to
the cousin; the court of A will presumably apply A's law, as
courts almost invariably do in custody cases, and the cousin
lacks substantive custody rights and standing to claim such
rights.876 Nevertheless, the cousin's opportunity to litigate in A
the question of whether or not A has and should exercise juris-
diction is an important right,877 and the application of the bar
on modification against the cousin does not impair this right.
The cousin's access to the courts of B, however, is impaired, an
access which the cousin may have enjoyed until a judicial pro-
ceeding, in which the cousin was given neither notice nor an
opportunity to be heard, eliminated it. Thus, even the bar on
modification seems to present a substantial question of due
process if applied to a person denied notice of the prior pro-
ceeding. Section 1738A should probably be interpreted as not
even presenting this constitutional question, but as creating
duties applicable only against persons given the notice and op-
portunity to be heard required by subsection (e).
The result of any failure to accord the rights to notification
and a hearing to a contestant limits the operation of section
1738A and the effectiveness with which its purposes are served.
If the cousin does sue in A, then two proceedings have been
used to accomplish what could have been done in one if A had
initially given the cousin notice and an opportunity to be heard.
If the cousin is content not to sue and to remain in B with the
child, then the father and his state must depend for vindication
of their interests not upon the federal requirements of enforce-
875. Priscilla S. v. Albert B., 102 Misc. 2d 650, 424 N.Y.S.2d 613, 618 (Fain. Ct.
1980).
876. 1 A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 237, at 122.
877. Cf In re Rebecca B., 68 Cal. App. 3d 193, 199-200, 137 Cal. Rptr. 100, 104
(Ct. App. 1977) (unmarried natural father entitled to notice and opportunity to
be heard).
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ment and nonmodification but, as before passage of the Wallop
Act, primarily on the law and courts of B. These consequences
can, of course, simply occur by failure to comply with the statu-
tory requirement of notice, for example, to a parent. The likeli-
hood of these consequences occurring with respect to remote
relatives and other persons having standing in some states but
not in others will be reduced, however, if the courts interpret
subsection (e) to require the provision of notice to such per-
sons even by states in which they lack standing.
The unadorned word "claims" in subsection (e)'s require-
ment of notice provides no indication regarding the propriety of
this interpretation. Courts should interpret claims to exclude
assertions lacking any legal foundation. 78 The subsequent is-
sue is whether the term can be further interpreted as including,
for instance, claims cognizable under the law of any state that
under the circumstances could foreseeably become a forum for
litigation concerning -the child. Such an interpretation would,
in a sense, serve the Act's general purposes by requiring a pro-
cedural step that may be essential to application of the Act in
certain cases. The purposes of the Act, however, given the re-
straint exercised by Congress in selecting the duties and crite-
ria with which it would promote those purposes, suggest the
opposite and more defensible interpretation. No provision of
section 1738A purports to require a state to give its proceedings
broader interstate effect than the law and the policies of the
state indicate. Though subsection (g) requires deference to a
prior, pending proceeding, the court in which it is pending can
relinquish its jurisdiction to the state where proceedings were
later commenced. The Act similarly requires deference to the
jurisdiction of a state that has made a decree, but never longer
than the state claims jurisdiction. It would be inconsistent with
the pattern of section 1738A to construe subsection (e) as re-
quiring a state to take steps to bind a person by its proceedings
although no state law or policy required it to do so. In this re-
spect the courts should treat subsection (e) as consistent with.
the remainder of the statute. Congress designed the require-
ment of notice and opportunity to be heard only to assure that
those purportedly bound by a proceeding are notified of it, and
to condition application of the statutory duties to the proceed-
ing, just as those duties are only designed to resolve actual con-
flicts. The notice requirement is no more intended to force a
878. See supra text accompanying notes 325-30.
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broad assertion of state power than the statutory duties are
designed to precipitate conflicts.
B. NEEDED INTERPRETATIONS AND AmENDMENTS
Adding this new federal statute to the previous mixture of
state and federal law thus seems appropriate. Nevertheless,
current law must receive certain interpretations and applica-
tions if it is to function as this Article maintains it should.
First, it is important that the due process limitations on ter-
ritorial jurisdiction in custody cases be defined in a manner
that appropriately accommodates the interests of defendants as
well as other individual and institutional interests. 879 So long
as a requirement of personal jurisdiction over defendants ap-
pears to be required in some cases, either by due process or as
a condition of full faith and credit,880 it is also desirable that
state law permit joining in a single proceeding each contestant
with whom the state has the constitutionally necessary rela-
tionship. If the U.C.C.J.A. is not a satisfactory equivalent to a
long-arm statute,8 81 many states will have to enact legislation
for this purpose.882
Second, Supreme Court resolution of the question of the
full faith and credit clause and statute's application to custody
proceedings is now necessary, appropriate, and more important
than ever.883 The Court should at least hold that it generally
requires preclusion of issues of fact.884
Third, the courts must faithfully interpret section 1738A ac-
cording toits language, its legislative history, and the spirit of
federalism that shaped it. The requirements it creates are few
and narrow. When applicable, however, they are inflexible pre-
cisely because they only result in allocations of authority
among states. Parties must not make pleas for the exercise of
discretion or the recognition of exceptions by inviting a state to
violate its duty of deference to a prior proceeding or decree;
when parties offer such invitations, courts must refuse them.
Under the Act, the parties must instead address those pleas to
the prior court, so that there can be judicial discretion without
interstate conflict.
879. See supra text accompanying notes 141-284.
880. See supra text accompanying notes 141-52.
881. See supra text accompanying notes 161-63.
882. See supra text accompanying notes 154-56.
883. See supra text accompanying notes 601-02.
884. See supra text accompanying notes 603-18.
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The only context in which reliance upon the prior court
may present a serious problem is that of an emergency con-
cerning a child present in a state other than the one to which
the Act requires deference. Section 1738A makes no exception
for emergency cases, for substantial reasons. There is a risk
that litigants, and even some courts, would abuse a statutory
provision exempting emergencies from the federal duties. "The
'emergency' may be real or contrived; the facts may be bitterly
disputed; the decision may be based upon affidavits or papers
of a most self-serving kind; the emergency exception is a 'natu-
ral' for lawyers to claim and for judges to find for other rea-
sons.18 8 5 Nevertheless, there will be instances of real
emergency in which the court must take prompt, temporary ac-
tion to remove an endangered child from the custody of one to
whom a court had initially given custody or to place an aban-
doned child in another's custody.
The solution is not to read an exception into section 1738A
as some courts have done to the U.C.C.J.A.886 Such a judicially
created exception is necessarily general and flexible, and there-
fore especially susceptible to abuse.8 87 Instead, judges should
endeavor to deal cooperatively with courts of other states in
emergency cases. The judge or another officer of the state
where the child is present should telephone the judge of the
prior state to seek a temporary order for change of custody, or
perhaps a temporary declination to exercise jurisdiction.8 8
This approach would permit protection of the child while fur-
ther proceedings occur in the prior state or, if the prior state's
judge agrees, in the state where the emergency arose. If this
proposed cooperation is inadequate in practice, then amend-
ment of section 1738A will be necessary. Any such amendment
will necessarily define in general terms the circumstances in
885. Foster & Freed, supra note 297, at 2, coL 3.
886. See, e.g., Breneman v. Breneman, 92 Mich. App. 336, 342, 284 N.W.2d 804,
807 (Ct. App. 1979); . CROUCH, supra note 70, at 34-36; Bodenheimer, supra
note 361, at 225-26.
887. See, e.g., Mondy v. Mondy, 395 So. 2d 193, 196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
888. It is not clear that under the Wallop Act or the U.C.C.J.A. a court with
continuing jurisdiction can, by declining only for a stated period of time to ex-
ercise jurisdiction, permit another state temporarily to deny enforcement to or
to modify a prior decree, and yet retain control over the decision for later pro-
ceedings concerning a permanent decree. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(a), (b) (3),
(b) (5), (c), (f) (2), (g) (West Supp. 1980); U.C.C.J-.A §§ 3, 6(a), 13, 14(a) (1968).
An interpretation of section 1738A as giving the intended effects to a limited
declination of jurisdiction would not be clearly inconsistent with the language,
legislative history, or general scheme of section 1738A, and would offer a usu-
ally workable solution to the problem of emergencies.
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which it is applicable. It should, however, specifically make re-
lief from the statutory duties temporary, and allow the state
that is protected by the Act's basic duties to determine whether
a permanent shift of jurisdiction will occur.
Finally, of course, it is desirable that all the states enact
the U.C.C.J.A., and that courts interpreting and applying the
uniform statute exercise self-restraint and seek to achieve uni-
formity. With all the federal statutory and constitutional law
on the subject of interstate child custody litigation, it still re-
mains, and should remain, primarily a matter of state law. If
the issues of due process and full faith and credit are resolved
as this Article urges and if the courts properly interpret section
1738A, federal law will have done about all it should in an area
as clearly a function of the states as child custody litigation.
Federal law will provide substantial assurance that a state lack-
ing a minimal connection with a custody case cannot bind other
states by deciding it, and at the same time will present sub-
stantial barriers to different states making conflicting decisions
and orders. Within those limits, however, it is state law and
discretion that will determine the wisdom with which the judi-
ciary employs its power. The success of the law in regulating
custody jurisdiction and the effects of decrees will continue to
depend mainly on the wisdom with which judges interpret and
apply state law.
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